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ARTICLE
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WAGNER ACT:
POWER, SYMBOL, AND WORKPLACE COOPERATION
Mark Barenberg*
To shed light on the legal debate over new forms of workplace collaboration, this Article reexamines the origins of the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935. ProfessorBarenberg concludes that the Wagner Act scheme was
profoundly cooperationist, not adversarialas is conventionally assumed. Revisionist historiographyshows that, contrary to the claims of public choice
theorists, Senator Wagner's network of political entrepreneurs was the decisive force in the conception and enactment of the new labor policy, amidst
interest group paralysis and popular unrest. Drawing on original archival
materials and oral histories, ProfessorBarenbergreconstructs the progressive
ideology of Wagner and his circle. That elite network understood, consonant
with recent critical theories, that legal symbols could shape worker consciousness. Their goal, however, was not to pacify but rather to galvanize
workers to seek the collective empowerment that alone could secure democratic consent and cooperation in both the enterprise and in the polity in
the era of mass production. Wagner rejected the leading interwar model of
workplace cooperation - company unionism - because he believed it could
not combine high-trust cooperation with protection of workers against instrumental and symbolic "domination" by employers. Unlike recent legaleconomic theorists who presume a world of self-interested, rational behavior,
Wagner understood that workplace hierarchiesgenerate cultural contests over
trust and resentment. Wagner's model is more akin to current theories that
maintain that human interests and perceptions - including dispositions
toward trusting cooperation - are constituted intersubjectively and selfreflexively.
I. INTRODUCTION

T

HIS Article reexamines the political and intellectual origins of the
Wagner Act in order to reconstruct the vision of political economy,

ideology, and law that impelled Robert Wagner's crusade to build a
cooperative social democracy. It draws on historical evidence to illuminate two issues currently at the center of labor law: the substantive controversy over the appropriate legal policy toward innovations
in workplace cooperation, and the methodological contest between

* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. For their help and encouragement, I
thank Jim Atleson, Bernie Black, Vince Blasi, Richard Briffault, Ken Casebeer, Jack Coffee,
Daniel Ernst, Martha Fineman, Terry Fisher, Steve Fraser, Josh Freeman, Ron Gilson, Vic
Goldberg, Jeff Gordon, Milton Handler, Alan Hyde, Jim Liebman, Lance Liebman, Jerry
Lynch, David Millon, Eben Moglen, Subha Narasimhan, Kellis Parker, Jim Pope, Simon
Rifkind, Mark Roe, Chuck Sabel, Bill Simon, Peter Strauss, Kendall Thomas, and Michael
Wachter. I am also grateful for financial support provided by Columbia Law School Alumnae/i.
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self-interested rationalism and symbolic constructionism for understanding labor relations and law. With varying degrees of explicitness,
Robert Wagner's progressivism addressed both problems, and his "solutions" to them were tightly intertwined. He presaged, to a surprising
degree, the more self-consciously theoretical views of several present
approaches to labor relations specifically and to social conflict and
coordination generally. These approaches hold that economic and
political actors' desires, interests, perceptions, and identities are
shaped endogenously and self-reflexively in the practices, discourses,
and power relations of legal, political, and economic institutions.' In
this light, this Article portrays Wagner as an exemplar of those "practitioners" of institutional ordering whose "programs often profoundly
shape our [theoretical] reflections on problems of coordination in unsuspected ways. "2
The last decade brought with it a profusion of new and potentially
contradictory analyses of the origins, impact, and desirable future of
American labor law. These analyses can be roughly arrayed into two
methodological categories - call them self-interested rationalism and
symbolic-constructionism - which loosely correspond to the respective
I These approaches contrast with traditional economic theory, which takes actors' subjective
preferences, interests, and perceived choice constraints as "exogenous" variables, and explains
or predicts actors' behavior on the assumption that they act rationally to satisfy those preferences
and interests within the choice set or environmental constraints they face. See, e.g., HAL R.
VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 115-18 (2d ed. 1984); George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker,
De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 76, passim (1977); see also AMARTYA
SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS io-i8 (1987) (summarizing and criticizing the traditional
theory); Michael S. McPherson, Want Formation, Morality, and Some "Interpretive"Aspects of
Economic Inquiry, in SOCIAL SCIENCE AS MORAL INQUIRY 96, 98-I1o (Norma Haan, Robert
N. Bellah, Paul Rabinow & William M. Sullivan eds., r983) (same). Often, economists assume
that an economic or political actor's goals are narrowly self-interested if not pecuniary, are
"reduc[ible] into a homogeneous descriptive magnitude," and generate complete and consistent
value-orderings of the options faced by the actor. See SEN, supra, at 61; see also infra pp.
1431, 1439-40.

Actors' subjective preferences, interests, and perceptions are "endogenous" if they are dependent variables of a particular theory or are the outcome of a causal relation. They are endogenous to institutional practices, discourses, or power relations if any of the latter are arguments
or independent variables in the theory or causal relation. They are "self-reflexive" if actors,
either individually or intersubjectively, evaluate and transform some of their own preferences
and perceptions based on their other preferences and perceptions. See infra pp. 1431-34, 143542.

2 Charles F. Sabel, ConstitutionalOrdering in HistoricalContext, in GAMES IN HIERARCHIES
AND NETWORKS (Fritz W. Scharpf ed., forthcoming) (manuscript at 37, on file at the Harvard
Law School Library). Wagner's blend of academic, practical, and popular political economy is
exemplary of the kind of policy-driven economic knowledge frequently generated by pivotally
placed state actors. See Mary Turner & Barry Supple, Ideas, Institutions, and State in the
United States and Britain, in THE STATE AND ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE 3, 12-26 (Mary Turner
& Barry Supple eds., I9go). In fact, Wagner and his circle were pioneers of such state-centered
economic creativity. Present at the birth of the new macro-regulatory state, they elaborated
self-consciously on particular social scientific programs of the day. See infra Part II.
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insurgencies of economic analysis and critical theory in legal scholarship. Legal economists located both the political origins of the New
Deal labor policy and its economic impact in the self-interested, instrumental behavior of private and public individuals and organizations. For these and other public choice theorists, the Wagner Act 3
was the product of the rent-seeking interests of organized labor; the
Act, indeed, is the very paradigm of the private-regarding, interestgroup statute, and its proper interpretation must start with acknowledgement of this essential fact. 4 In the analysis of legal economists,
the Act either distorts efficiency by encouraging cartelization in the
labor market 5 or promotes efficiency by facilitating a workplace governance mechanism designed to protect against opportunistic subversion of internal labor markets and relational contracts. 6 In either
event, the Act's effect is explained by the self-interested, instrumental
rationality of workers, unions, and firms.
Critical theorists underscore instead the symbolic and consciousness-shaping dimension of both the Act's origins and its impact. For
some critical theorists, major initiatives in labor legislation such as
the Wagner Act are symbolic interventions designed to defuse the
social disruption of subordinate groups. 7 For others, the subsequent
judicial and administrative interpretation, and actual impact, of such
legislation is explained in significant part by the ideological maps
8
encoded in legal discourse.
3 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ I51-69 (1988) [hereinafter NLRA].
4 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for LaborRelations: A Critique of the New
Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1435, 1441 (1983); Richard A. Posner, Some
Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 988, passim (1984) [hereinafter Posner, Some
Economics]; Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 273 (1982) [hereinafter Posner, Reading of Statutes].
0OO4S See, e.g., Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38 STAN. L. REv. 991,
22 (1986); Epstein, supra note 4, at 1386-14o8; Posner, Some Economics, supra note 4, at 99i.
6 See, e.g., DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: PROCESS AND
POLICY 31-34 (3d ed. 1992); Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics
of Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting,
Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1349, 1355-77, 1386, 1415 (1988). The
"internal labor market" is the cluster of contractual rules that specify job classifications and
seniority ladders, and the wages, benefits, and rights attached to such classifications and ladders.
For a more detailed discussion, see below at pp. 1462-65.
7 See Alan Hyde, A Theory of Labor Legislation, 38 BUFF. L. REv. 383, 385-92 (1990).
8
See, e.g., JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW
passim (1983); Karl E. Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in THE POLITICS OF
LAWv: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 61, 81 (David Kairys ed., i99o) ("[T]he richly textured doctrine
of labor law that envelops and pervades the daily lives of all union officials and activists induces
us to think about workplace problems in ways that defeat the effort to create industrial freedom."); Katherine V.W. Stone, The Post-War Paradigmin American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J.
1509, I515-16 (1981) [hereinafter Stone, Post-War Paradigm]. Some critical scholarship also
deploys instrumental analysis of the impact of labor law. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Workplace
Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. I,
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This ferment in theoretical approaches to labor law coincided with
a period of flux in the actual practice of labor relations, which wakened some dormant labor law doctrines and statutory provisions.
Experiments in "cooperative" workplace arrangements began in the
1970s with relatively superficial innovations such as quality circles and
joint labor-management committees, 9 and deepened in the ig8os and
199os with the spread of full-blown cooperationist models of labormanagement relations. 10 In the ideal implementation of these models,
task conception and execution, which had been strictly separated
between management and labor in the classic Taylorist workplace, 11
are integrated in learning-intensive labor processes that depend upon
continuous problem-solving by workers. Flexible, multiple-task workteam processes replace narrowly decomposed tasks and rigid job clas-

24-35 (i988); Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further "Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws," 199o Wisc. L. REV. 1, 11-17; Katherine V.W. Stone, Labor
and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 73, 152-61 (I988) [hereinafter Stone, Labor and Corporate Structure]. Critiques of the
thesis of the ideological or legitimating impact of law from within and outside of critical
scholarship include Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983
Wisc. L. REV. 379, 400-17; Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Great Image of Authority, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 349, 379-87 (1984); David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and
Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575, 61o-i5 (1984). Nuanced defenses and reformulations of
the thesis are presented in MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 242-95
(1987); J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint,43 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1137-48 (I991); and Robert
W. Gordon, CriticalLegal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 93-95 (1984).
9 "Quality circle" refers to a variety of workplace entities in which small groups of rank and
file workers meet briefly on a regular basis (perhaps one hour per week), typically in the presence
of management representatives, to discuss generally minor workplace grievances and production
problems. See, e.g., ROBERT COLE, STRATEGIES FOR LEARNING: SMALL-GROUP ACTIVITIES
IN AMERICAN, JAPANESE, AND SWEDISH INDUSTRY 19-33, 1I-1-25 (1991); Edward E. Lawler
III & Susan A. Mohrman, Quality Circles After the Fad, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1985,
at 65, 65-71. "Joint labor-management committee" refers more broadly to any entity in which
managerial and non-managerial employees participate, including committees on which employees
serve on an ad hoc and representative basis, rather than on a permanent and participatory
basis.
10 These models include flexible specialization, see, e.g., MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES
SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE 28-35 (1984); post-Fordism, see, e.g., Simon Clarke,
The Crisis of Fordism or the Crisis of Social Democracy, 83 TELOS 71, 74-90 (199o); sociotechnical systems, see, e.g., LARRY HIRSCHHORN, BEYOND MECHANIZATION: WORK AND TECHNOLOGY IN A POSTINDUSTRIAL AGE 113-69 (r984); the J-firm, see, e.g., MASAHIKO AOKI, INFORMATION, INCENTIVES, AND BARGAINING IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 7-43 (1988); and the team
organization, see, e.g., THOMAS A. KOCHAN, HARRY C. KATZ & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 46-61 (1986).

11"Taylorism" refers to the system of "scientific management" pioneered by industrial engineer
Frederick Winslow Taylor at the turn of the century. Its main elements include centralized
managerial planning and analysis of production phases; rigorous specification and hierarchical
monitoring of the time and motion of narrowly defined work tasks; and incentive payment
schemes to motivate workers to perform those tasks. See, e.g., DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE
FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR 214-44 (1987); DANIEL NELSON, FREDERICK W. TAYLOR AND
THE RISE OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 38-46 (598o).
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sifications and work rules. 12 Although corporate decisionmaking over
strategic matters remains centralized, production activity is decentralized and coordinated horizontally among work teams. 13 Both the
empirical question how widespread these innovations are in practice,
and the theoretical question whether they mark a distinct break with
traditional workplace hierarchies, are highly contested among political
economists. 14

The new workplace arrangements have likewise stirred debate over
the application of a number of labor law doctrines and over the
continued viability of the deeper, purportedly adversarial underpinnings of New Deal labor policy. A primary focus of these debates is
section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 15 which banned
the company unionism of the I93oS 16 in language spacious enough to

jeopardize most of today's experiments in labor-management collaboration. 17 The decline of company unions in the decade after section
12In 1984, an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) draft report
on labor management in the international automobile industry concluded that "[t]he strongest
general trend is the introduction of group work.... There is a trend away from 'man-machine
relations' towards 'team technological system relations.'" OECD, THE DEVELOPMENT AND
UTILISATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES IN THE CONTEXT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND
INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING 39 (1984).
13The most thoroughgoing of the new organizational forms, exemplified by the Shell chemical
plant in Sarnia, Canada, and the joint General Motors-United Auto Workers Saturn plant in
Tennessee, are centered around self-managing work teams - formal groups of workers to whom

the organization delegates authority for large chunks of the operational and administrative
decision-making that is traditionally vested in management. See BARRY BLUESTONE & IRVING
BLUESTONE, NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE: A LABOR PERSPECTIVE ON AMERICAN BUSINESS 191200 (1992) (discussing the Saturn plant); THOMAS D. RANKIN, NEW FORMS OF WORK ORGANIZATION 60-75 (i99o) (describing Shell Sarnia experiment).

14Summaries and assessments of the voluminous literature are presented in Richard Hyman,
Flexible Specialization: Miracle or Myth?, in NEw TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
48, 48-59 (Richard Hyman & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1988); and Stephen Wood, The Transformation of Work?, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK? SKILL, FLEXIBILITY AND THE LABOUR
PROCESS I, 4-28 (Stephen Wood ed., 1989).
1529 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
16The typical company union of the 192os and i93os -

"works council" or "employee

representation plan," as management called it - was established and funded by management
and was limited to the employees of a single company. Employees periodically elected representatives from the ranks of the workforce, who generally met with managerial representatives
in monthly conferences to discuss workers' grievances, shopfloor operational problems, and, less
frequently, wages and benefits. Final authority over all decisions, including grievances, remained
with management. Management consent was required for amendment of the constitution or bylaws of the organization. No strike funds were provided. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 634, CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPANY UNIONS 32-77 (1937).
17 The Taft-Harfley Amendments of 1947 did not change the language of § 8(a)(2), but did

alter the provision's section numbers in the Wagner Act. For simplicity, this Article refers to
the pre-1947 provision as § 8(a)(2). Section 8(a)(2) provides in part that it is illegal for an
employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization
or contribute financial or other support to it." NLRA, supra note 3, § i58(a)(2). Section 2(5)
defines "labor organization" as "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
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8(a)(2) was enacted may obscure, from today's vantage point, the
provision's critical effect on American workplace governance and the
labor movement since the I930s. The role of the company union was,
in fact, the most important substantive issue in the political fight over

the drafting and passage of the Wagner Act.' 8 At the time of its
enactment, as many as three million workers were organized in company unions, compared to four-and-a-half million members of autonomous unions; and the former were growing faster than the latter. 19

The NLRA's most basic impact was to encourage outside unionization
while erasing the inside union option on which the more progressive
managers of the interwar years had pinned their hopes for a stable
and effective mode of workplace governance. Section 8(a)(2) helped
ensure that American labor relations would not follow the path of
enterprise unionism and labor-management collaboration that, for example, the Japanese tread in postwar years. 20 It also discouraged
experiments in the kinds of enterprise-based works councils that have
2
been central to German and other European industrial relations. 1
The recent jurisprudential debates over the ban on collaborative
workplace entities have turned on three conceptual axes: adversarialism versus cooperationism, paternalism versus free choice, and labor
empowerment versus managerial flexibility. These debates cut across
the broader methodological encounter between economic and critical

representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes,
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." Id. § I52(5). The National
Labor Relations Board and the Supreme Court have decided that the labor organization need
not "bargain," but need only interact with or make recommendations to management in order
to satisfy the "dealing" element of § 2(5), and that any ongoing employee committee or entity is
an "organization." See NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 212-13, 218 (1959). Section
8(a)(2) is therefore implicated in the case of quality circles, joint labor-management committees,
and self-managing work teams, as the Board and the circuit courts have frequently recognized
- most recently in the Electromation case. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. x63 at
4-9 (Dec. 16, 1992); infra notes 22, 24.
IsSee infra pp. 1402-03, 1442-6I. The first of many drafts of the bill in Wagner's Senate
office contained only a single substantive provision: a ban on company unions. See Kenneth
Casebeer, Drafting Wagner's Act: Leon Keyserling and the Precommittee Drafts of the Labor
Disputes Act and the National Labor Relations Act, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 73, 102 (1989)
(reprinting the first draft). Milton Handler, General Counsel to the National Labor Board of
1933-34, who drafted the decisional law that was codified in the unfair labor practice provisions
of the NLRA, said that the salient substantive problem was "[t]he fight . . . between company
unions and outside unions." Milton Handler Oral History 38 (i974) [hereinafter Handler Oral
History] (transcript available in Oral History Research Office, Columbia University).
19See SANFORD M. JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY 224, 227 (1985).
20 See, e.g., AOKI, supra note io,at 185-9, (1988); KAzuO KoiKE, UNDERSTANDING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN MODERN JAPAN 247-59 (1988).
21 See ERNEST R. BURTON, EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION 42-43 (1926); Clyde IV. Summers,

Worker Participationin the U.S. and West Germany: A Comparative Study From an American
Perspective, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 373-77 (i98o).
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theory mentioned above. In one view - to which the National Labor
Relations Board has adhered, at least nominally2 2 - the new collaborative schemes undermine the adversarial, worker-empowering model
of collective bargaining that New Deal labor policy purportedly intended. 23 In another - reflected in recent circuit court decisions 24 legal curtailment of these workplace innovations is a paternalistic
affront to the Wagner Act's purpose of protecting workers' free choice
over modes of dealing with management, and an anachronistic obstacle to efficient labor-management relations. 25 A third view proposes
that adversarial collective bargaining, labor-management cooperation,
and free worker choice are compatible, at least within an appropriately
reformed legal regime. 2 6 In fact, the progressive political entrepre-

22 In a significant ruling, the NLRB recently reaffirmed an objective approach to the application of § 8(a)(2). See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. x63 at 7 (Dec. 16, 1992) (finding
§ 8(a)(2) violation where joint labor-management committee, established and structured by
management, discussed conditions of employment). That is, regardless of workers' subjective
satisfaction or dissatisfaction, it is illegal for management to establish, dominate or support
labor organizations, understood to include at least representative, ongoing employee entities.
(By contrast, the circuit courts have looked to the apparent subjective preferences of the
workforce. See infra note 24). However, the Electromation Board also reaffirmed earlier
decisions that had stretched the objective approach to accommodate the conventional wisdom
that the new cooperative schemes are generally benign. See Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. No.
163 at 6 (citing General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977) (characterizing participatory
work teams without representative team leaders as work crews performing managerial functions
and therefore not "labor organizations" under § 2(5)); Mercy-Memorial Hospital Corp., 231
N.L.R.B. 1108, 1109 (1977) (finding that a management-created, joint labor-management committee did not "deal[]" with management under § 2(5) because the committee had final authority
to resolve employee grievances)). The Board's reaffirmation of General Foods leaves open
whether self-managing teams with elected or rotating team leaders will be deemed "labor
organizations."
23 See, e.g., Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation:The Uncertain Significance
of Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REv. 499, 515-I6 (1986); Wilson McLeod, Labor-Management
Cooperation:Competing Visions andLabor's Challenge, 12 INDUS. REL. L.J. 233, 276-80 (i99o);
Note, Collective Bargaining as an Industrial System: An Argument Against JudicialRevision
of Section 8(a)(2) of the National LaborRelations Act, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1678-80 (1983).
24 Several circuit courts, candidly rejecting the "adversarial" model of labor relations, have
adopted a subjective approach to § 8(a)(2). They have upheld a variety of managementsupported participatory or representative structures on the ground, inter alia, that there was no
apparent worker dissatisfaction with the entities. See, e.g., NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott
& Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 295 (6th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 6oi F.2d 1208,
1213-14 (ist Cir. I979); Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1974);
NLRB v. Newman-Green, Inc., 401 F.2d i, 4 (7 th Cir. 1968).
2S See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 4, at 1391-92; Charles C. Jackson, An Alternative to
Unionization and the Wholly Unorganized Shop: A Legal Basis for SanctioningJoint EmployerEmployee Committees and Increasing Employee Free Choice, 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 8o9, 845
(1977); Theodore St. Antoine, The Legal and Economic Implications of Union-Management
Cooperation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE N.Y.U. 41ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF LABOR 8-i
(Bruno Stein ed., 1988).
26 See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 225-306 (I990) (arguing that
cooperative schemes should be legalized in non-union workplaces, so long as concurrent legal
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neurs who were most decisive in crafting the model of collective
bargaining embodied in the Act were preoccupied with these conceptual relations. That reform elite sought ways to achieve the cooperation and integration of labor and management in large-scale enterprises (and in a polity built on such enterprises) without sacrificing
labor to disempowerment and depersonalization.
Wagner's view, it is true, was grounded in the exigent social
projects of the mid-193os: the drive for recovery from the Great
Depression and the effort to reconstitute a democratic, capitalist order
during the class-fractured emergence of a mass consumption economy.
Current approaches to labor-management cooperation arise, by contrast, in a context of heightened international competition and capital
mobility, chronic sluggishness in productivity growth, and the rollback
of organized labor. Nonetheless, it is worth mapping the salient conceptual and structural assumptions of labor policy of an earlier period
of ferment for at least two reasons. First, current policy arguments
and legislative interpretations often make historical appeals that are
unfaithful to Wagner's fully elaborated "model" of workplace relations.
These appeals read back into that model either the adversarial mode
of industrial pluralism that hardened during and after World War II
or the neoclassical or transaction-cost economic categories of another
intellectual universe. 27 Second, a careful theoretical specification of

reforms protect workers' choice to unionize); cf. Michael C. Harper, Reconciling Collective
Bargaining With Employee Supervision of Management, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 38-75 (1988)
(arguing that employee representation on board of directors is compatible with collective bargaining, if proper constraints on conflicts of interests are read into § 8(a)(2)); Karl E. Klare, The
Labor-Management CooperationDebate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 39, 6o-8I (1988) (endorsing cooperative arrangements in unionized workplaces).
27 This Article assumes that the understanding of a statute articulated by those most responsible for its framing and enactment - particularly its key legislative proponents and the politicalintellectual movements backing them - carries some weight in any appealing interpretive theory,
including the pragmatist and radical democratic theories that I find most satisfying. See, e.g.,
James G. Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American
Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 287, 358-64 (iggo); Margaret S. Radin & Frank
Michelman, Pragmatistand PoststructuralistCriticalLegal Practice, X39 U. PA. L. REv. 1oi9,
1028-43 (iggi). In the case of the Wagner Act, there is also good reason to believe that
supporters' elaborate public justifications for the Act coincided with their deeply held, principled
beliefs. See infra pp. 1412-27, notes 146, 245. While the psychoanalytic question of their
"actual" conscious or unconscious motives for supporting the Act is inevitably murky, there are
strong normative grounds, rooted in conceptions of deliberative democracy, for basing statutory
interpretations on legislators' articulated public-regarding justifications. See, e.g., William N.
Eskridge & Phillip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 321, 356-58 (I99O); Pope, supra, at 358-64.
I focus on reconstructing the legal-economic world-view which framed the Act's meaning in
the minds of the relevant progressive legislators and their extra-governmental political allies. I
do not mean to deny, however, that either the Act's meaning to other propulsive political actors
or the causal role of those actors - especially the participants and leaders in the mass labor
and political movements of the 1930s - may be relevant to statutory interpretation. Cf. Karl
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Wagner's model sheds light on current economic and sociological theories of labor-management cooperation. Some of the most compelling
(but more or less maverick) current approaches rest on frameworks
similar to Wagner's progressive political economy and are, in fact,
usefully supplemented by it.
This Article is therefore archeological and reconstructive. It seeks
to uncover the vision of labor-management cooperation of those most
responsible for articulating and enacting New Deal labor policy, and
to recast that vision in the more explicitly theoretical terms of current
economic sociology and anthropology. 28 Part II links original research
on Wagner's circle of political associates with revisionist accounts of
interwar political history. It disputes the public-choice view that the
political elite responsible for the Wagner Act "sold" policy to the
intentional, rent-seeking interests of organized labor or employer associations. Instead, the convergence of two key elements was decisive
in the immediate origins of the Wagner Act. The opportunity for
such a dramatic legislative initiative was generated by "mass politics"
in the form of popular electoral realignment, populist political orga-

nization, and mass labor unrest (often outside the compass of organized interest groups and propelled by radical activists and managerial

belligerants with no intention of securing legislative reform similar to
the Wagner Act). That opportunity was seized by loosely interconnected networks of political-technocratic entrepreneurs driven by progressive ideological commitment and ambition. Fortuitously located
at the central nodal point was Robert Wagner, the progressive "pow29
erhouse" of the New Deal legislative program.
E. Klare, TraditionalLabor Law Scholarship and the Crisis of Collective BargainingLaw: A
Reply to Professor Finkin, 44 MD. L. REV. 731, 754-59 (1985) (claiming that a statute may
have alternative meanings within perceptual frames of reference other than that of dominant
interpretive theory); Pope, supra, at 360 (arguing that statutes resulting from popular mobilization, such as the Wagner Act, should be given broad, public-regarding interpretation). To
the contrary, one historical theme of this Article is the mutual interaction between and partial
convergence of reform elites' and workers' understandings of workplace entitlements in the
1930s.
28 This Article therefore lays the broad historical and theoretical foundation for a companion

Article, in which I apply, elaborate, and empirically assess the (recast) Wagner model in the
context of various specific types of labor-management collaboration. The companion Article
generates a revised § 8(a)(2) jurisprudence designed to encourage the most democratic, empowering, and efficient forms of flexible, team-based organizations. See Mark Barenberg, Hegemony
and Democracy in the Law of Workplace Cooperation:From Company Unions to Self-Managing
Teams (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
29Handler Oral History, supra note 18, at 24. The ideological horizons of Wagner and his
circle are unimaginable outside the context of the major social and cultural forces of the 1930s;
however, their legislative policy was not the sum of vectors of instrumental interest-group
pressures and state actors' self-seeking motives. That is, my critique of interest-group instrumentalism does not rule out the Gramscian view that the ideology of political elites (and other
social actors) was heavily conditioned by the alignment of social forces. See, e.g., JOSEPH V.
FEMIA, GP MscI's POLITICAL THOUGHT 23-50 (1987); infra note 277.
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Part Im of this Article then turns to the political ideology and
debates of Robert Wagner and the progressive reform currents in
which he was immersed. My reconstruction of Wagner's progressivism
disputes the conventional assumption that New Deal labor policy
rested on an "adversarial" view of labor-management relations. Part
I shows that the NLRA was aimed - at least in the minds of the
political entrepreneurs who conceived and fought for it - at achieving
the legally engineered transformation of large-scale enterprises from
low-trust, adversarial organizations into high-trust, cooperative organizations. Wagner's quasi-utopian mission was to "build[] . . . a cooperative order" designed to reintegrate a class-riven society and to
replace or at least legitimate asymmetric power relations. 30 Democratic consent to enterprise and state authority would flow from a
regime of egalitarian communication and reason, presided over by the
newly fortified administrative state of which Wagner was the principal
31
legislative architect.
Part IV discusses the implications of the political origins and ideological substance of the Wagner Act for the current methodological
and substantive debates mentioned above. Addressing three central
theoretical questions, 32 Part IV traces a common theme: instrumental
understanding of the behavior of individuals and institutions is enriched by an analysis of the ways that interests, norms, and perceptions are shaped endogenously in institutional practices and discourse.

30 Robert Wagner, Industry and Labor, Address on NBC Radio 6 (Oct. 18, 1933) (transcript
available in The Robert Wagner Papers, Georgetown University [hereinafter The Wagner Papers], at 6oo SF 103, Folder 28).
31 Placing the Act within Wagner's broader progressive vision also brings some clarification
to the question, long vexing to labor law adjudicators and commentators, of the relationships
and priorities among the Act's multiple purposes. In Wagner's vision, achieving workers'
democratic consent and substantive freedom through collective empowerment took absolute
precedence over the other important goals of macroeconomic stabilization and growth, but see
Kenneth H. Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling on Drafting the
Wagner Act, 42 U. MAmI L. REV. 285, 295-96 (1987) (arguing that proto-Keynesian policy was
primary purpose of Act); industrial peace, but see CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND
THE UNIONS 318 (x985) (arguing that virtually all proponents of the Act saw the right of selforganization not as an end but only as a means to labor peace); and microeconomic productive
or allocative efficiency, but see Stewart J. Schwab, Collective Bargainingand the Coase Theorem,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 254-56 (2987) (equating Congress's assumed primary goal of industrial
peace with allocative efficiency). Wagner nonetheless expected that these secondary goals would
generally be served as byproducts of achieving his central objective. See infra Part III.
32 The three questions are (I) what do the political origins of the Wagner Act teach about
the role of legal symbolism and ideological contests in legislative action?; (2) how did Wagner,
a committed cooperationist, justify the legislative ban on the foremost managerial models of
labor-management collaboration of his day, although other leading progressives, such as Franklin
Roosevelt, endorsed such collaboration?; and (3) in Wagner's conception of workplace governance, what is meant by the concept of workplace "cooperation," and what institutional or
symbolic mechanisms account for the achievement or failure of cooperation?
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First, as to the puzzle of the political origins of the Wagner Act,
the historically contingent interpretive frameworks and subjective interests of key players 3 3 played crucial roles. At the same time, as
Wagner and his allies fully understood, 34 the potential symbolic impact
of legislative initiatives was a significant endogenous variable in the
political process. The intended impact of legislative symbolism, however, was not simply to defuse worker rebellion, but rather to galvanize and focus workers' discontent and sense of entitlement in ways
concordant with the political aims of the reforming elite.
Second, with respect to the currently salient question of the purpose of the ban on company unionism, the two leading contemporaneous justifications rested, in different ways, on the assumed social
plasticity of worker consciousness. Because, Wagner believed, legalpolitical symbolism would help guide workers' subjective preferences
toward the objective "substantive freedom" of full-fledged collective
bargaining, management could secure company unionism only by systematic coercion of workers' choice. 35 A secondary, potentially contradictory, 36 justification located the danger of company unionism not
in its tendency openly to coerce worker choice but rather in its illegitimate reconstruction of workers' perceptions of workplace reality
and of their own interests and desires. In Wagner's institutional ideal,
company-union-like collaborative structures such as works councils
and joint labor-management committees would emerge and operate
effectively and non-manipulatively only within the protective shell of
independent unionism.
Finally, regarding the theoretical dynamics of workplace cooperation, Wagner and his advisers understood the "labor question" in the
same way that contemporary economists model a bargaining game: a
central problem is to secure credible commitments to productive effort
by workers in exchange for commitments to job security and a fair
distributive share by management. In contrast to legal economists'
model of the internal labor market, however, Wagner's progressivist
model of workplace relations emphasized the group basis of worker
33They included, in particular, the voluntarist ideology of organized labor; the contested
programmatic ideas of elite political entrepreneurs; and the haphazard labor relations philosophies of managerial groups.
34 They had learned a striking lesson from the electrifying effect of § 7(a) of the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1933), on workers' consciousness and
behavior.
35 For Wagner, the structural constraints on collective empowerment under company unions
blocked workers' substantive freedom. Those constraints included the lack of strike funds, the
limits on trans-enterprise or multi-employer bargaining, and the various institutional modes by
which company unions suppressed or deflected workers' communication, solidaristic sentiments,
and autonomous interest-formation. See infra pp. 1449, 1456-59.
36 Potentially contradictory because, as discussed below at pp. 1458, 1482-84, an openly
coercive regime is unlikely to succeed at subtle ideological manipulation.

1302

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. io6:1379

norms and interests; privileged the distributional contest between labor
and management over efficiency maximization; and stressed that
norms of fairness, shared interests, and mutual trust could be nurtured
by institutional structures cleansed of excessive power disparities.
Wagner and his circle recognized that even if hierarchical organization
solves certain strategic problems, it also produces cultural and psychic
conflict over legitimacy, trust, and resistance - conflict that may
significantly influence institutional performance.
Wagner's progressivism and its recent variants thus teach that the
relation between power and trust should be a central focus in the
current debate over collaborationist labor relations. 3 7 The Conclusion
comments briefly on the theoretical ambiguities and historical legacy
of Wagner's political economy of labor relations.
II.

THE ORIGINS OF THE WAGNER ACT: THE ROLE OF INTEREST

GROUPS, MASS POLITICS, AND POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS

Some public-choice theorists have been tempted, from a historiographic distance, to deduce that the Wagner Act - including its ban
on company unions - was a classic case of legislation designed to
promote the rent-seeking interests of an effectively organized interest
group. They maintain that the New Deal served its key constituent,
organized labor, by encouraging outside unionism and banning the
leading rival, company unionism. 38 The historical evidence does not
support such an a priori plausible deduction. 3 9 Those accounts reveal
several crucial sources of slippage between organized interests and
legislative action: first, the ideological contingencies of organized labor,
shaped in part by the historical relation between trade unions and the
legal system (section II.A); second, the indirect influence on policymaking of macro-structural economic relations, as opposed to the
37 The doctrinal and policy implications are explored in Barenberg, supra note 28.

38 The Act "was procured . . . by the labor movement" acting as an "interest group,"
according to Richard Posner. Posner, Reading of Statutes, supra note 4, at 273. The charge
that the Act was nothing but "organized minorities" triumphing over "unorganized majorities"
was leveled many times by management representatives in the Congressional hearings. National
Labor Relations Board: Hearings on S. 1958 Before Senate Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 74 th
Cong., 1st Sess. 479, 5o9, 595-96, 681, 746, 820 (1935) (hereinafter Hearings on S. 1958],
reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 1865,
I895, i981-82, 2o67, 2132, 2206 (1949) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
39 The historical interpretation offered in Part H1draws on original research on Wagner and
his network of policy entrepreneurs, but builds on the powerful revisionist literature cited
throughout. That original research and revisionist literature, in turn, is at many points (with
key exceptions noted below) consistent with the classic narrative accounts of New Deal policy,
also cited throughout Part II. Part III offers an original reconstruction of the progressive ideology
embodied in the Wagner Act, consistent with Part H's interpretation of the Act's political origins.
Part IV assesses the theoretical significance of the political and intellectual histories presented
in Parts H and II.
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direct, intentional influence of interest-group deal-making (section
ll.B); third, the propulsive force of mass electoral politics, populist
and radical movements, and relatively disorganized popular unrest
(section II.C); fourth, the unpredictability of legislative consequences
- including the unanticipated effects of legislation on the preferences
and interests of workers - in a time of political desperation and
experimentation (section ll.D); fifth, the central role of political entrepreneurs, in the form of a rising political-intellectual elite impelled by
ideological convictions (section .E); and, finally, not only the institutional idiosyncracies and fluidity of the political game, but the ideological quirks and personal relations of the key players, especially
Robert Wagner and Franklin Roosevelt (section H.F).
A. Organized Labor: Historical Weakness,
Ideological Passivity
At the onset of the New Deal, contemporary observers accurately
characterized the American Federation of Labor as "ineffectual flabby, afflicted with the dull pains of moral and physical decline.
The big industrialists and conservative politicians are no longer worried by it." 40 AFL membership had tumbled from more than five
million in 1920 to 3.4 million at the peak of prosperity in 1929, and,
under the impact of the Depression, fell another half million by 1933.41
Organized labor had minimal influence on the Republican Party; neither was "its influence within the Democratic Party . . . substantial,

as many party factions mistrusted or even opposed the unions. '42 The
support of organized labor was irrelevant to FDR's election victory in
I932. 4 3

As of early 1935, according to historian Thomas Ferguson,

"Roosevelt had fairly consistently sided with business against [the
AFL], and the federation was increasingly divided and rapidly losing
control of its own membership. '44 Nor did unions unaffiliated with
40 Louis Adamic, The Collapse of OrganizedLabor, 164 HARPER'S MONTHLY MAG. 167, 171
(1932), quoted in IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY I
(ig5o); see also DAVID BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 45, 82 (1980) (arguing that

"organized labor was an arrested movement" with a "deep sense of impotence").
41 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 2. One-tenth of the nonagricultural labor force was
unionized as of 1933, a level that had not changed in 30 years. See BRODY, supra note 40, at
82.

42 David Plotke, The Wagner Act, Again: Politics and Labor, x935-37, 3 STUD. AM. POL.
DEV. 105, 140 (1989).
43 See STANLEY VITToz,

NEW

DEAL LABOR POLICY AND

THE AMERICAN

INDUSTRIAL

ECONOMY 78 (1987); Daniel Sipe, A Moment of the State: The Enactment of the National Labor
Relations Act, 1935, at iio (i98i) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania).
Several national union leaders, including John L. Lewis of the Mine Workers, supported the
Republican ticket. See id.
44 Thomas Ferguson, Industrial Conflict and the Coming of the New Deal: The Triumph of
Multinational Liberalism in America, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEw DEAL ORDER,
1930-1980, at 3, I9 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989).
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the AFL have the strength to achieve an interest-group power play
on the scale of the New Deal revolution in labor policy. 45
A deep-seated ideological unwillingness to embrace aggressive government intervention in labor relations debilitated organized labor as
much as its diminishing size and its failure to achieve prominence in
a partisan coalition. Captured in the concept of "labor's voluntarism,"
the AFL's ambivalence toward an active state was the fruit of decades
of governmental attacks on labor. The state's arsenal included judicial
exercise of equity powers, the expansive enforcement of antitrust leg-

islation, the nullification of protective labor legislation, and the relentless application of coercive police powers by all levels of government against labor's concerted activity. 4 6 As late as the spring of
1933, while Senator Wagner and others were drafting and debating
the national recovery legislation that would form the centerpiece of
early New Deal policy, AFL leaders remained "vehemently opposed"
to proposals from pro-labor progressives to establish administrative

boards empowered to police labor standards.4 7 Even when Wagner's
office drafted the landmark section 7(a) of the National Industrial

Recovery Act, enshrining collective organizing and bargaining rights
rather than administered labor standards, "the AFL was nowhere to
be seen" 48 and, in any event, "was in no condition in 1933 to have
staged such a coup. " 49 Nor was organized labor's role any more
dynamic when Wagner introduced his 1934 Labor Disputes bill. 50 The
4S While the leadership of the emerging industrial unions within and outside the AFL - the
Garment Workers, Clothing Workers, and Mine Workers - was more aggressive politically and
programmatically, their organizations were particularly hard hit by the economic trends of the
192os and again by the Depression. They were in no position to exert sufficient pressure to win
the Wagner Act. Indeed, the most politically potent unions, the Railroad Brotherhoods, opposed
the NLRA. See Sipe, supra note 43, at ii,
46

See generally WILLIAM E.

175.

FORBATH, LAxv AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 37-39, 59-66, io5-x8 (i99i); FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE
LABOR INJUNCTION 82-182 (1930); MONTGOMERY, supra note ii, at 271.

47 STEVEN S. FRASER, LABOR WILL RULE 285-86 (iggi). Even the AFL's nominal endorse-

ment of unemployment insurance at its November, 1932 convention required an agonizing effort
against the grain of its voluntarist traditions. See Kenneth Casebeer, The Workers' Unemployment Insurance Bill, in LABOR LAW IN AMERICA 231, 238-40 (Christopher Tomlins & Andrew
King eds., 1992).
48 FRASER, supra note 47, at 289. In the spring of 1933, the AFL focused its efforts on the

Thirty Hours Bill proposed by Senator Hugo Black. Wagner and his adviser, Sumner Slichter,
opposed the bill. They believed that such legislation would reduce mass purchasing power and
that "economic stability and not the AFL's interests was uppermost." TOILINS, supra note 31,
at 132; see also BERNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 30 (recounting same).
49 DONALD

R.

BRAND, CORPORATISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: A STUDY OF THE NATIONAL

RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 266 (1988). However, for a prerevisionist view attributing to the

AFL a more significant role in the origins of § 7(a), see BERNSTEIN, cited above in note 40, at

32, 3750 The crucial political elites in a position to transmit or broker interest-group pressure did

not believe that organized labor deployed substantial or decisive power. Brains Trusters Rexford
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following year, although his revised Labor Relations bill incorporated
changes that in crucial respects cut against the AFL's interests, 5 ' the
federation left the drafting entirely to Wagner's office. 5 2 This is not
to suggest that the AFL did not lend lobbying support to Wagner's
Tugwell, Frances Perkins, and Adolph Berle all recognized the relative political impotence of
organized labor:
New Dealers in general [did not] have much expectation in 1934 of creative contributions
from labor. In [Labor Secretary] Frances Perkins's experience, the unions never had any
ideas of their own; most labor and welfare legislation in her time had been brought about
by middle-class reformers in face of labor indifference. [Brains Trust economist Rexford]
Tugwell declared that labor 'seems always to be in opposition, to be resisting progress.
. . :In this they are perhaps worse than most other American groups.' A labor
renaissance, he added, appeared unlikely ....
ARTHUR IV. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 403 (1958). Berle believed
that "[tihe theory of the Recovery Administration offered to American labor a chance to pull
itself together and achieve a unified policy. This, so far as I am able to discover [as of I934],
American labor groups failed to do . . . . [W]e over-estimated the potential statesmanship of
American labor." Adolph A. Berle, Memorandum Report on the Underwriting Policy of the
NationalRecovery Administration, in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, i918-i97i, at 97, ioo (Beatrice
Bishop Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs eds., 1973).
Leon Keyserling, Wagner's sole legislative aide and the hub of his labor bill drafting team,
recalled that AFL representatives "at no time took the initiative" to seek the inclusion of specific
provisions in Wagner's labor bills, and asserted more broadly that "organized labor has never
been the originator or creator of any of the important progressive economic or social legislation
that has benefitted labor." Casebeer, supra note 31, at 329, 349 (quoting Keyserling). Howell
Harris confirms that, although the AFL supported Wagner's labor bills, it "played little part in
determining what they were, and scarcely understood their detailed implications." Howell
Harris, The Snares of Liberalism? Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Shaping of the Federal
Labour Relations Policy in the United States, ca. 1915-47, in SHOP FLOOR BARGAINING AND
THE STATE 148, x68 (Steven Tolliday & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 1985). Even Irving Bernstein's
early history, giving the most AFL-centered account of Wagner's legislation, says that direct
AFL pressure behind Wagner's 1934 bill "can be exaggerated" and was secondary to legislators'
motivation to address recovery-threatening labor unrest. BERNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 71-72.
He attributes congressional efforts to force consideration of the 1934 bill against FDR's wishes
not to the AFL, but to the initiative of progressive Senators concerned about labor unrest, see
id. at 79, and intimates that the AFL's abandonment of its voluntarist ideology came as a result
of the 1934 legislative battle. See id. at 83.
St The 1934 bill did not require majority rule. See S. REP. No. 1184, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
27-28, 40, reprinted in i LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1087, 1095. Wagner's 1935
bill dealt a serious blow to organized labor by barring minority unions. After the AFL unavailingly sought an amendment that would have allowed closed shop agreements with minority
unions, "the AFL's endorsement became increasingly strained." TOMLINS, supra note 31, at 139
n.I15. The 1935 bill also dropped labor's representation on the labor board. See SENATE
COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 74TH CONG., IST SESS., COMPARISON OF S. 2926 AND S. 1958,
at I (Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 132o. In
addition, both the 1934 and 1935 bills included other elements that significantly departed from

the AFL agenda, including governmental determination of bargaining units (and therefore union
jurisdictional lines) and public, rather than private (i.e. union), enforcement of employee rights.
See TOMLINS, supra note 31, at 132-40.
52 See Casebeer, supra note 31, at 323, 349. The leading contemporary historian of New
Deal labor politics, Steven Fraser, declares bluntly that the Act would have been enacted even
without the interest-group support of the AFL. Interview with Steven Fraser in New York,
N.Y. (Feb. 7, 1992) (on file at the Harvard Law School Library).
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initiatives or seek advance consultation about the bills' substantive
provisions. 5 3 But the rent-seeking interests of organized labor clearly
were not the driving force behind the initiation, specific content, or
passage of his legislation. Nor can the interest-group explanation of
the Act's origin be salvaged by the (again a priori reasonable) hypothesis that political elites anticipated that a labor movement enhanced
by state power would provide the future interest-group base for their
instrumental political purposes. Contemporary observers and histo54
rians agree that there simply was no such anticipation.
B. Business: The Contingent Impotence of
Well-Organized Interest Groups
One of the apparent paradoxes of an interest-group perspective on
the politics of the New Deal is that the policy of protecting unionization was embraced in the teeth of what at the time was the largest
lobbying campaign in American history by business organizations.5 5
Even in the Depression, business associations easily remained the most
resource-laden and effectively organized interest groups in the society.
The paradox is partially dispelled once policy-making is understood
as more than interest groups' (or even the broader electorate's) delib56
erate buying and state managers' intentional selling of public policy.
A key dimension of New Deal politics is illuminated by a model
of the "structural" relation between state policy and private business
interests originally formulated by Polish economist Michael Kalecki
and elaborated more recently by Fred Block and others.5 7 That model
begins with the plausible premise that in a democratic, market economy, political incumbents wish to be reelected. They will therefore
attempt to achieve or maintain social prosperity, both as a direct
means of maintaining electoral popularity and as a means to sustain
tax revenues for popular government spending and enhanced state
power.58 But in a private economy, prosperity depends on investment
53See BERNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 89 (noting that the AFL "firmly supported" the NLRA);
id. at xio-ix (describing AFL efforts in lobbying for, among other things, the NLRA).
54See, e.g., SCHLESINGER; supra note 5o, at 403; Casebeer, supra note 31, at 323; Sipe,
supra note 43, at io6; supra note 50.
55 See JOSEPH HUTHMACHER, SENATOR ROBERT F.
LIBERALISM 191 (1968); STEPHEN J.

WAGNER AND THE RISE OF URBAN

SCHEINBERG, EMPLOYERS AND REFORMERS 245 (x986);

VITTOZ, supra note 43, at 149-50 (stating that the NLRA was "relentlessly" attacked by the
National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the prestigious Business
Advisory and Planning Council of the Department of Commerce, and, of course, the American
Liberty League).
56 On this economic model of policy-making, see below at pp. 1439-40.
57 See FRED BLOCK, REVISING STATE THEORY 51-68 (1987); MICHAEL KALECKI, SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE DYNAMICS OF THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY, 1933-1970, AT 139-41 (197).

58 For an empirical study confirming the importance of economic prosperity for electoral
outcomes, see EDWARD R. TUFTE, POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY 9-27 (978).
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decisions made by private managers of capital, who can be induced
to make prosperity-sustaining capital allocation decisions only by government policies consistent with their perception of a favorable investment or business climate.5 9 As a general matter, then, private
managers of capital exercise an implicit or "structural" veto over
radical reformist policies, for political incumbents know that such
policies are likely to induce an unfavorable business climate, an investment slump, and a popularity-damaging economic downturn.
Such a veto may operate without any deliberate collective action or
political deal-making by managers of private capital. It therefore adds
an important determinant of state behavior to the intentionalist, collective-organization core of the public-choice paradigm.
As Block and others note, such a structural veto operates with
drastically diminished force in precisely such historical conjunctures
as the Great Depression. 60 When business activity is already locked
in a low-level equilibrium, radical reforms - such as the Wagner
Act, the most dramatic statutory assault on corporate prerogatives in
American history - cannot make the climate for investment and
consequent macroeconomic performance significantly worse than they
already are. Thus, even with direct lobbying by business interest
groups at an all-time high, the lapse of the structural veto presented
a rare historical opportunity that reform-minded political elites could
61
seize.
This political-science hypothesis is empirically supported by the
precise events and motives surrounding Wagner's decision to pursue
deeper labor reform in early 1934 and FDR's initiation of the "Second
New Deal" in the late spring of 1935. Conservatives at the time
denounced Wagner's early New Deal relief legislation, such as the
Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933, for "increas[ing] the lack of
confidence" of business. 6 2 But when Wagner unveiled his labor legislation in 1934, he explicitly rejected "the argument that revival and
reform are conflicting objectives and that pursuit of reform at the
present time will burden the course of revival" because of business
displeasure with reform legislation. 63 The only alternative to reform
s9 See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 4-5 (1982).
60 See BLOCK, supra note 57, at 25; Kenneth Finegold & Theda Skocpol, State, Party, and
Industry: From Business Recovery to the Wagner Act in America's New Deal, in STATEMAKING
AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 159, 166-67 (Charles Bright & Susan Harding eds., 1984); Plotke,
supra note 42, at 116.
61 The lapse of the structural veto was, of course, reinforced by the ideological de-legitimation
of business elites during the Depression. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 5o, at 444; Sipe, supra
note 43, at io8.
62 77 CONG. REC. 1035-38 (1933) (statement of Sen. Fess).
63 Robert F. Wagner, Labor Dispute Bill and Other Points in Programfor Economic Reform
[draft) 3-4 (Apr. I5, I934) (on file in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at 6oo SF 103, Folder
30).
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legislation was "the dismal failure of letting things alone." 64 Rexford
Tugwell insisted that from the outset of the New Deal he and the
other core members of the original Brains Trust - Adolph Berle and
Raymond Moley - had rejected the usually prevailing notion "that
business confidence was all-important." 65 In late May of 1935, FDR
faced the failure of the two-year experiment in business-dominated
corporatism represented by the recovery program of the "First New
Deal." The business community's escalating denunciations of FDR
were matched by increasingly insistent pleas to radicalize his program
from such intimate presidential advisers as Felix Frankfurter. In this
64 Id. at 4.
65 REXFORD G. TUGWELL, IN SEARCH OF ROOSEVELT 95 (1972). In addition to the shortterm lapse of business's structural veto, secular transformations in the American economy had,
by the interwar period, generated clusters of employers less hostile toward collective dealing
with workers. Such dealing, however, primarily took the form of "employee representation" or
company unionism rather than actual collective bargaining with independent unions. World
War I and its aftermath saw the expansion of relatively capital-intensive corporations in industries such as oil, electronics, paper, and tobacco. Some of these corporations were less bellicose
in their opposition to collective dealing with employees than were the more labor-intensive firms
in sectors such as steel, textiles, and rubber, that had implacably fought organized labor since
the late nineteenth century. Thomas Ferguson attributes this attitude to the fact that labor
costs were less decisive for the profitability of these emergent firms. See Thomas Ferguson,
From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public
Policy in the Great Depression, 38 INT'L ORG. 41, 50-52, 63-64 (1984). Ferguson's theoretical
premise is supported by some labor economists. See, e.g., BRUCE E. KAUFMAN, THE ECoNOMICS OF LABOR MARKETS AND LABOR RELATIONS 519-20 (2d ed. 1989). Jon Elster and
Oliver Williamson, however, argue that capital-intensive firms are more motivated to oppose
collective dealing because of their greater vulnerability to workers' collective expropriation of
sunk capital. See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 167 (1989); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 263 (1985).
At the same time, a smattering of firms tied to the nascent mass consumption market of the
1920S came to believe that the wage-enhancing, mass-market-stabilizing logic of collective dealing
was less contradictory to their own interests. See Steve Fraser, The "Labor Question," in THE
RISE AND FALL OF THE NEw DEAL ORDER, 1930-x980, supra note 44, at 55, 6o-6i. The
capital-intensive and mass-consumption firms participated disproportionately in organizations
that advocated the "enlightened" company union strategy or full-blown collective bargaining.
See FRASER, supra note 47, at 130-33, 262-64; Ferguson, supra, at 69.
Given the aggressive opposition to the Wagner Act by the business community's most
powerful political organizations, however, the more conciliatory behavior of a small number of
progressive firms cannot account for the New Deal's affirmative program to encourage collective
bargaining. That is, there is little support for the "corporate liberal" theory that the Wagner
Act was the work of a far-sighted segment of the business community attempting to save
capitalism. But see G. William Domhoff, The Wagner Act and Theories of the State, 6 POL.
POWER & Soc. THEORY 159, I6O-61 (1987) (offering this class segment analysis). Indeed, the
corporate leaders of the movement for "enlightened" personnel administration policies, assembled
in the elite Special Conference Committee, forged an alliance with the National Association of
Manufacturers vigorously to oppose the NLRA. Even the most prominent managerial progressives, such as Henry Dennison, opposed the NLRA because of its ban on company unions. See
To Create a NationalLabor Board, 1934: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Comm. on Educ. and
Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 400-04 (1934) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 2926] (statement of Henry
S. Dennison, industry representative, National Labor Board), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 38, at 434-38.

1993]

WAGNER ACT

1399

superheated conjuncture, FDR decisively turned against business organizations and, for the first time, announced his support for the labor
legislation that Wagner had been doggedly, virtually single-handedly
promoting for the previous fifteen months. 66
C. Mass Politics:Propulsive, Disruptive,
but Indeterminate
The lapse of business's structural veto was a necessary but, of
course, insufficient condition for enacting a program encouraging collective bargaining. A second enabling condition was the maelstrom
of mass politics in the 193os, including electoral re-alignment, labor
unrest, and populist upsurges. 67 Even purely intentionalist publicchoice models include the direct influence of popular electoral accountability among the potential sources of policy decisions. 68 Both Wagner
and Roosevelt had been present at the birth of Progressive electoral
politics in New York State, where they learned first-hand that populist
legislation could yield handsome electoral returns. 69 The "Al Smith
Revolution" that brought urban working classes into the Democratic
Party in the late 192os and the national electoral re-alignment of 1932
helped set the stage for the Wagner Act. 70 The decisive electoral
event, however, was the 1934 national election. Wagner set aside his
1934 Labor Disputes bill in June, 1934, in the face of FDR's vacil-

lation over labor policy, business's opposition, and the upcoming test
of popular support for the New Deal in the November ballot. After
the sweeping electoral endorsement, Wagner pushed ahead with an
even stronger version of the bill. 7 1 The 1934 elections also account
in part for FDR's last-minute support for the Labor Relations bill in
June, 1935, after it passed in the Senate but before the House voted.
The President was eager to maintain his alliance with the now-en66 For a further discussion of this transition, see below at pp. 1401-03, 1410-12.
67 See, e.g., Finegold & Skocpol, supra note 6o, at 16o-61; Michael Goldfield, Worker
Insurgency, Radical Legislation, and New Deal Labor Legislation, 83 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 1257,
1277-78 (I989); Plotke, supra note 42, at 115-16.
68 The way that electoral accountability modifies interest-group politics has been modelled
by Arthur Denzau and Michael Munger, who reach the not-so-startling conclusion that "departures by legislators from their voters' interests are constrained by the strong preferences voters
have on some issues, and by the threat of informing and mobilizing public opinion that the
news media and potential competitors always represent." Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C.
Munger, Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented, 80 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 89, 1o3 (1986).
69 See HUTHMACHER, supra note 55, at 3-37; ROBERT F. WESSER, A RESPONSE TO PRO-

GRESSIVISM: THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND NEw YORK POLITICS, 1902-1918, at 46 (1986); cf.
IRWIN YELLOWITZ, LABOR AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK STATE, 1897i916, passim (i965) (recounting rise of progressivism in New York).
70 See KRISTI ANDERSEN, THE CREATION OF A DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY, 1928-1936, at 23,

33-38 (1979); PAUL KLEPPNER, WHO VOTED? THE DYNAMICS OF ELECTORAL TURNOUT, 1870i98o, at 83-Ill (1982).

71See BERNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 88.
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larged progressive bloc (especially with its leader, Robert Wagner) in
the Congress. 72 His aim was also to avoid being outflanked on the
73
left by surging populist movements.
One reason for the relative importance of mass politics over interest-group deal-making in the origin of New Deal labor legislation is,
of course, the very saliency of the political issues at stake at a moment
of extraordinary social crisis. 74 Such saliency accounts for the heightened mobilization of mass electoral constituencies and of populist
political organizations. Even Richard Posner - although he identifies
the NLRA as the quintessential interest-group statute - recognizes
the theoretical possibility of public-regarding legislation. 75 Such issuesaliency and attendant mass mobilization offer one explanation for the
relative down-grading of interest-group politics - and account for
why the very legislation assumed by some to be the prototype of
private rent-seeking is taken by others as the paradigm of the "popular
76
republicanist moment.
As important as direct electoral and political mobilization, however, were indirect mechanisms of mass influence on policy, again
operating in part through political incumbents' motivation to secure
economic growth. 77 Roosevelt and Wagner, in particular, were highly
sensitive to the perceived threat to recovery posed by mass labor
unrest. 78 This instrumental motive was reinforced by - indeed, was
secondary to - Wagner's deep ideological commitment to an integrationist and cooperationist vision of class relations. That vision was
threatened by the spiral of managerial intransigence and the growth
of the radical organizations that widely led worker discontent and
militancy, especially in the massive strike wave of the summer of
I934. 79 This represents yet another way in which the substance of
72 See ViTToz, supra note 43, at 147-48.
73 See ALAN BRINKLEY, VOICES OF PROTEST: HUEY LONG, FATHER COUGHLIN AND THE

GREAT DEPRESSION 246-48 (1983).
74See BARBARA SINCLAIR, CONGRESSIONAL REALIGNMENT, 1925-,978, at 35 (1982).

75 See Posner, Reading of Statutes, supra note 4, at 269-71, 273.
76 Pope, supra note 27, at 310-13, 362 (i99o). My view is closer to Pope's, although the
pivotal role of the political elite takes the origin of the Wagner Act a fair distance from the
face-to-face, dialogic politics of classic republicanism.
77Against the backdrop of the Depression, political incumbents were, unsurprisingly, obsessed with the success of the regime's recovery program. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 5o, at
402.

78 See, e.g., PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 204 (1982); VITTOZ, supra note

43, at 134-43; Robert F. Wagner, Company Unions:A Vast Industrial Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
II, 1934, § 19, at I.
79On Wagner's integrationist vision, see below at pp. 1418-22, 1427-3o. The three largest
strikes of the summer of 1934 were led by radical organizations: the San Francisco general
strike by the Communist Party, the Toledo Autolite strike by the American Workers Party, and
the Minneapolis Teamsters' strike by the Socialist Workers Party. See IRVING BERNSTEIN,
TURBULENT YEARS 217-351 (1969).
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New Deal labor policy was not the intentional outcome of group deals.
In respectively exacerbating and leading worker unrest, employers and
radical organizations had no intent to achieve, and in fact opposed,
80
the kind of legislative response that their actions helped produce.
Although Roosevelt's and Wagner's desire to relieve the sources of
labor unrest was unflagging, the pursuit of that policy goal was contingent and shifting. Both the broad contours and the details of the
new labor policy turned decisively on the programmatic experience
and contests among political entrepreneurs well-positioned to manipulate state power. The experience of the National Recovery Administration labor boards of 1933 to 1935 was particularly salient. That

experience taught Wagner and his circle critical lessons about company
unionism and the effects of novel legal initiatives on workers' subjective interests, perceptions, and behavior.
D. The Crucible of the NLRA: The NRA Labor Boards and
"the Education of Senator Wagner"8
In Senate debates on his 1934 Labor Disputes bill, Wagner stated
accurately, "[e]very one of its provisions is addressed to specific evils
that have become abundantly manifest during the io months' experience of the [Wagner-chaired] National Labor Board."8 2 The unfair
labor practice provisions at the core of Wagner's bill essentially codified the specific employer duties, freshly minted by that Board, to
refrain from interference with and coercion of workers' collective or83
ganizing and bargaining.
The administrative gestation of the Wagner Act was unexpected.
Section 7(a) of the Recovery Act was intended to diminish the number
of recovery-threatening strikes.8 4 Its symbolic legitimation of workers'
collective action had, in the face of continued employer resistance to

80 See, e.g., Plotke, supra note 42, at 113-14 (describing Communist Party opposition to
NLRA).
81 The NRA labor boards "completed the education of Senator Wagner in the realities of
American industrial relations and employer behaviour." Harris, supra note 5o, at 166.
82 78 CONG. REC. 12,018 (I934).
83 The General Counsel to the NLB, Milton Handler, saw the Board's task as the authorship
- "writing on a clean page" - of a "common law of labor relations." Handler Oral History,
supra note 18, at 14, is. Handler recalled:
I don't believe the job [of drafting the Wagner Act] could have been done in the summer
of 1933 when the [National Labor] Board was established. . . . So . . . we had to learn
through experience what were the principal devices which impeded organizational activity, how far you could reasonably go in imposing obligations on the employer to bargain
collectively.
Id. at 19-2o. See also JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD 67 (1974) ("'[The 1934 bill] reflected in [its] details the agony of the Labor Board.'")
(quoting Philip Levy, NLB staff).
84 See IRONS, supra note 78, at 204.
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unionization, precisely the opposite effect. 85 As a result, section 7(a)
led to a degree of federal administrative intervention that its drafters
and enactors simply had not foreseen.
The National Labor Board, jerry-built by the White House to
respond to this wave of labor unrest,8 6 failed to turn back the tides
of worker rebellion and of employer opposition to unionism. 8 7 But
the Board's failure persuaded Wagner and the other officers of the
NLB (and of its successor, the old NLRB) that more thoroughgoing
labor reform was required.8 8 Their frustration with the implementation of section 7(a) focused on two broad failings, one remedial and
one substantive, that decisively shaped Wagner's labor bill.8 9 First,
the NRA labor boards were not equipped with enforcement authority.
After four months of successfully eliciting voluntary settlements in a
string of "easy" cases, the NLB ran into a credibility-shattering wall
of willful employer noncompliance in the high-visibility cases of Budd
Manufacturing and Weirton Steel. 90
Second, and crucial to understanding the origins of section 8(a)(2),
Wagner and his circle became increasingly committed to the organic
solidarity of autonomous unionism and exclusive representation after
they confronted management's deployment of company unionism as a
weapon against workers' collective action. The NRA labor boards
fought tenaciously against the company unionism and proportional
representation condoned by the National Recovery Administration and
by FDR himself. 9 1 Indeed, the impertinent combativeness of the labor
board policy entrepreneurs, assembled by the White House itself,
85 See infra pp. 1435-37.
86 The NLRA was signed on June i6, 1933. "The number of employee-days lost because of
strikes tripled between June and September [of 1933], and the calendar year 1933 (especially
the last half) witnessed the largest number of work stoppages during any twelve-month period
since 1921." VITToz, supra note 43, at 138.
87 See id. at 142.
88 Kenneth Finegold and Theda Skocpol downplay the importance of labor unrest in the
origins of the Wagner Act, on the ground that the strike wave peaked in the summer of 1934
and trailed off in 1935, the year the Act was actually passed. See Finegold & Skocpol, supra
note 6o, at 181. Wagner himself, however, had become personally committed to the legislation
during the strike wave of 1933-34 and, even in 1935, still feared the recurrence of unrest. See
HUTHMACHER, supra note 55, at 192. At the center of Wagner's progressivist world-view was
the belief that only collective bargaining could legitimately elicit the acquiescence of workers,
at least in the mass production industries. See infra pp. 1423-26.
89 See Robert F. Wagner, Radio Speech on S. 1958, at 6-8 (Mar. 27, 1935) (transcript
available in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at 6o SF io3, Folder 33).
90 See Budd Mfg. Co., x N.L.B. 58 (1933). The NLB did not render a reported decision
in the Wierton case. On the administrative crisis caused by these two cases, see GROSS, cited
above in note 83, at 37-39; and LEWIS L. LORWIN & ARTHUR WUBNIG, LABOR RELATIONS
BOARDS io5-o6 (1935).
91 See Interview with Milton Handler, former General Counsel of the NLB, in New York,
N.Y. (Oct. 17, i99i) [hereinafter Handler Interview] (on file at the Harvard Law School Library);
LORWIN & WUBNIG, supra note go, at 112-13, 142-55, 263-72; infra pp. 1454-55.

1993]

WAGNER ACT

1403

attests both to their ideological commitment to progressive labor reform and to their frontline education about the specific modes of
employer resistance. 92 They, and their progressive allies inside and
outside government, became the driving force behind the substance
. 93
and passage of the Wagner Act in 1935
E. Progressive Policy Entrepreneurs,
94
In and Out of Government
Wagner's Senate office and the NRA labor boards were the nervecenter of a network of progressive policy entrepreneurs whose ideological commitments and ambitions are not reducible to interest-group
reflexes. While Progressivism, understood as a "movement" unified
behind a single program, never existed, 95 the programmatic efforts of
several loosely connected aggregations of self-identified "progressives"
came to fruition in the New Deal years. 96 This sub-section presents
92 Roosevelt himself ruefully admired the activism of the NRA labor boards. Referring to
the key decision of the old NLRB that challenged the proportional-representation/companyunion position of the White House, FDR said, "The Board has been courageous. It certainly
took great courage to make that Houde decision." GROss, supra note 83, at ioo. See also
Harris, supra note 5o, at 166-67, 184 (capsulizing the dynamic political role of NRA boards);
Sipe, supra note 43, at 140-45 (same).
93 My detailed investigation of the motives and actions of Wagner's particular fraction of
elite political entrepreneurs thus confirms and elaborates Plotke's general hypothesis that "in a
situation in which capital opposed the Wagner Act and labor did not have enough strength to
impose it, both the formulation and implementation of the measure were significantly dependent
on what occurred within governmental institutions and political discourse." Plotke, supra note
42, at 134-35; see also BRAND, supra note 49, at 288 (examining the New Deal progressive
elite); Harris, supra note 5o, at 166-67, r84 (emphasizing the role of state actors). It also
illustrates Turner and Supple's broader theoretical claim about "the importance of strategic
[governmental] position for the bearer of a particular set of [politically consequential economic]
ideas." Turner & Supple, supra note 2, at 23.
94 The term "policy entrepreneur" usually refers only to governmental actors, particularly
legislators. See Eric M. Uslaner, Policy Entrepreneursand Amateur Democrats in the House
of Representatives: Toward a More Party-Oriented Congress?, in LEGISLATIVE REFORM 105
(Leroy N. Rieselbach ed., 1978). It is intended to capture one sense in which legislators are
relatively free from interest-group instrumentalism. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice
and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the
198os, 139 U. PA. L. REv. i, 93-94 (1990). I use the concept to refer more broadly to a
network of policy reformers inside and outside government, while recognizing that the significance of such a network for legislative outcomes depends ultimately on its linkage with legislators.
g5 See JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSMISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870-1920, at 311, 311 n.27, 362-63 (1986)
(identifying Progressive factions); Peter G. Filene, An Obituaryfor "The ProgressiveMovement,"
22 AM. Q. 20, 20-24 (1970).
96 The Wagner Papers are studded with the Senator's self-description as a "progressive"
reformer. See, e.g., Robert F. Wagner, Talk at Woman's Trade Union League ii (May 6, 1936)
(on file in The Wagner Papers, supra note 3o, at 6oo SF 103, Folder 37); Robert F. Wagner,
Draft Article for Chicago Daily News 4 (Sept. 26, 1932) (on file in The Wagner Papers, supra
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a highly schematized map of the relevant entrepreneurs' ideological
and institutional locations and linkages. Part III below discusses the
various substantive philosophical and programmatic currents among
these reformers, their particular blend in Wagner's philosophy, and
their decisive effect on the passage and content of Wagner's legislation.
Because of Robert Wagner's early immersion in New York State
reform politics, he was, by the time he took his United States Senate
seat in 1927, already on "intimate terms" with many of "the hard core
of Progressive Era social reformers" who had continued their reform
efforts into the I92OS. 9 7 His first legislative aide, Simon Rifkind,
established formal ongoing communication with "a nationwide network of professional and academic social scientists," numbering approximately 250, who were regularly mobilized for consultation and
lobbying in the legislative battles that Wagner spearheaded. 98 Contemporary observers recognized Wagner as the first legislator to draw
so systematically on the newly consolidated social sciences of the
interwar period. 99
Wagner's larger network of personal and organizational allies is
illustrated (though that network's full concatenation is by no means
exhausted) by the team of legal and social science advocates in Wagnote 30, at 6oo SF 1O3, Folder 25); Robert F. Wagner, The Government and Labor Relations,
CBS Radio Address 2 (June 4, 1937) (on file in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at 6oo SF
io3, Folder 38). Although FDR self-consciously adopted the term "liberalism" for his brand of

reform politics, he, Tugwell, and Wagner still "called themselves progressives," and FDR predicted in 1932 that his presidency would reshape the Democratic Party into a "Progressive
party." RExxFoRD G. TUGWELL, THE BRAINS TRUST 411 (x968).

For the richly documented view - confirmed by this Article's exploration of Wagner's
particular network of policy entrepreneurs - that the ideology of New Deal reform generally
may be understood as an outgrowth of certain currents of progressivism, see BRAND, cited
above in note 49, at 61-69; FRASER, cited above in note 47, at 4-12, 77-348; and Plotke, cited
above in note 42, at 12o-35. For an earlier, contrary view and debates about the genealogy of
reformist elites, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R.
302-80 (1955); and OTIS GRAHAM, AN ENCORE FOR REFORM: THE OLD PROGRESSIVES AND
THE NEW DEAL 179-8I (1967).
97 HUTHMACHER, supra note 55, at 58.
9s John Brooks, Advocate: Simon Hirsch Rifkind, NEW YORKER, May 23, 1983, at 46, 56;

see also Interview with Simon Rifklnd, in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 17, x991) [hereinafter Rifkind
Interview] (on file at the Harvard Law School Library) (expressing same idea).
99 He quickly became known to the Washington press corps as "the regular spokesman at
the Capitol for scientific and progressive economists." HUTHMACHER, supra note 55, at 76.
Isador Lubin, himself a leading progressive economist, see infra pp. 1405-o6, was greatly
impressed by Wagner's relentless search for "the best" social scientists to call to Washington for
advice on specific questions of industrial and labor policy. Isador Lubin Oral History 43 (1957)
[hereinafter Lubin Oral History] (transcript available in Oral History Research Office, Columbia
University); cf. EDwARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC
NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 95-114 (1973) (describing interwar social science
and its relation to progressive politics); DOROTHY Ross, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL
SCIENCE 143-257 (iggi) (same).
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ner's campaign against the labor injunction in the late 192os; his
Senate aides and inner-circle advisers; the members and staff of the
NRA labor boards; and the small groups that Wagner led in drafting
his key recovery and labor bills. First, Wagner's inner circle of economic advisers included the day's preeminent institutionalist economists - particularly labor economists' 0 0 - many of whom were
leading students of the pioneering progressive institutionalists, Thorstein Veblen, Simon Patten, and John Commons. By way of example,
Isador Lubin, Wagner's closest economic adviser after 1928, was Thorstein Veblen's most intimate protege. 10 1 A staff economist at the new
progressive think-tank, the Brookings Institution, 0 2 Lubin was a
leading proponent of collectivist planning within the National Progressive Conference, 10 3 and a close associate of several members of
100 In addition to the three economists discussed in this paragraph, Wagner's advisers included such leading institutionalists as Sumner Slichter, Leo Wolman, Jett Lauck, and Paul
Douglas. See $ JOSEPH DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 520-44
(1959); W. JETT LAUCK, POLITICAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, 1776-1926, at 79-91 (1926);
PAUL McNuLTY, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR ECONOMICS: A CHAPTER IN
THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL THOUGHT 150-59, 180-97 (ig8o).

101See DORFMAN, supra note oo, at 534-35; Lubin Oral History, supra note 99, at 12-13.
Lubin was a graduate student of Veblen's at the University of Missouri and for a time lived
with and provided personal care for Veblen and his wife. Lubin recruited Veblen to a wartime
post in the Food Administration, but both were fired after they submitted a report recommending
a conciliatory policy toward agricultural workers affiliated with the Industrial Workers of the
World. See Isador Lubin, Recollections of Veblen, in THORSTEIN VEBLEN 131, 138-42 (Carlton
C. Qualey ed., 1968).
102 Harold Moulton, the Brookings Institution's president, and Meyer Jacobstein, a Brookings
staff economist and close friend of Wagner's, were key members of Wagner's drafting group for
the National Industrial Recovery Act. See HUTHMACHER, supra note 55, at 146. The core of
Wagner's Recovery Act originated from a plan circulated by Moulton and Jacobstein. See id.
Jacobstein was a particularly influential adviser of Wagner's during the framing of the NIRA.
See Rifkind Interview, supra note 98.
103 In 1931, Lubin was a member of the committee on unemployment and industrial stabilization established by the National Progressive Conference. Lubin's colleagues on the committee
included such progressive luminaries and Wagner associates as Tugwell, Jacobstein, Leo Wolman, George Soule (editor of the house organ of progressivism, The New Republic), Edwin
Smith (adviser to corporate progressives Henry Dennison and Edward Filene of the Twentieth
Century Fund, and, later, member of the old NLRB), Sidney Hillman (president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers), and Florence Kelley (secretary of the Consumers' League, another
loyal ally of Wagner's, in both his New York State and New Deal reform campaigns). See
FRASER, supra note 47, at 281-82; HUTHMACHER, supra note 55, at 39, 73; R. ALAN LAWSON,
THE FAILURE OF INDEPENDENT LIBERALISM, 1930-1941, at 67-74 (1971). Senator La Follette,
a close progressive Senate ally of Wagner's, drew on the work of that committee in formulating
a bill to establish a National Economic Council for purposes of economic planning. The hearings
on the bill, in which Lubin served as La Follette's aide, were a significant forum in which
progressive proponents of democratic economic planning, such as Frankfurter, Hillman, and
Lubin, began their political war against the recovery plans promoted by business leaders. That
battle was ultimately settled by the Wagner-drafted-and-sponsored Recovery Act of 1933, whose
§ 7(a) sparked more thoroughgoing labor law reform. See FRASER, supra note 47, at 280-82;
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the Senate's progressive bloc. Leon Keyserling, Wagner's Senate aide
and economic adviser from 1933 to 1938,104 was a protege of the New

Deal's "economic counsellor at large,"10 5 institutionalist Rexford Tugwell. Tugwell, in turn, owed heavy intellectual debts to Veblen,
Patten, and the avatar of progressive philosophy and political action,
John Dewey. 10 6 William Leiserson - who was Commons's most
energetic disciple in the academic and practical worlds of industrial
relations 10 7 - worked closely with Wagner during the crucial educative months of the NLB's operation, participated in the drafting
team for Wagner's 1934 labor bill, testified on behalf of it and the
1935 bill, and helped orchestrate the Twentieth Century Fund's influential campaign in support of the NLRA. 10 8 In the I92os, Leiserson
was a central figure in refining the progressive institutionalist model
of collective bargaining as a form of workplace constitutional democracy, a key metaphor in Wagner's understanding and appeals for
passage of the NLRA.l 0 9

Stuart Kidd, Collectivist Intellectuals and the Ideal of National Economic Planning, Z929-33,

in

NOTHING ELSE TO FEAR: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICA IN THE THIRTIES 15,

26-33

(Stephen Baskerville & Ralph Willett eds., 1985) [hereinafter NEW PERSPECTIVES]; Lubin Oral
History, supra note 99, at 5o.
104 Wagner hired Keyserling away from Jerome Frank's legal staff at the Agricultural Adjustment Administration after the Senator witnessed Keyserling's commitment to collective bargaining in meetings between Frank and Wagner and their staffs during the drafting of the
Recovery Act. See Casebeer, supra note 31, at 296, 314; Leon Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its
Origin and Current Significance, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REV. x99, 200 (196o).
105 Stephen Baskerville, Cutting Loose from Prejudice:Economists and the Great Depression,
in NEW PERSPECTIVES, supra note IO3, at 259, 277.
106 See, e.g., BRAND, supra note 49, at 77; Kidd, supra note 1o3, at 20.
107 See J. MICHAEL EISNER, WILLIAM MORRIS LEISERSON: A BIOGRAPHY 12 (1967). Before

the First World War, Leiserson, as Wisconsin's Deputy Industrial Commissioner, established
public employment offices which served as a model for Wagner-supported New York State
legislation of the igios and Wagner's federal legislation of the late 192os. During the war,
Leiserson advised Wagner's fellow New York reform democrat, Franklin Roosevelt, on labor
matters, and began a close association with another future Wagner associate, Sidney Hillman
of the ACW, whose "new unionism" of the 192os became a model for the New Deal labor
policy. See id. at 12, 93; FRASER, supra note 47, at 130-31, 330-32.
108 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 63; FRASER, supra note 47, at 330-31. Leiserson was
particularly important in shaping the crucial policy banning company unions. See Casebeer,
supra note 31, at 335. On the role of the Twentieth Century Fund in supporting the Wagner
Act, see TOmLINS, cited above in note 31, at 13, 318; and REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON THE GOVERNMENT AND LABOR OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND 2 (1935) (on file at
The Wagner Papers, supra note 3o, at 7oo LA 717, Folder 36).
109 See William Leiserson, ConstitutionalGovernment in American Industries, 12 AM. ECON.
REv. (SUPP) 56, 6o-66 (1922); infra section 1II.D. Leiserson opened channels to two influential
clusters of progressive technocrats: the industrial engineers, managers, and academics affiliated
with the Taylor Society, and the corporate liberals and social scientists of the Twentieth Century
Fund. Both of those organizations played important entrepreneurial roles in the passage of the
Wagner Act. See supra note io8; infra pp. 24o8-o9, 1428-29.
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Second, the legal reformers who staffed the NRA labor boards including Milton Handler, 1 0 Philip Levy, 11"' Thomas Emerson, 112 and
Paul Herzog" 13 - were young exemplars of two closely related currents of influential legal activists. The two converged both in the
long-term construction of the labor relations model ultimately embodied in the Wagner Act, and in the decisive short-term crafting and
passage of the Act. The first current was "the emerging mandarinate
of the regulatory state," led by the quintessential progressive political
entrepreneurs Felix Frankfurter and Louis Brandeis." 4 In the economic emergency of the 1930s, many proponents of an expanded
administrative state looked back to the First World War administrative experience - in which Frankfurter played a central role' 15 - as
a model both for the quasi-corporatist Recovery Act of 1933 and the
administered collective bargaining of the Labor Act of 1935.116 There
is a certain historical symmetry in the fact that Frankfurter, progenitor
of the wartime model of the i91os, helped convince FDR to give

110 Beginning in 1932, Columbia law professor Milton Handler advised Wagner on the
antitrust aspects of economic planning. Later, as General Counsel to the NLB, working closely
with Wagner, Handler helped shape the Senator's bedrock commitment to collective bargaining
into a viable administrative system of rules and procedures. Handler directed a legal team that
fortified the NLB's substantive rules protecting collective bargaining and countered the influence
of the less aggressively reformist Labor Department on Wagner's labor bill. See HUTHMACHER,
supra note 55, at 145; Handler Interview, supra note 9i. But see Casebeer, supra note 31, at
307 (downplaying the importance of the staff of NRA boards); Handler's and Irons's claim about
the importance of the NRA boards' staff is plausible in light of the fact that these boards'
decisions formed the substantive core of the NLRA. See IRONS, supra note 78, at 227-28.
"I Levy, a former student of Handler's, contributed substantially to Wagner's 1934 and 1935
bills (and later succeeded Keyserling as Wagner's Senate aide). See GROSS, supra note 83, at
131-45.
112 Emerson, a product of the legal realists at Yale Law School, "worked over [Wagner's
1934 bill] in great detail" while sharing a house with Keyserling and other New Deal lawyers.
See IRONS, supra note 78, at 226.
113 Herzog, while still a law student, served as NLB assistant secretary under Leiserson,
and later became chair of the post-Wagner Act NLRB. See GROSS, supra note 83, at 19.
114 IRONS, supra note 78, at 7. See generally BRUCE MURPHY, THE BRANDEIs/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION 98-275 (1982) (discussing the political influence of Brandeis and Frankfurter). Other important Wagner advisers and allies from this current of administrative-state
activists included Adolph Berle, Gardiner Means, Joseph Chamberlain, and Lloyd Garrison.
See Handler Interview, supra note 91.
115 Frankfurter had been at the center of labor administration and policy as chairman of the
War Labor Policies Board and a principal civilian adviser to Newton Baker, Secretary of the
War Department.
116 See William Leuchtenberg, The New Deal and the Analogue of War, in CHANGE AND
CONTINUITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 81, 117-22 (John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner & Everett Walters eds., 1964); Gerald D. Nash, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Labor: The
World War I Origins of Early New Deal Policy, i LAB. HiST. 39, 52 (i96o). But cf. ViTToz,
supra note 43, at 77 (noting that New Deal labor policy was more of a positive macro-economic
program than was the reactive mediation policy of World War One.)
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decisive support to its 193os reincarnation in the Wagner Act. 117
Meanwhile, Frankfurter's mentor and political co-conspirator into the
1930S, Brandeis, was intimately involved in the origins of the key
institutional bridge between the wartime labor machinery and its New
Deal variant: the "new unionism" of the needle trades.1 1 8 Brandeis's
was the most influential public voice urging the marriage of labor
progressivism and scientific management in the i9ios and 192os. 119
That union, blessed by the Taylor Society and Robert Wagner after
the war, had crucial consequences for the conception of labor-man-

See, e.g., HUTHMACHER, supra note 55, at 197-98; MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKHis TIMES: THE REFORM YEARS 243-46 (1982). Frankfurter was an active
supporter of Wagner's overall proto-Keynesian program, including its collective bargaining and
public works components. See Stephen Baskerville, Frankfurter, Keynes, and the Fight for
Public Works, r932-1935, 9 MD. HISTORIAN i, 4 (1978); Felix Frankfurter, What We Confront
in American Life, SURV. GRAPHIC, Apr. 1933, at 133, 133-35.
The key language of the Wagner Act's preamble and central substantive provisions - §§ 7
& 8(i) - was derived from the Frankfurter-drafted policy statement of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. See Robert Gorman & Matthew Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of "Concert"
Under the National LaborRelations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286, 333-35, 337-38 (I98i). The
Norris-LaGuardia policy statement was first incorporated in § 7(a) of the NIRA of 1933, and
then redeployed in the NLRA. See National Industrial Recovery: Hearings on H.R. 5664
117

FURTER AND

Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 73d Cong., ist Sess. I17 (1933) (statement of

William Green). Frankfurter's Norris-LaGuardia language, in turn, was similar to that of the
earlier Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch. 347, § 2, Third, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended
at 45 U.S.C. § 152, Third), drafted principally by longtime labor progressive and legal activist
Donald Richberg, who collaborated with Frankfurter and others in drafting the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS 397-403 (i96o); FORBATH, supra note
46, at 163-64; Daniel Ernst, The Yellow-Dog Contract and Liberal Reform, 1917-9g32, 3o LAB.
HIST. 251, 271-72 (1989).
118 Brandeis's creative role in the i9io strike negotiations in the New York garment industry
helped forge the landmark "Protocol" under which Brandeis himself served as impartial umpire.
See FRASER, supra note 47, at 78; PHILIPPA STRUM, Louis D. BRANDEIS 176-77 (1984). The
Protocol was an important step in developing the model of a "lawful, constitutional framework
of labor relations" that was central to the garment trades in the 192os and to the Wagner Act
scheme itself. Steve Fraser, Dress Rehearsalfor the New Deal: Shop-Floor Insurgents, Political
Elites, and Industrial Democracy in the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, in WORKING-CLASS
AMERICA 212, 217 (Michael H. Frisch & Daniel J. Walkowitz eds., 1983).
119 See, e.g., Louis Brandeis, Efficiency by Consent: To Secure Its Active Cooperation Labor
Must Be Consulted and Convinced in Regard to Changes, 55 INDUS. MGMT. 1o8, 108-09 (1918).
The most important event that propelled scientific management into popular consciousness and linked it firmly with progressivism - was Brandeis's invocation of scientific management
in his well-publicized condemnation of the Eastern railroad trunk lines in the ICC rate case of
19IO-Ii. See Louis D. BRANDEIS, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT AND THE RAILROADS (1911)
(reprinting Brandeis's brief to the ICC); SAMUEL HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFT: SCIENTIFIC

MANAGEMENT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA-i89o-I92o, 53-61, 77, 8o-82 (1964); STRUM, supra

note 118, at 161-65.

Frankfurter also actively supported the combination of unionism and

Taylorism. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Industrial Relations: I. Some Noteworthy Recent
Developments, 4 BULL. TAYLOR SOC'Y 12, 12-x6 (x919). Keyserling, the hub of Wagner's NLRA
drafting team, acknowledged that the theory of collective bargaining that informed his work on
the Act owed a large intellectual debt to Brandeis. See Casebeer, supra note 31, at 320.
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agement cooperation animating New Deal labor legislation. 120 The
Taylor Society, a progressive "oasis" in the 1920S for future innercircle New Dealers, 12 1 also lent its organizational muscle to the pas22
sage of the legislation.1
The legal realist movement was the second current of progressive
legal activism that substantially influenced the Wagner Act. 123 In
addition to the younger realist-influenced staff of the NRA boards and
of Wagner's Senate office, such eminent academicians as Robert
26
Hale 124 and Herman Oliphant 25 of Columbia and Jerome Frank
and Thurman Arnold 127 of Yale collaborated with Wagner at a number of stages, one of which was legislatively and historically decisive. 128 In a triumphant speech in 1937 - five days after the Supreme
Court ended two years of paralyzing corporate attacks on the constitutionality of the NLRA - Wagner explained and extolled the influ29
ence of legal realism on the Act's origin and substance.1
A final category of progressives instrumental in Wagner's legislative program was a miscellany of industrial relations "practitioners,"
including enlightened managers such as Meyer Jacobstein and Daniel
Willard; Taylorist engineers such as Otto Beyer and Morris Cooke;
and efficiency-minded labor bureaucrats and activists such as Sidney
Hillman. These practitioners were especially important in imple120 See infra pp. 1416, 1428-30.
121 HABER, supra note rig, at 46; see also FRASER, supra note 47, at 268-70 (recounting
development of Taylor Society); EDWIN T. LAYTON, JR., THE REVOLT OF THE ENGINEERS
144-45 (x986) (same).
122 See, e.g., Letter from Francis Biddle to Robert Wagner i (March 14, 1935) (on file in
The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at 7oo LA 717, Folder 36).
123 Even as a New York State judge in the 1920s, Wagner showed the influence of the new
legal pragmatism. See HUTHMACHER, supra note 55, at 45-49.
124 In Senate hearings, Hale, an early and active proponent of the Labor Act, voiced
quintessential realist arguments about the pervasiveness of relations of power and coercion in
the labor market, which were echoed throughout Wagner's own rhetorical appeals for the Act's
passage. See Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 65, at 50-58 (statement of Prof. Robert L. Hale),
reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 80-88; 78 CONG. REC. 3679 (i974)
(statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 20; Casebeer, supra note 31, at 304.
125Wagner, Oliphant, and Hale collaborated on a brief, which was published by the Workers
Education Bureau and widely circulated among labor progressives, that combined institutionalist
and realist arguments against the yellow-dog injunction. See INTERBOROUGH RAPID TRANSIT
COMPANY AGAINST WILLIAM GREEN, ET AL., BRIEF FOR DEFENDANTS (1928) [hereinafter
Wagner Brief]; HUTHMACHER, supra note 55, at 65; infra note 230.
126 The "vigilance" of Frank, Keyserling, and Wagner was instrumental in ensuring the inclusion of § 7(a), which decisively set in train the events leading to the Wagner Act. SCHLESINGER, supra note 5o, at 99; see also BERNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 33 (confirming Frank's role).
127 Arnold advised Wagner on labor and other matters in this period. See Rifkind Interview,
supra note 98.
128 See supra note 126.
129 See Robert F. Wagner, Law and Judges: NLRA One-Sided?, Speech at Yale Law School
2-22 (Apr. i6, 1937) (on file in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at 600 SF 1o3, Folder 38).
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menting and defending what became Wagner's model of "cooperative"
or "integrationist" collective bargaining, discussed at length below in
sections IlI.E and IV.C.
These various elite progressive strands stretched across an organizational lattice of academic departments,1 30 think tanks and professional associations, 131 journals, 132 independent or bipartisan progressive political organizations, 133 legislatures and public bureaucracies. 134
135
F. The Fortuitous Role of "The Key Man in Congress"

These channels of progressive influence leading directly or indirectly to Robert Wagner loom as large as they do in the origins of the
NLRA because of his extraordinary, historically fortuitous role in the
New Deal legislative program. Virtually alone in the Congress, Wagner had an all-consuming commitment to collective bargaining as an
integral component of political democracy in the age of mass production. Wagner was the only legislator active in drafting the 193 3
Recovery Act, including the labor rights of section 7(a); 136 in drafting

130 These included schools of law, economics, philosophy, social work, industrial relations,
and engineering.
131 The Brookings Institution, the Taylor Society, the Twentieth Century Fund, the Russell
Sage Foundation, and the American Association for Labor Legislation were among the most
important. Wagner had particularly close ties with the AALL, whose officers included a pantheon of leading progressives. See Robert F. Wagner, Compensationfor TransportationWorkers,
26 AM. LAB. LEG. REv. 15, 18 (1936) (expressing debt to AALL).
132 Wagner maintained ties with and occasionally contributed to the leading progressive

publications, which, in turn, supported his legislative efforts both editorially and through their
ancillary organizational links. Wagner had such ties with The New Republic, The Nation,
Liberty, Survey Graphic, New Outlook, and other publications. Paul Kellogg, the editor of
Survey Graphic and a close associate of Wagner, participated in the Emergency Committee for
Federal Public Works that supported Wagner's campaign for countercyclical public works (which
culminated in the Recovery Act), mobilized lobbying on behalf of Wagner's labor legislation,
and published articles extolling both. See Correspondence Between Paul Kellogg and Robert
Wagner (on file in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at LE x88, Folder 423). George Soule,
editor of The New Republic, was active in the American Association for Labor Legislation and
the National Progressive Conference.
133 These included the National Progressive Conference, the League for Independent Political
Action, and John Dewey's People's Lobby.
134 Note that these institutional positions are predominantly outside the economic interest
groups of the market economy proper. See FRASER, supra note 47, at 266; Sipe, supra note 43,
at 54, 167. The theoretical significance of this fact is discussed below at pp. 1433, 1440-42.
13SJohn Dewey's Peoples Lobby gave Wagner this title in 1932. See HUTHMACHER, supra

note 55, at 1x8.
136 See ROBERT F.

HIMMELBERG, THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINIS-

Indeed, Wagner initiated the entire industrial recovery legislation
independent of even the White House. When FDR dropped efforts to modify Senator Hugo
Black's Thirty Hours Bill and instead supported broader recovery legislation in April, 1933, the
President himself was "follow[ing] Wagner's lead." Id. at 201.
TRATION

203-10 (1976).
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and promoting his 1934 Labor Disputes bill; 137 and in the fifteen-

month campaign of redrafting and lobbying that culminated in the
passage of the 1935 Act. 138 Many historians have affirmed Arthur
Schlesinger's conclusion that Wagner "almost singlehandedly forc[ed]
139
a reluctant administration into a national labor policy."'

What explains Wagner's ultimate success? Wagner had become
the main bridge between the two dominant ideological blocs in the

Democratic Senatorial contingent -

the progressive insurgents, whose

ranks were swollen by the 1934 election, and the "regulars" -

espe-

cially as to the issues that became salient after the stock market
crash. 140 After

1927,

he had quickly established himself among both

groups as the Senate's unmatched authority on labor and industrial
policy.141 Equally important, no other legislator had the longstanding

personal and political friendship with FDR that gave such pre-eminence to Wagner's legislative role in the New Deal. FDR's resulting

dependence on Wagner's legislative leadership, in turn, gave the Senator the leverage against FDR to insist that his labor legislation go
forward.14 2 Finally, Wagner's stunning policy entrepreneurship was

aided by the "extraordinary openness and confusion of the policymaking and administrative process in the mid-193os."1 43 In particular,
137 When Wagner introduced his 1934 Labor Disputes bill, he said, accurately, "It reflects
my own experience. As to this legislation, I alone am responsible for it." Hearings on S. 2926,
supra note 65, at 31 (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 38, at 43.
138 Wagner's 1934 and 1935 bills met, at best, indifference from the Labor Department, the
National Recovery Administration, the chair of the Senate Education and Labor Committee,
and, most importantly, the President. See IRONS, supra note 78, at 213; Casebeer, supra note
31, at 3X3; Leon Keyserling, Why the Wagner Act?, in THE WAGNER ACT: AFTER TEN YEARS
5, 6 (Louis G. Silverberg ed., 1945).
139 SCHLESINGER, supra note 5o, at 403; see also BERNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 128 (confirming same); VITToz, supra note 43, at 148 (stating that NLRA "was forced to a vote by the
sheer tenacity of its chief legislative sponsor"); Harris, supra note 5o, at 168 ("Wagner, almost
singlehandedly, and against the odds, sustained the campaign for federal labour law reform in
1934 and 1935.").
140 See HUTHMACHER, supra note 55, at 118.
141"In the Senate [in 1931] only one man had shown a consistent preoccupation with the
business cycle, the labor movement, and other issues of industrial society. This was Robert F.
Wagner...

." ARTHUR W. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER, 1919-1933,

at 224 (1957); see also id. at 113 (noting that Francis Perkins "was 'amazed' at the deference
that New York's junior senator already enjoyed at the Capitol" in 1929); HUTHMACHER, supra
note 55, at 118 (noting that even conservative Democrats "came to trust his knowledge and
judgment on industrial problems"). The deference shown to Wagner's expertise throughout the
protracted NLRA legislative proceedings is undeniable. According to Handler, "[tlhere was
absolutely no chance of any legislation going through in the labor field without [Wagner's]
endorsement if not sponsorship." Handler Oral History, supra note x8, at 25.
142 See RAYMOND MOLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS 304 (1939); Handler Oral History, supra
note x8, at 24-25. Wagner's importance in FDR's legislative program gave the Senator leverage
not only to insist that his bill go forward, but also to fend off the Labor Department's efforts
to weaken it. See id.
143 Harris, supra note 5o, at 67.
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after the Supreme Court's nullification of the Recovery Act in May,
1935,144 the New Deal was left without a program that either addressed economic recovery directly or eased the labor unrest that
threatened recovery indirectly. Robert Wagner was ready in the wings

with a portion of a recovery program, which bore the stamp of
progressive debate and experience.

III. ROBERT WAGNER'S PROGRESSIVISM: "IF WE INTEND TO

PURSUE THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NEW ERA"
Wagner wrote in March, 1934, that obstructions to collective bargaining "cannot be allowed to continue if we intend to pursue the

philosophy of the new era." 145 Consistent with his location at the
political confluence of various currents of progressive action, Wagner's
surprisingly broad political "philosophy" 14 6 blended three tendencies

within reform thought

-

the technocratic corporatism and "growth-

manship" associated with institutionalist economists such as Veblen
and Tugwell, the responsibility-enhancing civic republicanism of

144 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935). Although FDR
had indicated his general support for the principles of the Wagner Act three days before the
Schechter decision was announced, he first flatly stated his support for the Act itself after the
Schechter ruling. See BRAND, supra note 49, at 286. Some opposition to the Wagner Act
subsided because of expectations that it too would be declared unconstitutional. See IRONS,
supra note 78, at 231.
145 Wagner, supra note 78, at i.
146 Wagner's political vision emerges - with unexpected breadth and coherence - from
dozens of lengthy speeches, radio addresses and interviews, newspaper and journal articles, and
private correspondence and discussion. As noted above at note 27, Wagner's consistent public
statements should carry weight under any appealing theory of statutory meaning, whatever his
"true" motivations. In any event many close observers attest that he was an uncommonly
principled legislator, that he did not deviate between his public and private arguments for his
labor program, and that his words scrupulously reflected his beliefs and not those of aides,
party leaders, colleagues, or the interests groups who sought his support. Simon Rifkind recalled:
No one, not even FDR or the other party leaders, could get him to say a single . . .
word, unless he believed it. He went over the speeches word by word. He would not
leave a word, a phrase, a sentence if he didn't believe it. You could not put a word in
his mouth.
Rifkind Interview, supra note 98; see also Keyserling, supra note 104, at 215 ("I have never
known so 'nonpolitical' a politician."); Handler Interview, supra note 9x (confirming Wagner's
progressive convictions, personal control over legislative drafting, and respect among colleagues);
Lubin Oral History, supra note 99, at 52 (confirming depth of Wagner's principled convictions).
Historians agree. See, e.g., HUTHMACHER, supra note 55, at 2o8, xxx, xS; SCHLESINGER,
supra note 5o, at 224-35. Wagner's pronouncements about the Act are also particularly salient
because its substance was in all important respects what Wagner wanted. See Casebeer, supra
note 31, at 347.
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Brandeis, and the social cooperationism of Dewey. 14 7 He attempted
to link his broader, idiosyncratic vision with specific institutional models of labor-management cooperation associated with the practitioners
of industrial relations within his reform network. The tensions and
fault lines inscribed in the structure of the NLRA - particularly in
the company union ban - reflect that attempt. 148
A. PragmatistPremises: Scientific Guidance of the
"Processof Becoming"
Wagner situated both of his key labor legislative initiatives NIRA section 7(a) and the NLRA - within the popularized pragmatist understanding of social experience and action to which most
progressive intellectuals of the day adhered. 14 9 "We think of the ideal
state," Wagner wrote in characteristically Deweyan rhetoric, "not as
a fixed goal but as a process of becoming. .

.

. And it is in the

shifting scales of action and progress, and not by reference to a fixed
star, however luminous, that the ideals of a modern state must be
realistically judged."' 5 0 According to the Deweyans, human con147 Of the broader categories of progressive political thinkers identified by James Kloppenberg, Wagner blended elements from (z) advocates of the bureaucratic, associative state, suitably
reformed through scientific management and (2) those promoting a vision of the common good
through "public welfare measures, labor legislation, and social responsibility," but not from (3)
the antimonopolists or (4) the old Protestant elite that defended ethnic and cultural purity.
KLOPPENBERG, supra note 95, at 363.
148 For Wagner, those tensions were eased by his pragmatist assumptions about an evolutionary path of mutual adjustment between legal norms and social facts. See infra sections
IV.A.2 & IV.B.2.
149 See, e.g., KLOPPENBERG, supra note 95, at 320; R. JEFFREY LUSTIG, CORPORATE LIBERALISM: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY, 1890-192o, at 156-75

(1982). Popularized pragmatism reflected a constellation of related ideas and slogans: a vision
of a social world marked by constant flux and susceptible to deliberate political shaping; a belief
that social communication could transform individual and social preferences and interests; and
an urge to action based on present possibilities, scientific experiment, social consequences, and
self-critical revision of goals, rather than on past precedents or fixed principles.
1so Robert Wagner, The Ideal IndustrialState, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1937 (Magazine), at 8
[hereinafter Wagner, Ideal IndustrialState]. In an address at his alma mater, the City College
of New York, on the role of the intellectual in public life, Wagner argued that unlike the
"traditional" scholar, the pragmatic modernist, "steeped in the immediate present," had a vanguard role to play in public life. "To the modern, in the words of our own Professor [Morris
R.] Cohen[,] the past is irretrievable and the future is unpredictable," Wagner said. "Only the
present holds in its lap the wealth of sensation and the thrill of change which enjoy the undivided
attention of the modern age." Robert F. Wagner, The Place of the Scholar in Public Life,
Speech to Members of Phi Beta Kappa, C.C.N.Y. 4 (Nov. 24, 1931) [hereinafter Wagner,
C.C.N.Y. Address] (transcript available in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at 599 SF 102,
Folder 21). Wagner's words drip with popularized Deweyan and Jamesian pragmatism and its
Emersonian antecedents. Dewey wrote,
Pragmatism, thus, presents itself as an extension of historical empiricism, but with this
fundamental difference, that it does not insist upon antecedent phenomena but upon
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sciousness had a "creative constructive function" 15 ' in the "process of
becoming." Opportunities for intentionally guiding the trajectory of
social change were everpresent.' 5 2 Wagner, the legislative architect
of the New Deal regulatory state, constantly propounded the practicability of intervention in a fluid social world. 5 3 He challenged particularly the residues of Scottish Realist and Spencerian claims about
unchangeable economic "laws" that govern the labor market and labor
relations inside the corporation. 154 Wagner's almost utopian optimism
about social plasticity extended, significantly, to the malleability of
the very consciousness that pragmatist thought identified as a dynamic
element in social experience. 5 5
Surveying the impact of the Recovery Act after one year, Wagner
said, "Of far greater significance [than its economic effect] is our new
faith in democratic government as an instrument for promoting the
common weal. "156 Dewey "defined the democratic polity as an experconsequent phenomena; not upon the precedents but upon the possibilities of action. And
this change in point of view is almost revolutionary in its consequences.... [T]his taking
into consideration of the future takes us to the conception of a universe whose evolution
is not finished, of a universe which is still, in James' term, "in the making," "in the
process of becoming," of a universe up to a certain point still plastic.
JOHN DEwEY, The Development of American Pragmatism, in PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION

13, 24-25 (1931). Wagner's appeal to present sensation and the thrill of change reflect the deep
Emersonian influence on pragmatist thought. See generally CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN
EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM 9-41, 69-111 (1989). For further
instances of Wagner's appropriations of Dewey's ideas and very phrases, see infra pp. 141920.

Is DEWEY, supra note i5o, at 24.
152 This view had penetrated to the center of the sociological jurisprudence and legal realism

that began to influence Wagner when he was a judge in the 1920s. See HUTHMACHER, supra
note 55, at 45-49; Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L.
REV. 645, 671, 677-83 (1985).
153 Wagner used virtually every plea for labor reform as an opportunity to challenge the
"pretty fictions" of "i9th century economists and biologists." Robert F. Wagner, Address to the
Associated Jewish Philanthropies i (Oct. 29, 1933) (transcript available in The Wagner Papers,
supra note 3o, at 6oo SF io3, Folder 28). "We shall yet find," he told an audience of social

scientists, "that if there be such [economic] law it was written by our own ignorance and
thoughtlessness, and that it can be erased by organization and control." Robert F. Wagner,
Address to the Conference on Unemployment 5 (Dec. 30, 193o) [hereinafter Wagner, Conference
on Unemployment] (transcript available in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at 546 SM 453).
154 Although Malthusian pessimism was less deeply rooted among American than British
economists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, American economists nonetheless
assumed that hard toil (rather than social redistribution) provided the only avenue to material
progress for the working class in a world of scarcity. See, e.g., DANIEL T. RODGERS, THE
WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA I850-I920, at 99-102 (1978). According to Herbert

Hovenkamp, vestiges of the nineteenth-century "wage-fund theory" - according to which
income distribution was beyond governmental control - persisted into the 1930s in jurisprudential thought. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The PoliticalEconomy of Substantive Due Process,
40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 417-18, 437 (1988).
1"' See infra pp. 1435-39.
1s6 78 CONG. REC. 9336 (1934).
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imental polity capable of continually judging the results of its experi-

mentation,' l5 7 and in that definition Wagner concurred. The pragmatic, intersubjective search for truth by the scientific community was
58
itself a model of self-government in the democratic community.1
Wagner described both the NIRA and the NLRA as evolutionary
experiments in cooperative democracy - first efforts that would ultimately be small, though indispensable, components of the emerging
5 9
administrative state.1

B. Social Control and Planningin the
Administrative State
In a 193o keynote address to the leading progressive social scientists and economists in the country, Wagner declared that in the

science "of human engineering you are the experts. It is your prerogative to prescribe for us the new economics of social control." 160 The

references to "human engineering" and "social control," although telling, are not necessarily as coldly technocratic as they might seem. By
"social control," many progressives meant simply social self-regulation,
which could be effected by either democratic or autocratic means and
by either decentralized or centralized institutions. 161 Although Wagner was committed to democratic determination of the ends of public

157 LUSTIG, supra note 149, at 131.
158 See, e.g., KLOPPENBERG, supra note 95, at 319-20; WALTER LIPPMANN, DRIFT AND
MASTERY 274-75 (19x4); David A. Hollinger, The Problem of Pragmatism in American History,
67 J. AM. HiST. 88, 99 (1980). Sharing the progressives' fascination with scientific method,
Wagner frequently called for "[a] policy of deliberate experimentation." Robert F. Wagner,
Address at the Convention of New York Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen
24 (Sept. 15, 1932) (transcript available in The Wagner Papers, supra note 3o, at 6oo SF io3,
Folder 25). He also urged social scientists to conduct research useful to legislators. See Wagner,
Conference on Unemployment, supra note 153, at 7-8.
159 See, e.g., Robert F. Wagner, Industrial Recovery and Public Works Act, Address on
NBC Radio i-7 (June 13, 1933) [hereinafter Wagner, Industrial Recovery] (transcript available
in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at 600 SF io3, Folder 28); Robert F. Wagner, Address
on WOR Radio Broadcast 6-8, 12-13 (May i8, 1935) (transcript available in The Wagner
Papers, supra note 3o, at 6oo SF io3, Folder 34).
160 Wagner, Conference on Unemployment, supra note 153, at 9.
161 See ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEwEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY r88 (i99i).
The words "social control" were "made ... bywords in the Progressive era" by sociologist E.A.
Ross's i9oi book, Social Control. RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, THE PARTY PERIOD AND PUBLIC
POLICY 282-83 (1986). While many reformers understood "social control" as a catch-phrase
broadly connoting opposition to laissez-faire as both a descriptive and prescriptive theory, see
MORRIS JANOwITZ, THE LAST HALF-CENTURY: SOCIETAL CHANGE AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

29 (1978), Wagner used the term more broadly still to encompass even laissez-faire, consistent
with the legal realist understanding that even the common law of the "free market" was a form
of social regulation. See Wagner, Ideal IndustrialState, supra note I5o, at 8.
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policy,16 2 he advocated centralized administrative agencies empowered
63
to implement social planning on the basis of scientific expertise. 1
Although the appeal of centralized administration and planning
was intensified by the economic emergency, Wagner understood it to
be a permanent requirement of the industrial state in the era of mass
production. 164 The intellectual groundwork for that view was laid
during the 19IOS and 192os by such collectivist luminaries as Veblen,
Herbert Croly, George Soule, and Stuart Chase, 165 and by the less
celebrated progressive engineers, managers, labor officials, and academics associated with the Taylor Society. They transformed scientific
management from a theory of unilateral managerial control in the
workplace into a vision of centralized administrative planning and
decentralized collective bargaining in the larger political economy.
Their views culminated in the overblown Veblenism of the Technocracy craze of 1932, but also influenced the planning proposals of
inner-circle New Dealers such as Tugwell, Moley, Berle, Lubin, and
66
Wagner. 1
In its substantive goals, Wagner's vision of economic planning had
two proto-Keynesian components that advanced beyond the objectives
of the earlier administrative-state-building phase of the Progressive
Era: 167 first, long-term national planning of public works spending to

162

See Robert F. Wagner, Speech at the National Conference of Catholic Charities 4 (Oct.

3, 1933) (transcript available in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at 6oo SF 103, Folder
28).
163 "The new experimentalism in government imposes heavy but necessary duties upon
administrative agencies," Wagner wrote after the establishment of the NRA in 1933. "Few
today will deny the pressing need for a greater degree of purposeful planning on a national
scale." Robert F. Wagner, Planning in Place of Restraint, 22 SURV. GRAPHIC 395, 396, 438

(1933).
See, e.g., Casebeer, supra note 3, at 317.
works of the technocratic planners include STUART CHASE, THE NEMESIS OF
AMERICAN BUSINESS AND OTHER ESSAYS (1931); HERBERT CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY
(1914); HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE (igog); THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE
164

16s Leading

ENGINEERS AND THE PRICE SYSTEM (1921); and
REPUBLIC, Jan. 21, 1931, at 261.

George Soule, Hard Boiled Radicalism, NEW

166 On the alliance of scientific management and labor progressives, see above pp. 1408-09,
and below pp. 1429-30. Wagner's embrace of that alliance accounts for his fondness for the
metaphor of social or human engineering. See, e.g., Wagner, Industrial Recovery, supra note
I59, at 1-2; S. J. Woolf, Wagner Foresees a New Industrial Day: Out of His Experience as a
Labor Mediator the Senator Finds Encouragementfor a Better Economic Order, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 1933, § 6 (Magazine), at 6. On the collectivist planners, see WILLIAM E. AKIN,
TECHNOCRACY AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE TECHNOCRAT MOVEMENT, 1900-1941, passim (1977); SCHLESINGER, supra note 141, at 193-95; R. G. TUGWELL, THE BRAINS TRUST
99-IOO (1968). Although scientific management reinforced many progressives' attraction to
expert, centralized administration as a means of suppressing or evading political conflict, even
progressives of a more democratic bent, like Frankfurter, Hillman, and Wagner, embraced both
scientific management and economic planning. See, e.g., Frankfurter, supra note 117, 135-36.
167 See generally MARTIN SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPI-
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achieve countercyclical stabilization; second, enhancement of mass
purchasing power through redistribution of bargaining power from
capital to labor. 168 The desirable effect of high wages on consumption
and work motivation was a tenet not only of New Deal economic
thought, but of the popular "new economics" of the 1920S. 169 Almost
alone within the inner circle of the New Deal, however, Wagner linked
that tenet to aggressive support for collective bargaining
as the means
170
to permanent economic redistribution and growth.
In its administrative form, Wagner's vision of economic planning
evolved during the 1930s from comprehensive, centralized administrau 17 to
tive control, which he was willing to label "state socialism,'
administrative enforcement of corporatist planning by peak organizations of private groups, 172 to administrative oversight of more decentralized collective bargaining. 173 Wagner capsulized his consisTALISM, 1890-1916, at 177-212, 248-85 (1988) (emphasizing that state-building in the progressive
era aimed to construct corporate forms and competitive markets).
168 Virtually from the time Wagner entered the Senate in 1927, he was the leading Congressional voice for a labor market program to expand mass consumption. See HUTHMACHER,
supra note 55, at 57-69 (detailing Wagner's first efforts to combat unemployment and expand
purchasing power); Robert F. Wagner, Sound Policy to Break Bread Lines, THE INDEPENDENT,
Apr. 14, 1928, at 353, 353-54. Both the Senate report and Wagner's lengthy introduction to
his labor relations bill on the Senate floor emphasize the goal of increasing mass purchasing
power, both as a matter of distributive justice, see 79 CONG. REC. 7565, 7567 (1935) (statement
of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2326, and as the
crucial foundation for macroeconomic stabilization, see id. at 7568, 7572, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2330, 2339-40; S. REP. No. 573, 7 4 th Cong., ist Sess.
I8 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2318; see also NLRA, supra
note 3, § i, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) ("The inequality of bargaining power [between employees
and employers) tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and
the purchasing power of wage earners.").
169 See WILLIAM J. BARBER, FROM NEW ERA TO NEW DEAL: HERBERT HOOVER, THE
ECONOMISTS, AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY, 1921-1933, at 28, 84 (1985); THOEDORE
ROSENOF, DOGMA, DEPRESSION, AND THE NEW DEAL 39 (1975). Proponents of the high-wage
theory, such as Wagner, paid scant attention to the crucial question of how nominal wage hikes
would affect pricing and investment decisions, real output, and ultimately real purchasing power.
Compare PIORE & SABLE, supra note io, at 79-82 (arguing that collective bargaining maintained
the mass market in post-World War IM with Martin L. Weitzman, Profit-Sharing Capitalism,
in ALTERNATIVES TO CAPITALISM 61, 62 (Jon Elster & Karl 0. Moene eds., 1989) (arguing
that resulting downward wage rigidity may have actually aggravated economic fluctuations).
170 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 5o, at 403 ("Wagner was almost alone among liberal
democrats in placing a high value on trade unions."). In his introduction of the NLRA to the
Senate, Wagner posed a stark three-way choice between maintenance of purchasing power
through collective bargaining, "sustain[ing] the market indefinitely by huge and continuous public
spending," or "the certainty of another collapse." 76 CONG. REC. 7565, 7568 (1935) (statement
of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2330.
171 Robert Wagner, DangerAhead!, LIBERTY, July 23, 1932, at 6, 9.
172 See infra pp. 1420-21.
173 See Robert Wagner, "Industrial Democracy" and Cooperations, Radio Address at the
National Democratic Club 4 (May 8, 1937) (transcript available in The Wagner Papers, supra
note 30, at 6oo SF 103, Folder 38) (rejecting "super-government" in which unions are "creatures
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tently pragmatist conception of economic planning in his 1934 defense
of Tugwell against accusations of communism:
[B]y planning [Tugwell] means merely the scientific approach to problems of social control....
*

. .

It is a constant process of trial and error, with social interests

paramount, social control present, and any particular panacea subordinate to results. .

.

. Is this shocking? . . . Is it not in accord

with the idea [embodied in the NRA] of continuing cooperation
and
74
readjustment among industry, labor, and government?
Wagner gave concrete institutional content to his rhetoric of "cooperation," with specific implications for labor law, in the debates surrounding the drafting of the NIRA and the NLRA.
C. "Building.

. a Co-operative Order" in the
Age of Fordism

.

Of "the major forces which are at large upon the present day
scene," one Wagner thought most fundamental was the rise of industrial mass production.1 75 The twin policy problems posed by largescale industry, in his view, were the depersonalization and diminishing
bargaining power of the individual worker, 176 on the one hand, and
the heightened importance - tragically demonstrated by the Depression - of maintaining mass purchasing power for macroeconomic
stabilization and growth, on the other. 177 By the time he led the
drafting of the Recovery Act, Wagner had come to believe that the
of the state" and trade associations are "cartels of the state"). Nonetheless, Wagner never
abandoned his vision of some form of corporatist planning that transcended or supplemented
decentralized collective bargaining. See infra p. 1425.
174 Robert F. Wagner, Speech on the Confirmation of Dr. Tugwell io-xn (June, 1934)
[undelivered], (available in The Wagner Papers, supra note 3o, at 6oo SF 103, Folder 30).
175 Wagner, C.C.N.Y. Address, supra note 15o, at 4, 7-12; see also 79 CONG. REC. 7565,
7567 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38,
at 2325-26 (introducing NLRA).
176 See 79 CONG. REC. 7565, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2321
(arguing that the worker is "[c]aught in the labyrinth of modern industrialism and dwarfed by
the size of corporate enterprise"); Wagner, Address on WOR Radio Broadcast, supra note i59,
at 3 ("The vast size of corporate enterprise ... [has] made the individual a helpless plaything
of forces beyond his control.").
177 See 79 CONG. REC. 7565, 7567 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2325-26 (arguing that industrial concentration correlated
with maldistribution and the failure of mass purchasing power, which "was particularly serious
in an age of mass production"); Robert F. Wagner, Speech at Syracuse, N.Y. 12 (Oct. 21, 1932)
(transcript available in The Wagner Papers, supra note 3o, at 6oo SF lO3, Folder 26) ("Unless
there is purchasing power in the hands of the great masses of people there will be no purchasers
for the products of American mass production.").
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progressivist idea 178 of "building . . . a co-operative order" was the
lodestar for 79the social reconstruction necessary in the era of mass
production. 1
Wagner's ideal of social cooperation should not be conflated with
the early Roosevelt Administration's ephemeral deployment of the
language of "cooperationism." 180 His deeper commitment can be
traced to three cross-pollinated strains of progressive thought that
expressed the cooperative idea at different levels of philosophical and
institutional specificity: the communitarian progressivists, the institutionalist economists, and progressive industrial relations practitioners
and experts. 181
Wagner appropriated Dewey's popularized communitarian terminology when he argued that industrialism had generated an atomized,
yet interdependent "Great Society"' 8 2 that "grop[ed] desperately for
salvation through cooperation"' 8 3 and demanded a regeneration of the
social bonds of a "Great Community." For Wagner, as for Dewey,
the cooperative ethos -

an ideal of "reciprocal solidarity" 184 -

was

to inform both daily interaction in the workplace and other local
settings, and large-scale democratic politics. The Deweyan vision of
the democratic polity drew on an overarching conception of egalitarian
communication and its byproduct, the socially endogenous and selfreflexive transformation of social interests. 185 Keyserling recalled that

178 On the centrality in progressive thought of the cooperativist ethos and the attendant need
for moral transformation, see, for example, BRAND, cited above in note 49, at 78-79; JOHN
DEWEY, INDIVIDUALISM OLD AND NEW 61, 85-86 (1929); KLOPPENBERG, cited above in note
95, at 334-36, 348, 401-03; and LUSTIG, cited above in note 149, at 112.
179 Wagner, supra note 30, at 6; see also 79 CONG. REc. 6183-84 (1953) (address by Sen.
Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2283; Robert F. Wagner,
Address on WJZ Radio on the National Labor Board iO-ii (Sept. I8, 1933) (transcript available
in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at 6oo SF 103, Folder 28) (expressing same idea).
180 Wagner's commitment to a politics and economics of cooperation predated the NRA
period and persisted into the NLRA years, and was linked throughout to the particular role of
labor in society - unlike the vaguer, rhetorical "cooperationism" of many early New Dealers.
See Alan Brinkley, The New Deal and the Idea of the State, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-I980, supra note 44, at 85, 93, OO; James Holt, The New Deal and
the American Anti-Statist Tradition, in THE NEW DEAL: THE NATIONAL LEVEL 27, 33-35
(John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner & David Brody eds., 1975).
181 All three strains were well represented among Wagner's closest advisers and associates.
See supra section ILE; infra section M.E.
182 Wagner, supra note 162, at 4. For Dewey's formulation of the "Great Society" and "Great
Community," see JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 96-98, 126-28, 155-57 (2d.
ed. 1946) (1927).
183 79 CONG. REC. 14,229 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
184 DEWEY, supra note 178, at 6I, 85-86.
185 The "Great Community" would perfect "the means and ways of communication of meanings so that genuinely shared interest in the consequences of interdependent activities may
inform desire and effort and thereby direct action." DEWEY, supra note 182, at 155. That
conception accounts in part for the parallel that Dewey, Wagner, and other progressives often
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the Senator not only "envisaged the collective bargaining process as a

cooperative venture guided by intelligence, rather than a mere test of
relative strength," but also "foresaw that this process within our en-

terprise system could become an integral part of an ever larger cooperative process guided by intelligence" in the economy and polity
86
at large. 1

Wagner situated his specific legislative innovations within this
more abstract cooperationist vision. He understood his recovery program to be constituted by three specific mechanisms of social cooperation, each of which was to be supervised and enforced in the public

interest by the new administrative state.1 8 7 The first was cooperation

among businesses, through governmentally supervised codes of competition generated principally by trade associations.1 8 8 This aspect of
Wagner's program embraced the institutionalists' commitment to industrial "cooperation" and "control" rather than competition.' 8 9 He
nonetheless took pains to associate his stance as well with Brandeis,

the apostle of antitrust. Wagner accurately reminded the Senate that

drew between democratic and scientific communities: both were thought ideally to embody the
application of "critical intelligence" in the egalitarian intersubjective search for pragmatic truths.
See, e.g., Hilary Putnam, A Reconsiderationof Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1671,
1682-83, 1685-88 (I990).
186 Keyserling, supra note 104, at 221.
187 See Robert F. Wagner, NBC Radio Symposium on the National Labor Board 3 (Oct.
31, 1933) (transcript available in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at 6oo SF IO3, Folder 28).
188 In this, Wagner was not simply following the drift of the Roosevelt administration. Even
before the 1932 election, Wagner had Rifkind and Handler study the possibilities for antitrust
revision along these lines, and, in April, 1933, the White House followed Wagner's lead in
undertaking the formulation of comprehensive recovery program proposals. See HIMMELBERG,
supra note 136, at 200-01. This aspect of the recovery program - the relaxation of antitrust
regulation and the endorsement of industrial self-government via trade associations - reflected
the influence of business planners, transmitted principally through Assistant Secretary of Commerce John Dickinson. See id. at 201-04. Although legislative endorsement of this form of
business cooperation marked the culmination of the trade association movement of the 192os,
it was also embraced by corporatist progressives such as Wagner, Tugwell, Lubin, Hillman,
and Richberg. The latter accepted the inevitability of industrial concentration and welcomed
the economies of scale of mass production but wished to add government supervision and the
countervailing power of labor to business self-regulation of "wastefful]" competition. 77 CONG.
REC. 5152 (1933) (statement of Sen. Wagner); see also EIC F. GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH
DESTINY 259-65 (abr. ed. 1955) (recounting Moley's defense of mass production and industrial
concentration).
189 REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE INDUSTRIAL DISCIPLINE AND THE GOVERNMENTAL ARTS

13-20, 222 (1933). On this count, Wagner's ideology was heir to the New Nationalism program
of Van Hise and Croly, incorporated in the Veblenian institutionalist economics of Wagner's key
economic advisers, Lubin and Keyserling. See, e.g., CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE,
supra note 165, at 358-59; CHARLES R. VAN HISE, CONCENTRATION AND CONTROL 277-78
(rev. ed. 1914). For a description of their influence, first on the New Nationalism of Theodore
Roosevelt and then on the economic policy of the New Deal, see ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE
NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 43-46 (1966); DAVID W. LEVY, HERBERT CROLY
OF THE NEW REPUBLIC passim (1985); and SCHLESINGER, supra note 5o, at 179-8o.
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Brandeis endorsed business "'cooperation"'
when it could be said to
"purifly]" or "'promote"' competition. 190 The "purification" that Wagner had chiefly in mind in his sponsorship of the NRA code scheme
was the industry-by-industry standardization of minimum labor conditions to ensure that competition did not take the form of "destructive" wage cutting and sweating of labor.191 But, consistent with his
and other leading progressives' more sweeping cooperationist vision,
Wagner believed that the end of labor sweating was but an instance
of a visionary, culture-shaping project initiated by the Recovery pro92
gram. 1
The second institutional mechanism, also necessitated by the rise
of large-scale enterprise, was cooperation among workers via unionization. This would provide the organizational predicate for the functional representation of labor alongside the organizations of capital in
both collective bargaining and governmentally supervised corporatist
planning. Collective bargaining and corporatist planning, then, would
embody the third and, for Wagner, the "most important" form of
193
cooperation, that between labor and business.
Wagner understood the implementation of the three mechanisms
of governmentally supervised cooperation - among businesses, among
workers, between business and labor - as more than merely encouraging and relabelling the familiar institutions of, respectively, trade
associations, unions, and collective bargaining. 194 Rather, each re190 See 77 CONG. REc. 5153 (1933) (quoting American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 257 U.S. 377, 418 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); see also FRASER, supra note 47, at
270-72 (arguing that Brandeis did not naively oppose business concentration and coordination
where economically justified, but rather opposed the interwar "securities bloc"); Thomas K.
McCraw, Rethinking the Trust Question, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE I, 29 (Thomas K.
McCraw ed., 1981) (noting that Brandeis approved cooperation among smaller producers).
191 See Robert F. Wagner, Speech over NBC Radio 2-4 (May 19, 1933) (transcript available
in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at 6oo SF 203, Folder 27); Robert F. Wagner, Address
on the NIR Bill 3-4 (May 22, 1933) (transcript available in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30,
at 6oo SF 2O3, Folder 27); Robert F. Wagner, Address on NBC Radio on the NIR Bill 1-3
(May 26, 1933) (transcript available in The Wagner Papers, supra note 3o, at 6oo SF 103,
Folder 27). For contemporary arguments about cooperative paths to high-skill, high-wage
economic development as alternatives to low-wage, labor-sweating strategies, see PIORE &
SABEL, supra note 1o, at 270-72; Hyman, supra note 14, at 53.
Business interests, of course, understood the purposes of the code-formulating provisions of
the vaguely drafted NIRA differently than did Wagner. While he stressed the possibilities for
improvement and stabilization of labor conditions, they hoped to use the code authority for
cartel-like price setting and capacity restriction. See HAWLEY, supra note i89, at 35-39;
HIMMELBERG, supra note 236, at 208-12.
192See supra pp. 1422, 1435-38.
193 Wagner, Radio Symposium, supra note 187, at 3. "[O]ne [cannot] imagine a single huge
employer cooperating separately with each of IO,OOO or 5o,ooo workers. Cooperation depends
upon the untrammeled right of workers to organize for that purpose." 79 CONG. REc. 6183,
6184 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2283.
194 Wagner said that the kind of cooperation between labor and industry he envisioned was
"something entirely new in our history." Wagner, supra note 187, at 3.
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quired a new cooperative mentality, transforming the subjective interests and perceptions of labor and management. He envisioned, in
short, a culture of cooperation fit for a political economy of democratic
corporatism - a regeneration of "moral responsibility" even in commercial relations. 195 Before examining in more detail the theory and
practice of Wagner's brand of labor-capital cooperation, it is necessary
to sketch Wagner's view of worker empowerment, democratic consent,
and actual liberty of contract. For he believed that workers' genuine
consent provided the necessary legal and social foundation for both
workplace and political cooperationism.
D. Sovereign Power and Substantive Freedom in the
Large-Scale Enterprise and the Polity
For Wagner, the large-scale, hierarchical workplace of mass production was "an impersonalized and heartless machine" in which "the
isolated worker . . . is powerless to defend himself against the occasional wrong of the corporation which controls him . . . [and] 196
is
expressionless to convey to the management what his problems are."
The relation between employer and employee in modern industry "the most important relationship" in the worker's life' 97 - had taken
on the character of the authority relationship between sovereign and
subject or citizen. In his introduction of the NLRA in the Senate,
Wagner quoted Brandeis's charge that employers who sought legal
sanction for their obstruction of worker organization were "seeking
sovereign power" - seeking "to endow property with active, militant
power which would make it dominant over men." 198 The analogy
between political and managerial power had lodged firmly in the
progressive mind at the height of political appeals for industrial democracy during and after the First World War. 199 Many corporate
leaders, too, had come to justify their exercise of political influence

19s Woolf, supra note I66, at 6. In this respect, he was aligned particularly with Adolph
Berle, the leading voice in FDR's Brains Trust to call for a new moral credo for business. See
SCHLESINGER, supra note 5o, at 183. For perceptive analyses of the utopian strain in NRA
policy, see BRAND, supra note 49, at 8I, 94-95; and Harris, supra note 5o, at 169, and in
progressivism generally, see sources cited above in note 178.
196 8i CONG. REC. 2940 (1937).

197 Wagner, supra note 162, at 3.
198 79 CONG. REC. 7565, 7566 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2325 (quoting Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 368 (1921) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
199 See generally MILTON DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY III-

95 (describing the development of the idea of industrial democracy); RODGERS, supra note 154,
at 57-61 (same); Clyde IV. Summers, IndustrialDemocracy: America's Unfufilled Promise, 28
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 29, 29-34 (1979) (same).
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by the sovereign-like authority they already wielded as "industrial
20 0
statesmen" controlling the "vital institutions" of social life.
In light of his embrace of the analogy between political and industrial power, it is not surprising that Wagner, an ardent liberal
democrat, thought the most fundamental purpose of the statutory right
to collective bargaining was to afford workers sufficient substantive
freedom to enable them genuinely to consent to workplace authority
relations. While the diminished bargaining power of individual workers vitiated the normative force of their voluntary choice to submit to
the authority of the large-scale enterprise, collective bargaining would
20 1
empower workers sufficiently to cleanse that choice of duress.
Workers would cross the normative line - between false and genuine
democratic consent to authority, between duress and actual liberty of
contract, between unjust inequality and just equality of bargaining
power - when empowered to bargain collectively rather than individually. Collective bargaining would thus legitimate the management-labor authority relationship in the age of mass production.
For Wagner, even the important legislative goals of industrial
peace and macro-economic growth and stabilization were always secondary to the achievement of social justice through democratic consent
in the workplace. 20 2 As to industrial peace, Wagner often advanced
the proposition that tranquil labor relationships were not the sole
consideration: "It all depends upon the basis of tranquility. The slave
system of the old South was as tranquil as a summer's day, but that
is no reason for perpetuating in modern industry any of the aspects
of a master-servant relationship. '20 3 And, although Wagner was one
of the earliest advocates of counter-cyclical public spending and redistribution to sustain mass purchasing power, he often said unequivocally that "the moral injustice of gross inequality . . . is more important than its economic unsoundness. . . . Economic stabilization

is desirable; social justice is imperative.

' 20 4

Wagner further insisted,

200 LUSTIG, supra note 149, at 114-15.
201 See 78 CONG. REc. 3678, 3679 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 20 (equating actual liberty of contract with freedom from
duress due to unequal bargaining power); S. 2926, 73d. Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1934), reprinted
in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at I (identifying centralized and integrated economic
activity as cause of inequality of bargaining power that negates actual liberty of contract);
NLRA, supra note 3, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § I51 (1988) (stating that employees lack equality of
bargaining power and actual liberty of contract).
202 See supra note 31.
203 Robert F. Wagner, Company Unions: A Vast Industrial Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. II,
1934, § 9, at I. "Yet peace is not all. There are values we hold above peace ....
And first
among these is liberty. It is because of the guarantees of liberty that the Labor Relations
decisions are so important." Wagner, supra note 173, at 7; see also 78 CONG. REC. 12,041,
I2,O44 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in r LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38,
at 1241 (expressing same idea).
204 Wagner, supra note 162, at 2; see also Wagner, supra note 163, at 438 (arguing that
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in an exchange of letters with John Dewey, that even if distributive
justice could be achieved by tax-and-transfer policies, the latter would
not remedy the injustice of authoritarianism within workplace relations. 20 5 Only collective empowerment would implement "the new
'20 6
freedom" - "afreedom for self-direction, self-control, cooperation.
That the idea of substantive or positive freedom was at the heart
of Wagner's philosophy is not surprising in light of the centrality of
that idea in American progressivism. 20 7 In applying that idea to labor
relations, Wagner consistently deployed the moral vocabulary of two
currents of progressivism represented among his closest advisers and
associates: the institutionalists' discourse of the workplace as a constitutional democracy, 20 8 and the legal realists' language of economic
20 9
duress and substantive liberty of contract in the labor market.
government must "relegate even the difficult problem of eliminating the business cycle to a
position subordinate to the establishment of actual justice for the man who toils"); 79 CONG.
REC. 7565, 7567 (1935), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2326 (condemning maldistribution of income judged by a standard of minimal need).
205 See Letter from Robert Wagner to John Dewey 2 (Feb. 14, 1934) (on file in The Wagner
Papers, supra note 30, at 562 GF 325, Folder 26).
206 Wagner, supra note 173, at 7.
207 See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 95, at 401-03.
208 Typical of Wagner's use of institutionalist discourse was the following:
[Tihere can no more be democratic self-government in industry without workers participating therein, than there could be democratic government in politics without workers
having the right to vote. . . . That is why the right to bargain collectively is at the
bottom of social justice for the worker . . . . The denial or observance of this right
means the difference between despotism and democracy.
Wagner, Democratic Club, supra note 173, at 4-5. The institutionalists believed that the analogy
to democracy in politics not only underpinned their core normative proposition that workplace
authority should rest on the consent of the workers, see William Leiserson, Contributions of
Personnel Management to Improved Labor Relations, in 1928 WERTHEIM LECTURES ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 125, 160 (1929), but also provided a positive explanation for workers'
demands for collective bargaining. "'The idea that government derives its powers from the
consent of the governed,'" wrote Leiserson in 1926, "'is too fundamentally ingrained in the mind
of every American for wage-earners to be contented with absolute government in industry where
they spend the greater part of their lives.'" EISNER, supra note 107, at 40 (quoting an unpublished manuscript by Leiserson). This argument, too, was repeatedly echoed by Wagner. See,
e.g., Robert F. Wagner, Speech before the New York Labor Institute 5-6 (Feb. 29, 1936)
[hereinafter Wagner, Labor Institute] (transcript available in The Wagner Papers, supra note
3o, at 6oo SF io3, Folder 36); Robert F. Wagner, Talk on Labor Relations 9-io (Feb. 29, 1936)
(transcript available in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at 6oo SF 103, Folder 36).
209 Like the realists, Wagner understood the employment relationship as the paradigm for
equating the powers of property and sovereignty and blurring the line between public and
private action. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 814 (1927); Robert L. Hale, Labor Legislation as an Enlargement of Individual Liberty, 15 AM.
LAB. LEGIS. REv. 155, I55-6o (1925); Wagner, Address on the NIR Bill, supra note 191, at 4
(stating that the bill reflects the "new blend of public and private action"). In the debates of
the 1930s on labor policy, Wagner routinely voiced the characteristically realist arguments about
coercion and substantive freedom in the labor market. The realist Robert Hale testified that
workers' market freedom to enter and exit employment did not legitimate yellow-dog contracts:
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For Wagner, collective empowerment in the labor market was

necessary not only to achieve genuine consent in the workplace, but
also to secure democratic consent in the new cooperative political order
at large. First, when he put forward his labor bills in 1934 and 1935,
Wagner stressed the importance for democratic corporatism of achieving the countervailing organized power of labor against capital. 2 10 He
also insisted both that those bills protected basic worker rights that

normatively pre-existed the NIRA's relaxation of antitrust strictures,
and that the democratic function of the "correlative organization of

labor" in "checking" the power of large-scale enterprise would outlast
21
the NIRA's specific scheme of corporatist planning. '

[I]na complicated modern society like ours, nobody is going to be entirely free ...
[A]n employee of a [nonunion] steel company .
has no freedom as to the details of his
work whatever; he is a non-voting member of a society. Now, if he belongs to a union
in a closed-shop industry, it is perfectly true he has no freedom to work without being
a member of the union, but he has a little more freedcm through the brotherhood of his
union against the restraint imposed upon him by the employer. . . . If he is subject to
be governed by the rules of his union he presumably has a little more control over what
those rules are than if he is governed solely by the rules laid down by his employer. So
I think the moment you reflect a little bit on that notion of individual freedom, you see
that it breaks down.
Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 65, at 5I (statement of Robert L. Hale, Professor of Law,
Columbia University), reprintedin I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 8i. Drawing on
the repertoire of realist arguments against Lochner v. New York and its progeny, see, e.g.,
Lochner v. New York, i98 U.S. 45 (i9o5); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. i (i915), Wagner said
that the individual worker's exit option provided a merely "mythical freedom of action," 75
CONG. REC. 4915 (1932), because holding out against an employer's terms meant "fac[ing] ruin
for [the employee's] family." Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 65, at 17, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 47. The view that the employer-employee relationship was
marked by coercion and power disparity was held not only by the realists, but also by the
institutionalist labor economists. See, e.g., Neil W. Chamberlain, The InstitutionalEconomics
of John R. Commons, in JOSEPH DORFMAN, C. E. AYRES, NEIL W. CHAMBERLAIN, SIMON
KUZNETS & R. A. GORDON, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 63, 91 (1963).

210 Although the NRA "experiment" disillusioned Wagner about the ease of achieving "constructive" cooperation among enterprises, it only intensified his belief that cooperation between
labor and capital through "industrial democracy" was the linchpin of democratic renewal in the
wider polity. As corporate trade associations quickly came to dominate the NRA code-writing
process and simultaneously blocked collective bargaining by interposing company unions, Wagner repeatedly raised the alarm that only half of the corporatist Recovery Act was being
implemented. "This process of economic self-rule under the code system must fail unless every
group is equally well represented." 78 CONG. REC. 12,017 (934), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1181; see also Letter from Robert F. Wagner to Congressman George
W. Johnson x (Apr. 2, 1934) (on file in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at 694 LA 715,
Folder 8) (expressing same idea).
211 See 78 CONG. REC. 22,026, 12,017 (934), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 38, at 1181 ("The Recovery Act did not give employees any rights of organization to which
they were not entitled before the act was passed."); Wagner, Ideal Industrial State, supra note
I5o, at 9. Even after the NRA slipped into irretrievable crisis, Wagner still envisioned a polity
that would be based on cooperation and administrative planning, if in some unspecified form
other than NRA-style corporatism. The countervailing organized power of labor would, in such
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Second, and equally important, organized labor would act as an
antidote to the dangers of autocracy posed by the newly fortified
administrative state. 212 Like other leading progressive proponents of
expert administration, 2 13 Wagner was far from oblivious to the threat
posed by technocratic bureaucracy to the individual voluntarism necessary for genuine reciprocal solidarity. 214 Because democratic citizens' daily experience of "responsibility" is necessary to their "intellectual, moral and spiritual development," Louis Brandeis wrote in 1922,
"no remedy can be hopeful which does not devolve upon the workers'
,,215
participation in, responsibility for the conduct of business ....
Ten years later, Wagner repeatedly used the Brandeisian language of
civic republicanism in his defense of legal protection for workers'
collective action. To replenish the fading civic virtues of "the old
New England town meeting" in an increasingly "impersonalized" administrative state, 2 16 and to nurture "the dignity of freedom and selfexpression in [workers'] daily lives," Wagner prescribed the "road of
organized action to responsibility [and] self-mastery. "217
Wagner believed there was no turning back from mass production
or from the empowered technocratic state. Indeed, he anticipated that
the functions of the administrative state would be vastly multiplied.
Yet he also believed that industrial democracy would afford decentralized, countervailing power and a renewed culture of democracyfrom-below. In this way, Wagner amalgamated corporatist technocracy with both civic republicanism and the communitarian commitment to creating new seedbeds of solidaristic culture. 218 As discussed
a polity, still be indispensable to a democratic equilibrium of social forces. See Casebeer, supra
note 31, at 316.
212 "[Llet men know the dignity of freedom and self-expression in their daily lives, and they
will never bow to tyranny in any quarter of their national life." Wagner, Ideal Industrial State,
supra note I5o, at 23.
213 See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 95, at 1', 353, 358-61, 381-94.
214 The New Deal demonstrated that "the complexities of modern life demand an increasing
concentration of the [state] power to formulate and unify decisions." But such centralization
posed the possibility of an "autocrat[ic] misuse [of] power." Wagner, Ideal Industrial State,
supra note i5o, at 23.
21S STRUM, supra note 118, at 192 (quoting letter from Brandeis to Henry Bru re). Brandeis
believed that the ultimate aim of industrial democracy should be workers' assumption of "'full
responsibility'" for business, "'as in cooperative enterprises.'" Id; see also Louis D. BRANDEIS,
How Far Have We Come on the Road to Industrial Democracy? - An Interview, in THE
CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS 35, 43, 47 (Osmond K.
Fraenkel ed., 1934) (stating that the penultimate stage in the industrial struggle will be "the
sharing of responsibility, as well as profits," and that "[t]he eventual outcome promises to be
full grown industrial democracy").
216 Wagner, Ideal IndustrialState, supra note 1So, at 23.
217 75 CONG. REC. 4918 (1932); see also 78 CONG. REC. 4229, 4230 (1934), reprinted in I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 22, 24 (stating that participatory decisionmaking in
industry is necessary to compensate for impersonalized government).
218 For further discussion of the progressives' embrace of the Tocquevillian idea of inter-
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in the next section, Wagner thought that the collective empowerment
necessary for democratic consent in the enterprise and polity was also
essential for collaboration in workplace production.
E. Labor-Management Cooperation in Progressive Labor
Thought and Practice
For Wagner, workplace cooperation required that labor feel trust
toward management, take responsibility for productive efficiency, and
recognize shared, rather than adversarial, interests in the common
enterprise. But, Wagner was convinced, that mentality could rest
only on labor's sense that it would share fairly in the economic fruits
of such productivity-enhancing attitudes; and that sense, in turn,
depended on the security and consent of the workforce which only
2 19
collective empowerment could supply.
Wagner's normative understanding of collective bargaining, then,
was profoundly integrationist and cooperationist, not conflictual and
adversarial as is conventionally supposed. 22 0 His vision of labor relations was embedded in his progressivist assumption that the proper
deployment of social science and administrative technique, and redis-

mediate groups as schools for democracy, see, for example, WESTBROOK, cited above in note
161, at xvi, 434; and David E. Price, Community and Control: Critical Democratic Theory in
the Progressive Period, 68 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 1663, 1666-67 (1974). On the tension between
the technocratic and democratic poles within progressivism, see, for example, Richard W. Fox,
Epitaph for Middletown: Robert S. Lynd and the Analysis of Consumer Culture, in THE
CULTURE OF CONSUMPTION 103, 128-29, 160 (Richard W. Fox & T.J. Jackson Lears eds.,
1983).
219 See 78 CONG. REC. 3678, 3679 (1934), reprinted in i LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note

38, at 20 ("The primary requirement for cooperation is that employers and employees should
possess equality of bargaining power."); see also 79 CONG. REc. 6183, 6t84 (1935), reprinted in
2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2283 (expressing same idea); 75 CONG. REC. 4918
(1932) (expressing same idea). The theoretical implications of Wagner's thinking on this issue
are explored at length below in section IV.C. Wagner's view accorded with other post-war
labor progressives attuned to scientific management who thought independent unions, by achieving the "consent of the governed," would unleash workers' "precious psychic and social energies
[by means of] autonomous, self-imposed discipline." FRASER, supra note 47, at 129; see also
ORDwAY TEAD & HENRY C. METCALF, LABOR RELATIONS UNDER THE RECOVERY ACT 16
(1933) (expressing the same idea); TOMLINS, supra note 31, at 81 (attributing a similar view to

Leiserson).
220 This theme was persistent in Wagner's statements throughout the period of the drafting

and implementation of the Recovery Act and of the NLRA. A New York Times interviewer
noted that Wagner "stressed again and again the spirit of cooperation which he deem[ed]
essential" to the success of the New Deal program. In that interview, Wagner said "'cooperation
between employer and employe is not merely urged; it is boldly written into the law,'" Woolf,
supra note 66, at 6, and he concluded, "[a] true cooperation, based on mutual understanding,
is the only solution for our difficulties." Id. at I8. Wagner told the Senate in 1935 that
"cooperation was the only safeguard against social disintegration." 79 CONG. REC. 9417 (1935);
see also FRASER, supra note 47, at 127 (attributing same view to other labor progressives,
including Commons, Frankfurter, and Hillman).
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tribution of political and economic power could generate a regime of
egalitarian communication. Social conflict could be transcended by a
cooperative harmony of social groups, "based upon reason rather than
upon force." 22 1 Wagner could thus describe the NLRB as:
an agency designed for harmony and mutual concessions. [Congress]
established an impartial forum, where employers and employees could
appear as equals, where they could look with frank and friendly eyes
into each others [sic] problems, where they could banish suspicion and
hatred, and where they could sign contracts of enduring peace rather
than mere articles of uncertain truce. 222
"[M]utual understanding and trust" would flow from the statutorily
encouraged "method of conference, of give and take, of free cooperation. '223 Wagner, in short, envisioned a legally-engineered transformation of large-scale enterprises from low-trust, adversarial to hightrust, cooperative organizations.. He anticipated economic and psychological consequences very similar to those which more recent analysts of high-trust organizations have elaborated and celebrated.2 2 4
Wagner's highly cooperationist view of collective bargaining was
not merely a progressivist banner unfurled on the occasion of his
legislative initiatives. From the end of World War I into the 193os,
a cluster of influential labor, engineering, managerial, and academic
progressives had assiduously promoted '-

and practically tested

-

institutions of collective bargaining designed to encourage collabora225
tion and to reshape conflicting group interests.
While many on the left denounced the AFL traditionalists' brand
of cooperationism as abject class collaborationism, other progressives
and socialists saw unions' participation in joint problem-solving committees as the first step toward worker control and corporatist plan-

221 79 CONG. REC. 7565, 7573 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38,
at 2341; see also Robert F. Wagner, WOR Radio Debate (Apr. 28, 1935) (transcript available
in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at 6oo SF 103, Folder 33) (expressing same idea).
222 Wagner, Talk on Labor Relations, supra note 208, at 3-4.
223 Robert F. Wagner, Address at the AFL Convention io (Oct. io, 1930) (transcript available
in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at 546 SM 453); see also Wagner, supra note 173, at 6
(describing "permanent harmony" and "triumph of reason" that would flow from NLRA).
224 See infra section IN.C.
225 The mainstream AFL's embrace of the slogan of labor-management cooperation in the
service of industrial efficiency in the 1920S - usually ascribed to the desire of the severely
debilitated Federation to promote its conservative respectability in managerial circles - is a
familiar story. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 117, at 85-90; MILTON J. NADWORNY,
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT AND THE UNIONS, 1900-1932, at 122 (I955). Less familiar perhaps
is the active involvement of progressives and socialists associated with the AFL opposition bloc,
together with progressive engineers and social scientists, in some of the leading cooperative
experiments of that decade. See infra pp. 1429-30.

1993]

WAGNER ACT

1429

ning in basic production decisions.2 26 The "most famous offspring" of
this "paradoxical marriage of progressive unionism and scientific management" was the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad plan. 227 Under that

plan, members of the International Association of Machinists in the
railroad shop crafts participated in joint committees with managers
at the shop and district levels to revise work practices in the interest
of increased productivity. Perhaps more influential still among the
progressive reform elite was the cooperative machinery for planning
production and organizing work installed in a variety of settings by
Sidney Hillman's Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America. 228
Mary Gawthorpe, an ACWA education director, believed that such
machinery was "'bringing to the workers' hands and brains every
experience that is necessary to full and complete responsibility and
ownership of the industry.' "229 Wagner assembled leading figures
associated with the implementation and advocacy of these models for
close collaboration in his legal and political battles on behalf of labor
in the

192os

and 1930s, most notably in his campaign against the

yellow-dog injunction 230 and his fights for section 7(a) of the NIRA
2 31
and for the NLRA itself.

226 See, e.g., MONTGOMERY, supra note ii, at 420-24; Sanford M. Jacoby, Union-Management Cooperation in the United States: Lessons From the r92os, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
18, 26 (1983).
227 MONTGOMERY, supra note ii,at 422; see also DAVID M. VRooMAN, DANIEL WILLARD
AND PROGRESSIVE MANAGEMENT ON THE BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD passim (ggi) (describing the management programs at the B & 0).
228 See FRASER, supra note 47, at 131; HABER, supra note 119, at 15o.
229 MONTGOMERY, supra note ii, at 421 (quoting Gawthorpe).
230 In 1928, Wagner orchestrated the successful, landmark legal challenge to a New York
state court's injunction barring the AFL from organizing transport workers who had signed
yellow-dog agreements with the Interborough Rapid Transit Company. See Interborough Rapid
Transit v. Green, 227 N.Y.S. 258 (1928). The centerpiece of the litigation, a 480-page "Brandeis
brief," drafted by Wagner, Riflind, Oliphant, and Hale, see Wagner Brief, supra note 125;
Rifkind Interview, supra note 98, at I, was widely disseminated among labor and legal activists
and served as a key sourcebook for proponents of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See HUTHMACHER,
supra note 55, at 65; Ernst, supra note 117, at 270. The Wagner Brief's principal sociological
argument was that legal obstruction of collective bargaining impeded collaborative, efficiencyenhancing shop committees that could not succeed without the empowerment of autonomous
unions. See Wagner Brief, supra note 125, at 417-28; infra section IV.C. To offer expert
support for that proposition, Wagner assembled many proponents of labor-management cooperation, including Taylor Society engineers, see, e.g., NADWORNY, supra note 225, at 122-26,
131, 133; Otto S. Beyer, The Technique of Cooperation, II BULL. TAYLOR SOC. 7 (1926); labor
economists, see, e.g., LAUCK, supra note Ioo, at 171-73, 301, 320-346; Paul H. Douglas, Shop
Committees: Substitute for, or Supplement to, Trade Unions?, 29 J. POL. ECON. 89, 102-07
(1921); Sumner H. Slichter, Raising the Plane of Industrial Relations Discussion, II BULL.
TAYLOR SOC. 3, 3-4 (1926); progressive employers, see, e.g.,
VROOMAN, supra note 227, passim
(describing Daniel Willard of the Baltimore & Ohio); Sir Henry W. Thornton, K.B.E., Management's Appraisal of Principles, Methods and Results, ii BULL. TAYLOR SOC'Y 26, 29 (1926);
and sympathetic progressive publicists.
231 Those proponents of cooperationism discussed above at note 230 and other progressive
advocates of the new gospel of integrative labor relations - notably, Leiserson, Jacobstein, and
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In 1933, after most of the cooperative experiments of the 1920S
other than those of the Baltimore & Ohio and the Clothing Workers
had evaporated under the heat of the Great Depression and of reasserted managerial prerogatives, the AFL itself quietly dropped its
endorsement of cooperative plans. 232 Yet Robert Wagner and his
circle continued to champion the same ideal mode of cooperative labor
relations. 233 It was an ideal that continued to resonate powerfully
with Wagner's progressivist commitment to building a cooperative
order founded on the principles of scientific planning, substantive
freedom, and egalitarian communication and solidarity. Institutionally, that ideal called for independent unionism conjoined with the
company-union-like structures of shop committees and similar consul23 4
tative labor-management bodies.

Hillman - were central players in Wagner's key legislative initiatives to promote collective
bargaining. Jacobstein, one of Wagner's closest friends and most influential advisers on his
NIRA drafting team in 1933, was a personnel manager and economist who had zealously
implemented and publicized the ACW's "Rochester Plan" of cooperative labor-management
machinery. See Meyer Jacobstein, Can IndustrialDemocracy Be Efficient? The RochesterPlan,
5 BULL. TAYLOR SOC. 153, 156-58 (192o); Rifkind Interview, supra note 98. Jett Lauck, also
a member of that team, likely deserves substantial credit for ensuring the initial incorporation
of labor rights into the Recovery legislation. See ViTToz, supra note 43, at 89.
During the drafting and defending of the Labor Disputes and Labor Relations bills of 1934
and 1935, Wagner again enlisted the efforts of Beyer, Suffern, Slichter, Hillman and, of course,
Leiserson. In the Congressional hearings, they testified generally to the cooperative, integrative
promise of collective bargaining, and, more specifically, to the virtues of the Baltimore & Ohio,
Canadian National, and Amalgamated Clothing Workers' schemes of collaboration. See Hearings on S. 2926, sura note 137, at 286-92 (statement of Arthur E. Suffern), reprinted in I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 316-22; id. at 220 (statement of Otto Beyer), reprinted
in i LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 25o; Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 38, 176
(statement of H.A. Millis), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1556; id. at
874, reprinted in r LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1556. Indeed, the arguments of
opponents of the Act turned on contested interpretations of the origins and meaning of those
cooperative schemes. Walter Gordon Merritt, a leading management theorist, argued that the
Act's ban on company unions was mistaken, because the competitive challenge of company
unions likely induced labor unions to adopt such cooperative machinery as the Baltimore &
Ohio plan. See Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 137, at 1o9, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1057 (brief of Walter Gordon Merritt). At the same time, William
Dunne of the Communist Party's Trade Union Unity League denounced the Baltimore & Ohio
efficiency plan, linking it to the AFL's general pronouncements that managerial and labor
interests were aligned. See id. at 980 (statement of Walter F. Dunne), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at iOX8.
232 See Jacoby, supra note 226, at 31.
233 Nor was this ideal confined to the progressive reform elite. Working-class radical activists
in the 193os also continued to deploy the progressivist discourse of scientific management. See,
e.g., GARY GERSTLE, WORKING-CLASS AMERICANISM 10-I, 174-77 (1989).
234 For recent commentators urging similar combinations of collective empowerment and

collaborative structures, see sources cited above in note 26.
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IV.

THE ROLE OF SELF-REFLEXIVE INTERESTS, NORMS, AND
TRUST IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WAGNER ACT

The progressive origins of the Wagner Act illuminate the roles of
self-interested rationalism and symbolic constructionism in three broad
issues of labor law policy and theory. Section A of this Part examines
the play of ideology- and interest-transforming processes in the broad
origins and impact of the labor legislation. Section B explores how
those processes influenced the origins and justification of the key
contested substantive provision in the Act, the ban on company unionism. Section C analyzes Wagner's understanding of the instrumental
and symbolic dynamics of labor-management cooperation, and aligns
and elaborates Wagner's view with more recent theories of workplace
cooperation and trust. As to each of these issues, the common theme
of Wagner's political economy and its current variants is that actors'
preferences, interests, norms, and broader dispositions of trust are
endogenous to institutional practices and discourse. 235
A. Processes of Interest-Transformationin the
Origins and Impact of the Act
Processes of ideology- and interest-transformation shaped the origin
and impact of the Wagner Act in three broad ways. The major
relevant social groups entered the New Deal period with historically
contingent interpretive frameworks that informed their subjective political interests. The ensuing legislative initiatives had a reciprocal
effect on the perceptions and interests of those groups. Finally, that
transition in social consciousness was mediated by the ongoing political
contests of policy entrepreneurs. A particularly important elite debate
focused precisely on the impact of legal symbols and sanctions on
workers' and managers' consciousness.
i. Contingent Ideological Frameworks. - Much traditional economic theorizing - including the public choice explanation of the
Wagner Act - assumes that unions perceive and pursue an interest
in government intervention to aid their pecuniary rent-seeking. 236
Compelling recent theoretical and empirical writing suggests, however,
that political interests (or any other "self-interests 23 7) cannot be reli235 See note i above for explanations of the concepts of "exogenous" and "endogenous"
preferences, interests, and perceptions, and the relationship of those concepts to self-interested,
instrumental-rationalist theories of legislation and economics.
236 See sources cited supra note 4. Similarly, some traditional Marxist thinking ascribes
objective political interests to social classes or class segments. See, e.g., STEVEN LuKES, POWER:
A RADICAL VIEW 22 (I974); Isaac D. Balbus, The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian
Analysis, I POL. & Soc'Y i51, i6i, 167 (I97,).
237 "Self-interest is an empty term, until you have defined what a self is and the kind of
things it is interested in." James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible? The Post-Modern Subject in
Legal Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 489, 5o9 (i99i).
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ably ascribed to a group apart from the group's contingent judgment

of its interests; and the group's historically received, contested ideology
shapes that judgment. Work in discourse theory, cognitive psychol-

ogy, and the sociology of knowledge demonstrates that language and
other symbolic systems, discursive practices, and ideological maps are
not merely communicative, but in part constitutive, of individual and
238
group perceptions, interests, and identities.

This is not to suggest that subjective political interests are fully
constructed by (and therefore conflated with) a historically contingent
"political discourse," as some Nietzschean post-modernists have pro-

posed. 2 39 Nonetheless, the post-modernist denial "that the mere oc-

cupancy of some place within society will automatically supply you
with an appropriate set of political beliefs and desires" is indisputable. 2 40 Subjective political interests and perceptions are generally the

(highly contextual) joint product of actors' inherited discursive frameworks, socio-economic position, the political circumstances they face,
24 1
and their own creative, often intersubjective, deliberation.
The AFL's ideological occlusion and political passivity - discussed

in Part 1[ -

is a clear illustration that neither the "interests" sought

by social groups, nor the political will to satisfy them, are objectively
or ahistorically given. That the "interests" of organized labor in the
early 1930s were open to a wide range of specifications is well dem-

onstrated by the concurrent experiences of the AFL and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, which was not affiliated with the AFL

prior to the New Deal. While the AFL failed to play a more dynamic
role in early New Deal labor policy in part because of its voluntarist
ideological heritage, the ACW was equally hamstrung by the passion24 2
ately socialist political "interests" held by much of its membership.
238 For a recent summary of this vast literature, see Peggy J. Miller & Lisa Hoogstra,
Language as a Tool in the Socialization and Apprehension of Cultural Meanings, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 83, 83 (Theodore Schwartz, Geoffrey M. White
& Catherine A. Lutz eds., 1992). Among legal theorists, the interest- and identity-constituting
nature of (legal and other) categories of thought and discourse is well presented in KELMAN,
cited above in note 8, at 243; Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, ProfessionalLanguage,
and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, ioi HARV. L. REV. 727 passim (1988).
239 This extreme position is presented, not without ambiguity, in BARRY HINDESS & PAUL
HIRST, MODE OF PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL FORMATION 9-33 (1977); ERNESTO LACLAU &
CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND SOCIALIST STRATEGY 105-45 (1985).
240 TERRY EAGLETON, IDEOLOGY 206 (i99I).

241 Terry Eagleton, for example, asks us to "[i]magine an objective location within the social
formation known as third galley slave from the front on the starboard side." Id. Even if one
were unwilling to embrace Eagleton's declaration that someone - anyone - occupying that
social location has an "objective interest in emancipating himself," id. at 207 (emphasis added),
one can still predict that the galley slave is likelier subjectively to experience such an interest
under conditions of diminished secondary socialization by his superiors, and that such a subjective interest is likelier to be embraced by the "League of Escaped Galley Slaves" than by the
Emperor and Magnates. See id. at 206.
242 The ACW played a limited organizationalrole, even though its "new unionism" of the
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What was true for organized labor was also true for business
groups, as several of the leading historical studies of 1930S managerial
policy attest. Steven Fraser's study of New Deal political economy
has brought to light the "new, rising milieu of mass-market-oriented
producers, distributors, and financiers" who, in the 1930s, showed
"more amenab[ility] to 'Keynesian' approaches to shoring up aggregate
demand," including more willingness to contemplate forms of purchasing-power-enhancing collective dealing between labor and management.2 4 3 Nonetheless, Fraser makes clear that the emerging
Keynesian politics

-

including the new labor policy -

was actually

fashioned and won primarily by a reform elite "who stood outside the
marketplace." 244 Fraser's acute documentation shows that the new
"industrial profile" translated into neither a "political action committee
of businessmen" nor "the sort of shadow government that began to
gather in the corridors of the Democratic party and around the state'245
house in Albany.
Consistent with this analysis is Howell Harris's portrayal of managerial groups' strategic choices to promote the disparate policies of
"persistent anti-unionism," "realism," or "progressivism" in labor-management relations. 24 6 Case studies of the rubber, textile, auto, and
steel industries show that comparable enterprises in the same industry
supported such radically different labor policies, stemming from individual firm histories and cultures of labor relations and the idiosyncratic personalities and philosophies of key decisionmakers of each
firm. 24 7 Business historian Daniel Nelson concludes that such contin-

served as a model for New Deal political entrepreneurs including, of course, ACW
President Sidney Hillman. Hillman played a leading personal, entrepreneurial role as an early
New Deal strategist. See FRASER, supra note 47, at 28o. The ACW was later brought into the
New Deal fold, in part as a result of the shift in workers' interests and preferences induced by
New Deal policies and pronouncements - another confirmation that group interests are not
pre-politically fixed. See infra pp. 1335-39.
243 FRASER, supra note 47, at 264.
1920S

244

Id.

at 266.

245 Id.

In the mass, businessmen were scarcely more politically articulate or active than other
functional groups, oscillating between apathy and political routine, often informed by
nothing more elevated or enlightened than habit and tradition, or the myopia of selfinterest. . . . [T]he newly empowered "Keynesian" elite enjoyed at best limited support
among the great mass of entrepreneurs and practically no support among older industrial
groups.
Id.
246 HOWELL J. HARRIS, THE RIGHT TO MANAGE 23-37 (1982).
247 See, e.g., GERSTLE, supra note 233, at 1o5-i1 (textiles); Steve Jefferys, "Matters of
Mutual Interest": The Unionization Process at Dodge Main, i933-1939, in ON THE LINE:
ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF AUTO WORK 100, 121-24 (Nelson Lichtenstein & Stephen Meyer

eds., 1989) (auto); Daniel Nelson, Managers and Nonunion Workers in the Rubber Industry:
Union Avoidance Strategies in the 1930s, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 41, 41-5 1 (1989) (rubber);

Richard C. Wilcock, IndustrialManagement's Policies Toward Unionism, in LABOR AND THE
NEw DEAL 275, 300-302 (Milton Derber & Edwin Young eds., 1957) (steel).
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gency - which was typical of "much of American industry" - demonstrates that "corporate executives were not political symbols, but
individuals confronting complex problems in settings of extreme uncertainty." 248 The fallacy of reductionist assumptions about the formation of subjective political interests applies not only to elite economic groups, but also nonelite actors, as discussed in the next section.
2. The Perceived and Actual Symbolic Effect of the New Deal
Labor Legislation. - Wagner's understanding of consent and cooperation, discussed in Part III, registered a convergence between the
conditions necessary to render worker consent "genuine" in a normative sense and the conditions necessary to elicit subjective worker
acquiescence in a purely descriptive sense. Wagner's understanding
of the relationship between normative and descriptive consent reflected
a nuanced view of the relation between legal symbolism and worker
consciousness - a view that again interwove major strands of progressive thought.
Wagner's speeches and writings at times intimated a characteristically pragmatist and realist tendency; he seemed to conform his normative evaluation to existing fact, his "ought" to an "is. '"249 In his
1937 lecture at Yale Law School, he proposed that "while the facts
do not always govern what the law is, they at least determine what
the law ought to be."'25 0 Applying this proposition, the "factual
basis"25 1 for the Wagner Act's normative premise that collective bargaining would yield genuine consent might be that workers would
subjectively acquiesce in the authority relations of the mass production
workplace only if they were afforded collective bargaining. 25 2 What
the industrial worker subjectively took to be the dictates of social
justice would be enshrined by the legislature in the name of objective
justice.
But this initial interpretation ascribes to Wagner a too simple,
reductive view of the relation between legal norm and social consciousness - and inaccurately implies that his conception of objective
social justice was driven simply by the instrumental purpose of ap248 Nelson, supra note 247, at 5o.
249 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 187o-I96o, at
211-12 (1992) (explaining the realist tendency to conflate "ought" and "is"); MORTON G. WHITE,
SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA 212-214 (1952).
250 Wagner, supra note 129, at 2.
251

Id.

at 21.

252

[The workers] believe with every fibre of their being that their part in developing our
great national wealth entitles them to be heard....

They are sold upon the proposition

that the worker's right to some voice in the business from which he draws his bread, it
is [sic] fundamental as his right to some voice in the government from which he gets his
laws.
Wagner, Labor Institute, supra note 208, at 5-6; see also Wagner, Talk on Labor Relations,
supra note 2o8, at 1-2, 8-11.
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peasing workers' subjective discontent. 25 3 To the contrary, true to his
Progressive Era roots, Wagner took the moral objectivity of workers'
substantive freedom as axiomatic. 25 4 In his Yale speech he went on
to say that the relevant "changing facts" to which the law should
"cling"
embrace not only economic statistics. They embrace industrial law
and popular psychology as well. They include the mass of decisions
already rendered and statutes already passed. They include the crystallized attitude toward these laws on the part of workers, employers
and the public. Insofar as these group attitudes toward the law have
worked their way into the fabric of our institutional life, they are just
255
as much facts to be dealt with as the number of the unemployed.
Law must conform to facts; however, social facts, including popular
consciousness, were not pre-legal but were shaped by prior - and
could be reshaped by future - legal interventions. In short, Wagner's
understanding of the relation between legal norm and social consciousness was not reductionist but dialectical.
In setting out this abstract view in his 1937 speech, Wagner
generalized a historically pivotal experience on which he had
frequently commented since the enactment of section 7(a) of the
Recovery Act in 1933. While that provision effectively lacked
any enforcement mechanism, its encouragement of militant
worker action had been stunning.256 Along with many other
253 For an attack on such appeasement, see Epstein, cited above in note 4, at 1404-05. The
Wagner Act - even on this limited interpretation of Wagner's understanding of law and fact
therefore demonstrates that the realists' conflation of "ought" and "is" did not always embody
a politically conservative bias, as Horwitz sees in Llewellyn's factual appeal to extant business
norms to fashion the Uniform Commercial Code. See HoRWiTz, supra note 249, at 211-12. It
all depended on the "is" to be codified. For a progressive pragmatist like Wagner, the "is" was
a dynamic "process of becoming" that included oppositional "facts" such as workers' aspirations.
254 Although legal realists such as Hale and institutionalist economists such as Commons
believed that, as a descriptive matter, coercion was an inevitable element of contractual relations
regardless of relative bargaining power, see supra note 124, they were hesitant to take the
normative leap overtly to demarcate legitimate and illegitimate coercion, false and genuine
consent, in the way Wagner did. On the tension between ethical relativism and pragmatic
political action in institutionalist and legal realist thought, see Daniel Ernst, Common Laborers?
IndustrialPluralists, Legal Realists, and the Law of Industrial Disputes, 1915-1943, I LAW
& HIST. REV. (forthcoming, Spring 1993). Wagner's ethical objectivist stance was clearly rooted
in an abiding Progressive Era faith in "the reality of a common good." DANIEL RODGERS,
CONTESTED TRUTHS x82 (1987).
25s Wagner, supra note 129, at 2-3.
256 In the months after the enactment of § 7(a), workers flooded into labor unions, often
spontaneously forming new locals. The AFL issued charters to 3,537 new federal (i.e. industrial)
locals between June and October of 1933 alone. As employers resisted union demands for
recognition, strikes in 1933 rose to their greatest level since 1921. The following year witnessed
an even larger strike wave, including violent upheavals in Toledo, San Francisco, and Minneapolis which, to contemporary observers, approached the dimensions of civil war. By the end
of 1934, organized labor had regained almost as many members as it had lost between 1923
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observers, 25 7 Wagner attributed that upsurge in significant part to the
symbolic effect on worker consciousness of the legislative endorsement
of the right to collective bargaining. 25 8 Looking back in 1935, Wagner
wrote that section 7(a) "drove its appeal to the conscience and hopes
'2 9
and aspirations of nameless men and women from coast to coast. S
When Roger Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union opposed
the NLRA on the ground that it would "lull[-] labor," Wagner pointed
to the section 7(a) experience as proof that, to the contrary, it would
be "a galvanizing force." 260 The historical evidence confirms Wagner's
26
perception. '
and 1933, an accomplishment that would have been exceeded had the sluggish AFL been
prepared for the upsurge in worker militancy. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 79, at 172-73, 21798; JACOBY, supra note ig, at 224.
257 See, e.g., Sumner H. Slichter, Labor Under the National Recovery Act, 12 HARV. Bus.
REV. 142, 148 (1934).
258 Wagner's chairmanship of the NLB - set up precisely to respond to the unrest triggered
by the Act - had exposed him to the way that workers' desire for collective bargaining had
been sparked by the entitlement symbolized by § 7(a). (The revival of the labor movement in
1933-34 was not, of course, attributed wholly to Section 7(a). Among the other forces thought
to be at work were the recovery in employment due to enhanced business confidence after the
passage of the Recovery Act, the organizational efforts of militant, often leftist activists, and
workers' pent-up frustration after years of depression.) This was one of the crucial pragmatic
lessons of the "tremendous experiment" of the NRA. Wagner, supra note 179, at 12; see also
Robert F. Wagner, WEVD Radio Address x-2 (June 25, 1937) (transcript available in The
Wagner Papers, supra note 3o, at 6oo SF 103, Folder 38) (expressing same idea). Indeed, even
before he witnessed the "inspirational," id., and "galvanizing" impact of § 7(a), Wagner recognized that legal pronouncements could shape workers' desire. Letter from Sen. Robert F.
Wagner to Roger Baldwin, Director, American Civil Liberties Union i (Apr. 5, 1935) (hereinafter
Wagner, Baldwin Letter] (on file in The Wagner Papers, supra note 3o, at 700 LA 717, Folder
37). In his defense of the Norris-LaGuardia Act's proscription on injunctions to enforce yellowdog contracts, Wagner explained that the prior legalization of collective organization in state
law - amounting to a social pronouncement that unions were legitimate - had the effect of
"'whet[ting] the desire to join'" unions, in the face of employers' continuing private obstruction
of organizing by the yellow-dog contract. 75 CONG. REc. 4916 (1932) (quoting Walter Gordon
Merritt). For Wagner, of course, the entire Recovery Act was premised on the expectation that
a new cooperative ethos could be implanted in the "hearts and minds" of the citizenry. See
Wagner, supra note 62, at 4. More generally, Wagner believed that the success of the "controlled experiment" of reform legislation depended on the degree to which it induced citizens to
"come forward in eager participation." Wagner, Catholic Charities, supra note 62, at 4.
259 Robert F. Wagner, Speech at Madison Square Garden io (May 23, 1935) [undelivered]
(transcript available in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at 6oo SF 103, Folder 34).
260 Wagner, Baldwin Letter, supra note 258, at I.
261See supra note 256. "The strike wave of mid-1933 and the one in the spring and summer
of 1934 were inspired by the rhetoric if not the actual achievements of the new regime; again
and again the Blue Eagle and 7a were invoked to sanction acts of resistance and rebellion."
FRASER, supra note 47, at 329 (emphasis added); see also LIzABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW
DEAL: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CHICAGO, 1919-1939, at 278, 303 (i99o) ("Although the NRA
'had no teeth,' . . . it unleashed a torrent of pent-up enthusiasm for organization . .. .P;
Jefferys, supra note 247, at ioi (illustrating the impact of §7(a) on labor relations in the auto
industry). Popular consciousness of the legislation was promoted by the "Blue Eagle" campaign
launched by the public-relations-obsessed head of the NRA, General Hugh Johnson. See HUGH
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In Wagner's view, once workers had, in part under the inspiration
of section 7(a), come to "believe with every fibre of their being" 262 in

their right to collective bargaining, there was no turning back from
the government's commitment to secure that entitlement. In March,
1934, Wagner warned that "increasing unrest is inevitable if the hopes
inspired by the Recovery Act are frustrated. ' 263 The desires whetted
by the "pledge made by the government" in section 7(a) would be
further stimulated, and simultaneously satisfied, by the entitlements
of the NLRA.264
To the progressive mind of the 193Os, the lesson of section 7(a) that workers' subjective interests and sense of entitlement were (in
part) endogenous to legislative pronouncements - was easily assimilated. That popular consciousness was conditioned by social circumstances and susceptible to deliberate "engineering" were staples of

S. JOHNSON, THE BLUE EAGLE FROM EGG TO EARTH i58-408 (1935). Labor handbills across
the country proclaimed that the United States government had endorsed collective organizing,
and workers flocked into union locals named "NRA" and "Blue Eagle." See BERNSTEIN, supra
note 79, at 37-125; SCHLESINGER, supra note 5o, at 139. In November, 1933, George Johnson
of the Endicott Johnson Company warned his son, who managed the family business, to take
special care in attending to worker grievances because their nonunion workforce was "thoroughly
wrought up by that thing called the 'Seventh Article' in the Recovery Act." Gerald Zahavi,
Negotiated Loyalty: Welfare Capitalism and the Shoeworkers of Endicott Johnson, 1920-1940,
71 J. AM. HIST. 602, 614-25 (1983) (quoting letter from George F. Johnson to George W.
Johnson, Jr., and Charles F. Johnson, Jr.). Similar instances are recounted in COHEN, cited
above, at 304; FRASER, cited above in note 47, at 292; and GERSTLE, cited above in note 233,
at 128, 13o n.7.
262 Wagner, Labor Institute, supra note 208, at 5.
263 HUTHMACHER, supra note 55, at 192 (quoting Wagner); see also Robert F. Wagner,
Wagner Challenges Critics of His Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1937 (Magazine), at I ("[T]hose
goaded into fighting for ... elementary social rights are [not] amenable to ordinary restraints.");
79 CONG. REc. 2371 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 38, at 1312 ("[E]mployees find it difficult to remain acquiescent when they lose the
main privilege promised them by the Recovery Act.").
264 See Wagner, supra note 259, at 20, 23-25. In the language of his Yale speech, the law
would have to "cling" to a brute fact of "popular psychology" - the fact that workers believed
deeply in their right to collective organization. But that belief was itself a "crystallized attitude"
generated in part by the earlier enactment of § 7(a), and the passage of the NLRA would again
act as such a "galvanizing force." The "inspirationalvalue" of the NIRA would thus "stand[]
as a permanent contribution toward economic democracy upon the American continent." Wagner, WEVD Radio Address, supra note 258, at I (emphasis added). This account of Wagner's
understanding of the way that legislative pronouncements stimulated worker attitudes and
behavior is consistent with the new labor historiography ascribing central roles to state policy
and cultural transformation in the rise of the industrial labor movement in the 193os.
The great strike waves and daring forays into the heart of heavy industry of the mid1930s seem practically inconceivable without the prior sea change in mass political
attitudes inspired first by 7a and then by the legislative breakthroughs [including the
NLRA] of the 'second New Deal,' and registered with irresistible force in the Democratic
landslides of 1934 and 1936."
FRASER, supra note 47, at 329; see also GERSTLE, supra note 233, at 130 & n.7, 18o-8i
(documenting workers' assimilation of legal-administrative discourse).

1438

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

progressive psychology. 2 65

[Vol. IO6:I379

The salient experiences of wartime pro-

paganda and of nascent mass advertising, put the manipulable, fictive
qualities of public attitudes at the center of the social criticism of such
thinkers as Walter Lippmann, Harold Lasswell, and Thurman Arnold
in the 192os and 1930s. 2 66 By contrast, such "communitarian" progressives as Charles Horton Cooley, Josiah Royce, and John Dewey
saw positive, democratic possibilities in the social construction of

human desires and interests, 2 67 along the general lines of the cooperativist society that Wagner sought to create. 2 68 Wagner's view of law

and society thus suggests that what, according to R.J. Lustig, was
true for progressives during the Progressive Era remained true in the

New Deal: "[T]he new frontier for national effort . . . turns out to
have been the minds of the nation's citizens.

'26 9

In his broadest rhetorical moments, Wagner depicted industrial
democracy through collective bargaining as the inevitable working out

of the teleology of freedom. 270 But his more elaborate analyses make
plain that the means for realizing the evolution toward objective

worker interests and natural social justice would reflect Holmes's
pragmatist credo: "The mode in which the inevitable comes to pass is

265 Even John Dewey, the progressive thinker most hostile to paternalist suffocation of
individual voluntarism, evaluated "specific social arrangement[s]" in light of their "creation of
changed personalities." 12 JOHN DEWEY, Reconstruction in Philosophy, in THE MIDDLE
WORKS, 1899-1924, at 77, 192 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1982) (1920).
266 See, e.g., THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 5-82, 1I8-84 (1937);
HAROLD D. LASSWELL, PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUE IN THE WORLD WAR 185-213 (1927); WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 7-32 (2922). Wagner read and corresponded with Lippmann,
see, e.g., Letter from Sen. Robert F. Wagner to Walter Lippmann (May 26, 1934) (on file in
The Wagner Papers, supra note 3o, at 694 LA 715, Folder 8), and was advised by Arnold. See
supra note 227.
267 Dewey retained faith that egalitarian communication could sustain communitarian democracy. See supra p. 1419; see also CHARLES H. COOLEY, SOCIAL PROCESS 351-94 (918)
(arguing for "rational control of human life" as a means of establishing an intelligent democratic
process); JOSIAH ROYCE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY 228-48 (19o8) (arguing that training
people in loyalty will enhance participatory democracy). For a useful discussion of the communitarian progressive view that interests and desires were endogenous to communities, see
Price, cited above in note 218, at x663-73.
268 If Dewey's and Wagner's political philosophies converged in their general commitments
to cooperative, democratic interest-formation, they diverged at the programmatic level, at least
regarding the NRA. Dewey vehemently objected to the degree of centralized corporatism
embodied in the NRA. He did, however, support the NLRA. See WESTBROOK, supra note 161,

at 44o-4I.

269 LUSTIG, supra note 149, at 248; see also id. at 194 ("Progressive respect for human nature
came down to a decision to resolve social conflicts by controlling the conditions in which psyches
developed and symbols emerged.").
270 See 79 CONG. REC. 7565 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2321 ("It is the next step in the logical unfolding of man's eternal
quest for freedom."); 75 CONG. REC. 4918 (1932) (statement of Sen. Wagner) (arguing that
collective bargaining would produce "the kind of men Divine Providence intended us to be").
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through effort. '27 ' That is, the inexorable evolution toward industrial
democracy was a deliberately engineered evolution, an instance of
"Reform Darwinism," to use an apt characterization of the progressive
reform vision.2 72 The path of the law would help align workers'
subjective sense of the legitimacy of workplace governance with what
Wagner took to be the objective conditions of genuine consent.
Through both its instrumental and symbolic effects, then, the new
labor policy would help create the industrial labor movement in the
image of the progressive vision of objective worker entitlements and
2 73
social justice.
3. ProgrammaticDebate Among Progressive Policy Entrepreneurs.
Economists model legislation as a process in which legislators act
either as agents or brokers for the interests of social groups, or as
sellers of political benefits to interest groups.2 7 4 In the latter model,
payments by interest groups "take[] the form of campaign contributions, votes, implicit promises of future favors, and sometimes outright
bribes." 2 75 Public-choice theorists thus presume that legislators act in
their relatively narrow self-interest, which includes their desire for
reelection and their pecuniary interests. 2 76
271 GOLDMAN, supra note

188, at 79 (quoting Justice Holmes).

272 On the concept of Reform Darwinism, see GOLDMAN, cited above in note 188, at 72-81;
LUSTIG, cited above in note 149, at 158 (describing how progressives, outflanking conservative
Social Darwinists, argued that "the process [of social evolution] could be made more efficient
and humane if the adaptation were conscious"); and Hovenkamp, cited above in note 152, at
671-85.
273 It is important neither to overstate nor to decontextualize the claim for the impact of
legislative symbolism on worker consciousness. Wagner believed that workers' sense of entitlement to collective bargaining flowed not just from legislative symbolism but from democratic
commitments and other norms in the general political culture and from workers' daily experience
of subordination and solidarity. See supra note 208; infra pp. 1456, 1458. And the symbolic
entitlement of workers to collective bargaining rights was but one symbolic legal-political pronouncement among the many that emanated from New Deal policy and account in part for the
"sea change" in workers' political and industrial attitudes. FRASER, supra note 47, at 329; see
also COHEN, supra note 261, at 285, 289 (expressing same idea); GERSTLE, supra note 233, at
179 (same). To tell the full story of the symbolic impact of labor legislation, one would have
to identify more comprehensively not just the phase of symbolic production (i.e. legislation), but
also the means of symbolic transmission (e.g., government's, labor organizations' and the mass
media's dissemination of information about the legislation); the social contexts of symbolic
reception (i.e. the settings in which workers themselves discussed and interpreted the legislative
symbols); and the historically contingent importance of legislative symbolism relative to myriad
other cultural forces affecting worker consciousness. For useful frameworks for analyzing this

process, see W.

RUSSELL NEUMAN, MARION R. JUST & ANN C. CRIGLER, COMMON KNOWL-

EDGE: NEWS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL MEANING 3-22,

and

60-77, 96-122 (1992);

B. THOMPSON, IDEOLOGY AND MODERN CULTURE 28-73, 272-327 (1990).
274 For the agent or broker model, see ROBERT E. MCCORMICK & ROBERT D. TOLLISON,
JOHN

POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION,

AND THE ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GROUP

THEORY OF GOVERNMENT 7-11, 29-6o (1981). For the seller model, see William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, r8 J.L. &
ECON. 875, 877 (1975).
275 Landes & Posner, supra note 274, at 877.
276 For one leading analysis presuming narrow self-interest-maximization by political actors,
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While there is much explanatory power in the linkage between
private interests and the self-interest of policy-makers, 2 77 the historical
evidence suggests, in the case of the Wagner Act, a substantial independent role for programmatic debate and creativity among the relevant political entrepreneurs. 278 That is, just as the "interests" of
private interest groups are not objectively pre-determined but are
shaped in part by contingent ideological frameworks, the same is true
of the "interests" of political elites. Others, of course, have criticized
public choice models for their neglet of the importance of the ideological objectives of private or public actors. 2 79 This Article's account
of the Wagner Act, however, highlights the endogeneity and selfreflexivity of ideology and interests within the legal-political process
itself. Among the politically articulate, newly empowered reform elite
of the 1930S, ideological positions on the labor question were varied
see Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. OX, I03-o6 (1987). That presumed motivation, of course, implies
that legislators will by and large act as the transmission belt for the interests of effectively
organized groups or, where the saliency of a particular issue overcomes the public's rational
ignorance of political affairs, for the interests of voters. For some leading public choice theorists,
of course, the Wagner Act reflected organized labor's lobbying power, transmitted through the
narrow self-interest of a Congressional majority. Political theorists of the "corporate liberal"
school rely on the same reductionist assumption that political actors are the agents or suppliers
of private interest groups, but reach the antipodal conclusion about the identity of the buyers
and beneficiaries of the Wagner Act. Senator Wagner and allies like John Commons, Lloyd
Garrison, and Francis Biddle are portrayed as quintessential corporate liberals serving the longterm interests of the capitalist class. See, e.g., Domhoff, supra note 65, at 170-72, 178. Even
those neo-Weberian state theorists who grant political actors substantial autonomy from private
interests tend to presume that the interests of "state managers" can be read from their institutional
position in state bureaucracies or legislatures. See, e.g., BLOCK, supra note 57, at 54, 67. In
such theories, the interests of political actors again presumptively lie in retaining or expanding
state power or securing personal incumbency and perquisites.
277 See supra pp. 1396-97. Although this Article's account of the Wagner Act criticizes the
interest-group, deal-making model, it by no means rules out the Gramscian thesis that elite
actors' ideological frameworks are influenced by a dominant culture itself conditioned by powerful material forces such as business and organized labor. See T.J. Jackson Lears, The Concept
of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities, go AM. HiST. REV. 567, 568 (1985); supra
note 29. However, this Gramscian approach to political culture, even with its traces of functionalism, is a far cry from the market-like model of legislative deals sketched above. American
political culture in the 1930s was sufficiently multivocal, and the alignment of interest-group
forces sufficiently fluid, to allow political entrepreneurs a substantial degree of freedom in
drawing on (and altering) the extant repertoire of ideological understandings of labor relations,
including elements that were distinctly "oppositional" to dominant economic groups.
278 See supra Parts II, III; infra section IV.B. David Plotke makes this general point well,
though not in the context of a critique of public choice theories of politics, and without
reconstructing the debates among political entrepreneurs that shaped the crucial provisions of
the NLRA, including § 8(a)(2). See Plotke, supra note 42, at 117-26.
279 See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRicKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 29-33 (1991); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical
Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical"Practiceof the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L.
REV. I99, 205-23 (ig8); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 10, 32-45 (igi).
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and up for grabs. The debate over labor policy, in turn, focused on
the extent to which the subjective ideologies and interests of private
groups were susceptible to transformation through legal and political
engineering, symbolic and instrumental. In other words, theorists'
recognition that the ideologies of relevant actors play an important
role in political outcomes is just the beginning of the story. If ideology
and interests are malleable, and especially if the actors themselves
recognize that fact, then institutional and discursive contests (including
legal contests) over subjective interests and perceptions become central
to political processes and outcomes and require theoretical attention.
Politics becomes an arena not only for maximizing or brokering interests (whether narrow pecuniary interests or broader "ideological" 0in28
terests) but also for the transformation of ideology and interests.
In this light, the general theory that explains labor legislation as
the political deployment of symbolism to pacify a disruptive working
class 28 1 is broadly accurate in the case of the New Deal legislation,

but requires elaboration. That theory, by positing that the legalpolitical order will yield the symbolic output necessary for restoring
labor peace, risks falling into the functionalist fallacy. 28 2 The causal

mechanism that produces the "functional" symbolism in response to
worker disruption needs to be specified. The above analysis suggests
that (i) that mechanism cannot be taken for granted but rather turns
on the interpretive framework of the relevant political elite facing the
workplace unrest, and (2) that framework need not call simply for
maximum symbolic pacification. As detailed in the previous section,
Wagner's ideology was more nuanced than a simple labor-pacification
position. He believed that passage of the NLRA, like the enactment
of the NIRA, would not simply palliate worker discontent but would,
in his words, "galvanize" and "inspire" workers' collective rebellion by
reinforcing their sense of entitlement, even while channeling that rebellion into goals and institutional structures concordant with the
progressives' ultimate vision of labor-management cooperation.283

280 Cf. Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social
Choice Theory, Value Pluralism,and DemocraticPolitics, go COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2195 (1990)
(elaborating a positive and normative defense of political transformation of community selfdefinition); Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 16 ('99')
(elaborating a normative defense of political transformation of preferences).
281 See Hyde, supra note 7, at 431-48.
282 In the functionalist fallacy, a social phenomenon (here, the pacifying legal symbolism) is
"explained" by its function or effect. That is, it is explained by a posterior event, here, the
quieting of labor unrest, rather than by its actual causal origins - the political forces responsible
for fashioning and transmitting the legal symbol. See JON ELSTER, MAKING SENSE OF MARX

27-29 (1985). I do not mean to attribute this fallacy to Hyde himself in his applications of the
theory of symbolic pacification. To the contrary, Hyde has been a steadfast critic of functionalist
explanation. See Hyde, supra note 7, at 427 n.i56; Hyde, supra note 8, at 420-22.
283 This is consistent with Hyde's prediction that "when pressure is being placed on man-
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Thus, in the framing and passage of the Act, the reform elite did
not act merely as an uncreative courier of an existing package of
"precedents" under the "impetus" of labor and radical unrest, as some
commentators have intimated. 284 Ideological and political conflict
among elite political entrepreneurs decisively shaped the precise substantive content of the New Deal labor legislation and the future path
of American labor relations. The importance of such conflict, which
included debates over the plasticity of worker consciousness, was
apparent in the crucial contest5 over the appropriate regulatory re28
sponse to company unionism.

B. Worker Interest-Formationand the
Justificationfor the Ban on Company Unions
i. The Puzzle of the Justificationfor the Company Union Ban.
Wagner's justification for banning company unionism must ultimately
be understood in light of the primacy that he assigned to achieving
workers' genuine consent to workplace authority. For Wagner, as a
normative matter, the company union failed to provide sufficient collective empowerment to eliminate duress and achieve workers' democratic consent to the system of workplace governance in the largescale enterprise. 28 6 And because the objective conditions for normative consent and for descriptive acquiescence converged, company
agement by spontaneous or unorganized workers, concessions will be made" by political elites
"to build [unions] up as a restraint on employee action, or simply to institutionalize the conflict."
Hyde, supra note 7, at 440. On the other hand, the electrifying effect of New Deal labor policy
on the growth of the industrial labor movement deviates from Hyde's prediction that "one would
anticipate limited direct behavioral effects apart from the short-range goal of conflict suppression," id., and perhaps also from his prediction that "elites would, to the extent possible, offer
concessions which combine the maximum symbolic pacificatory value with the minimum inroads
on employer control," id. at 439. A regime of proportional representation and permissible
company unionism may have better fit the latter criterion than did the NLRA but was rejected
after entrepreneurial contest. See supra section ll.D; infra section IV.B.
284 See, e.g., Goldfield, supra note 67, at 1269.
285 The spirit of this analysis is captured in Robert Gordon's response to legal structuralists:

The structuralists would ... respond that legal structures, because of their indeterminacy,
can't be expected to connect in any predictable fashion with the interests of any particular
class or group. . . .One could concede this point to the structuralists and still ask them
to embed their story in a narrative context that would at least supply subjects and
occasions to the narrative to show that it is human beings with reasons and motives, not
disembodied Spirits, who drive the manufacture of legal concepts: Who pushed which
arguments on what occasions and why? What happened to set off the arguments? What
happened to destabilize previously stable conventions?
Gordon, supra note 8, at 119.
286 See 78 CONG. REc. 3443 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in x LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 38, at 15 (arguing that company-dominated union "makes a sham of [the]

equal bargaining power" necessary for workers "to exercise their proper voice in economic
affairs"). But see Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 65, at 725 (statement of Arthur Young, Vice
President, U.S. Steel), reprintedin I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 763 (arguing that

consent could be achieved with company unions).
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unionism also failed to achieve cooperation and subjective legitimation
28 7
in the firm and the polity.

Nonetheless, when viewed within the overall regulatory structure
of the Wagner Act, this failure-of-consent justification for the ban on
company unionism seems incomplete and requires substantial elaboration. Wagner and other legislative supporters of the Act repeatedly
offered three alternative arguments for why the company union failed
to sustain the substantive freedom or collective empowerment necessary to achieve workers' consent to managerial authority - call them
the "simple coercion," "contracting into slavery," and "empowerment
failure" arguments. Each of these arguments is insufficient to justify
the company union ban because each of them applies equally to the
non-union option which was left open to workers.
(a) The Simple Coercion Argument. - The simplest justification
for the company union ban was that employers coerced workers into
choosing, or participating in, company unions. Legislators - and
early judicial and administrative interpreters of section 8(a)(2) - emphasized employers' widespread threats and reprisals designed to intimidate workers to participate in company unions and shun outside
unions. 28 8 Some thought that even "[i]ntimations of an employer's
preference [for the company union], though subtle, may be as potent
as outright threats of discharge. '28 9 In this light, workers' inevitable

287 See 78 CONG. REC. 4230 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in i LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 38, at 24-25 (warning that a company union ban is essential to avoid
either "industrial fascism" or worker "revolt, with wide-spread violence," and that a company
union cannot "insure industrial peace" because "[m]en versed in the tenets of freedom" will not
accept such denial of freedom). Wagner's claim here is not that the company union caused
industrial unrest because employers used it to divide and conquer the workforce (although
Wagner did believe that too, see 79 CONG. REC. 7570 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2334), but that the company union failed to legitimate the workplace
regime for workers committed to a certain view of workplace freedom.
28 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 65, at 8o (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted
in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at no (stating that protecting individual worker
choice against employer compulsion to join company unions "is all this legislation is intended to
do"); 78 CONG. REC. 12,041, 12,042 (i934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in r LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1234 (arguing that "[r]efusal [by the worker to accept the
company union] means the loss of his job," and that "ft]hat is the way a company-dominated
union is organized"); id. at 12,o2o, reprinted in i LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1189
(stating that company unions are formed by "coercive methods").
289 NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 6oo (194i). The quote is from Justice Douglas's
opinion for the Court, but it faithfully mirrors some (though not all) Congressional opinion in
the debate over the Act. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 3266 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate
Commerce Amendments to the Railway LaborAct, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (i934) (statement of
Joseph Eastman, Federal Coordinator of Transportation); Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 65,
at 124 (statement of Sidney Hillman), reprinted in r LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at
154; S. REP. No. 573, 74 th Cong., Ist Sess. 10-Il (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 38, at 231o. But cf. SENATE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 74TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., COMPARISON OF S. 2926 AND S. 1958 27 (Comm. Print 1935), reprintedin i LEGISLATIVE
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presumption that the employer prefers the company union makes the
mere availability of such entities inherently coercive.
Nonetheless, this justification for the company union ban is inadequate as a coherent interpretation of section 8(a)(2). Proponents of
the ban believed that employers had equally widely conditioned work-

ers' jobs on their "choice" of no union and that workers were as likely
to presume their employer's preference for the open shop as for the

company union. Yet the entire architecture of the Act was premised
on allowing, not eliminating, the non-union option. Governmentsupervised, secret-ballot elections and administrative sanctions against
unfair labor practices would protect against just such coercion in the
collective choice process. 290 If, as Wagner was convinced, that machinery was adequate to safeguard workers from direct managerial

reprisals for their choice of an outside union over no union, 29 1 why
was it not adequate to safeguard the choice between a company union
2 92
and either of those two options?
HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1352 (stating that employer has right to "suggest" labor organization,
though not to dominate it); 78 CONG. REc. 10,559, io,56o (1934) (statement of Sen. Walsh),
reprinted in i LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1125 (stating that employer has the
right to "peaceful persuasion" as to merits of organization). This accords with the early administrative viewpoint, see, e.g., In re Wheeling Steel Corp., x N.L.R.B. 699, 709 (1936) (stating
that employees' initiative with respect to a company union was "determined by fear of [the
corporation]"), and with leading commentary, see, e.g., Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the
Labor Management Relations Act, x947 [Part 1], 6x HARV. L. REV. I, 15 (x947).
290 The premise that government intervention would free workers' collective choice from
managerial coercion may have been false. See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers'
Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1776-81 (1983); infra
notes 488, 498. Skepticism about the possibility of uncoerced choice in the workplace becomes
even more tempting once workers' interests and preferences are understood as potentially endogenous to the structure of labor-management relations. See infra pp. 1457-58, 1478-84.
In his powerful response to employers' continued (if not escalated) coercion of workers in
NLRB representation elections, Professor Weiler proposes the de facto elimination of employer
campaigns altogether by allowing workers to choose outside unions by means of either signed
membership cards or instant elections. See Weiler, supra, at 18o6-o8, I81x-x6. These reforms
would be insufficient to prevent continuing coercion in a regime that permitted workers to elect
a company union in NLRB elections. Workers who want to establish a company union may
have less incentive to hide their intentions from an employer, whom they would often expect to
support the company union. Or, management itself might initiate the company union campaign.
This would open the door to employer coercion of other workers. The distinction between
employer campaigns against outside unions and their campaigns for company unions would,
then, provide grounds for eliminating the company union option altogether while allowing the
non-union option - but only in a world in which, contrary to legislators' original assumption,
the Board could not eliminate employer coercion.
291 "Congress rejected [the] hopeless argument" that "no law could prevent the anti-democratic practice of systematic discharge for union affiliations." Letter from Senator Wagner to
the New York Times r (Apr. 25, 1937) (on file in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at 6cc SF
io3, Folder 38); see also Robert Wagner, National Labor Relations Bill, NBC Radio Address 3
(May 21, 1935) (transcript available in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at BB 120, Vol. 2,
§ iii) (arguing that "secret ballot" will force employer "to treat all [worker-voters] alike").
292 Even employers' continued requirement that workers join the company union against
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(b) The Contracting-Into-Slavery Argument. - One could infer
from three alternative legislative arguments that the ban on company
unions rested on workers' inalienable right to independent collective
representation. Wagner often advanced the following proposition:
To say that [the management-controlled] union must be preserved in
order to give employees freedom of selection is a contradiction in

terms. There can be no freedom in an atmosphere of bondage. No
organizationcan be free to
represent the workers when it is the mere
293
creature of the employer.
Of course, there is no "contradiction in terms" in the idea of giving
workers the option of voting for a labor-management structure that
operates under the control of management. There is nothing intrinsic
in the liberal concept of "freedom of choice" that bars choices that
trade future freedoms of either the workers or their chosen labor
organization for perceived benefits. 294 Such choices are made every
their will would not in itself prevent them from freely voting for an outside union in a secret
ballot election. For this reason, Professor Kohler's proposition - that recent circuit court
decisions that allow the establishment of inside unions "return[] the law to its pre-Texas & New
OrleansRailway state" and therefore fail to "remov[e] all obstructions to the exercise of employee
initiative to exercise their associational rights to organize" independent unions - requires
explanation. Kohler, supra note 23, at 545 (citing Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (193o)). Further argument is necessary to show
that the operation of the company union illegitimately prevents workers from organizing and
electing an independent union in a legal universe that includes the NLRB machinery.
Indeed, workers' belief in a managerial preference for an inside union, and workers' resentment of managerial threats, might induce workers to be more, not less, favorably disposed to
vote for an outside union, given the protection against reprisals that would, Wagner insisted,
be afforded by the secret ballot. Professor Getman makes just this claim in the somewhat
analogous context of an employer's preferential recognition of one of two rival outside unions.
He suggests that workers' awareness of the employer's preference for one union is more likely
to enhance than to reduce their support for the non-favored rival union. See Julius Getman,
The Midwest Piping Doctrine: An Example of the Need for Reappraisalof Labor Board Dogma,
31 U. CHI. L. REV. 292, 306-07 (1964). One of the grounds for Getman's claim that workers
will shun the company-favored union, however, is that "[t]he term 'company union' still has
strong pejorative connotations." Id. at 307. Because the legislative proscription of company
unions accounts, in part, for those pejorative connotations, Getman's argument is not as compelling when deployed against that very proscription.
293 79 CONG. REc. 2368, 2371 (1935), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38,
at 1313 (emphasis added); see also Hearings on S. z958, supra note 38, at 41 (statement of Sen.
Wagner), reprinted in i LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1417 (introducing the 1935

bill to the Senate Committee); Wagner, supra note 89, at 9.
294 The general point is well made in Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 3,
17 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983). Wagner did not deny that company unions provided some benefits
to workers. See infra note 302. Nor did he argue that the objective costs of company unions
outweighed the objective benefits, either as the grounds for a paternalistic, utilitarian justification
for the company union ban, or as evidence that workers must have been coerced into "choosing"
organizations with net costs. As discussed below in section IV.B.2.(c), Wagner did believe,
however, that workers would develop a sense of entitlement and solidarity that could not be
satisfied by company unions.
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and are not objec-

tionable for that reason alone, at least within the understanding of
liberal legislators such as those who supported the Wagner Act. 295
Second, Wagner at times linked the otherwise empty "contradiction
in terms" formulation with more substantial arguments that might be
taken implicitly to rest on overriding workers' group choice in the
296
name of either inalienable rights or unratifiable conflicts of interest.
As discussed in section Ill.D above, Wagner and his allies often drew
an analogy between the right to participate in political democracy and
the right to full representation through outside unions in industrial
democracy. They also occasionally cast their rights-based defense of
the company union ban in language redolent of "the Kantian argument
that there is something in every human being that is not his or hers
to alienate or dispose of: the 'humanity' that we are' 29enjoined
to
'respect, whether in our own person or that of another.' 7
A third, frequently articulated ground for blocking workers' ratification of company unions was the inherent conflict of interest generated by managerial influence over the workers' ostensible collective

agent. That conflict stemmed, in Wagner's view, from the economic
dependence of both the employee representatives and the company

295 An individual worker's choice to work in a non-union workplace - or a unionized
workplace, for that matter - places her, for the duration of her employment, under the coercive
regime of management rules enforced by the threat of discharge. The Act did not proscribe
such a choice. More to the point, the Act allowed the workforce as a group to choose nonunionization, which Wagner and other proponents understood as a state of managerial despotism.
See Wagner, supra note 89, at 8-9.
296 But see p. 1449 (describing Wagner's repeated denials that the Act overrode free
choice).
297 Feinberg, supra note 294, at 13; see also 79 CONG. REc. 9668, 9685 (1935) (statement of
Rep. Connery), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 3116 (arguing that the
company union ban allowed citizens to "say 'I am master of my soul, I am not an industrial
slave'"); 79 CONG. REc. 6183, 6184 (I935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2284 ("We must not now repudiate the pledge that has been
given [American workers] of emancipation from economic slavery and of an opportunity to walk
the streets free men in fact as well as in name."); 77 CONG. REc. 55280 (I933) (statement of
Sen. Wheeler) (stating that in company unions, workers "do not dare say their souls are their
own"). The philosophical basis of Wagner's non-consequentialist justification for the company
union ban need not be understood in specifically Kantian terms. One might object to the
company union regime, as to slavery or serfdom, based on non-transcendental or non-universalist
communitarian commitments to ways of life, see, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE:
A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY xiv-xvi, 98-103 (1983); on an interpersonal ethic of
mutual recognition and reciprocity, see Drucilla Cornell, Dialogic Reciprocity and the Critique
of Employment at Will, io CARDozo L. REv. 1575, 1582-88 (x989); or on "anarchic sentiment"
that is repulsed by a relationship that smacks of exploitation or peonage, see Duncan Kennedy,
Distributive and PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. Rlv. 563, 624, 628 (1982).
Elements of each of these positions can be found in the progressive ethos in which Wagner was
immersed.
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union itself on the employer. 298 The company union was thus akin
to "a practice whereby the person on one side of the bargaining table

pays the attorney of those with whom he deals."2 99

298 See 79 CONG. REc. 7565, 7570 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2334. Company union representatives appearing before
the Congressional committees insisted that workers could and would vote out of office those
representatives who were swayed by management's tug of the purse strings. Indeed, they argued
that representatives would more keenly serve the interests of the rank and file because of the
bonus pay received from management, which they stood to lose if voted out of office. See, e.g.,
Hearings on S. r958, supra note 38, at 539 (statement of Robert L. Hart, B.F. Goodrich Co.),
reprinted in 1-2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1373, 1925.

Of course, the proponents

of the ban had the more accurate understanding of the incentive structure facing employee
representatives. True, betraying coworkers' interests risked loss of the next election and with
it bonus pay, status, perquisites, power of patronage dispensation, the respect of peers, and
perhaps self-respect. But challenging management risked losing all those benefits of office and,
more important, loss of the job itself or of the chances of promotion that often were dangled
before employee representatives.
To say the least, the incentive structure was not well-designed to align the agents' interests
with those of their ostensible principals. It is true that the general nature of the workplace gave
the rank and file certain advantages - spatial, communicational, and informational - in
monitoring their agents that other kinds of collective principals (such as shareholders) lack.
Individual workers nonetheless faced the usual free-rider disincentives to making sacrifices
(including the risk of job loss) in the name of holding representatives accountable, weighed
against uncertain gains from a more honest slate of company union representatives. Wagner
and other legislators were also familiar with special obstacles to monitoring company unions.
These included the failure to provide accurate information to the rank and file about the
substance of meetings between management and employee representatives and the infrequency
of, if not formal ban on, general meetings between representatives and their constituents. See,
e.g., id. at 572 (statement of John D. House), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
38, at 1958.
299 79 CONG. REC. 7565, 7570 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2334. The argument that company unions put management "on
both sides of the table" was voiced by many of the bill's proponents, who drew analogies not
only to an attorney's conflict of interest, but to a shareholder's right to select a board of directors
that is independent of the employees, and to a seller's right to hire a sales agent who is not in
the pay of the buyer. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 65, at 38 (statement of Milton
Handler), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 68; Hearings on S. 1958,
supra note 38, at 871 (statement of Dr. William Leiserson), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 38, at 2257.

To assess properly the empirical severity of the conflict of interest in company unions,
legislators should, again, have reimagined the operation of inside unions in the context of the
new legal regime providing sanctions against just the kind of managerial threats through which
the inside agents' conflict was created - that is, threats of job loss, loss of promotion, and
organizational defunding or disbandment in retaliation for representatives' aggressive exercise of
statutory rights of concerted activity, organizing, and bargaining. See supra p. 1444. Legislators
should also have considered the degree of inside representatives' apprehension about managerial
reprisals in the context of a regime that makes outside unionization a more easily available
option and therefore a counter-threat that might provide additional deterrence against intimidation by management. But see Senate Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 65, at 656 (statement
of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2052 (erroneously
arguing that workers would be unable to vote out company unions in a post-NLRA regime
because of pre-NLRA simple coercion of voters).
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Wagner's attachment to the legalistic principle that an agent should
have but one master may seem unremarkable in light of his liberal
juridical background and, more important, the contractualist theme
of the new regulatory regime. 300 It is nonetheless in tension with his
recognition of the virtues of collaborationist workplace relations.
Some relatively hardboiled current analysts30 1 have affirmed what
Wagner acknowledged at the time: that company unions may have
served not just as contracting agents but as beneficial consultative
bodies, providing fora for exchanging information, settling grievances,
and solving operational problems between parties locked in an ongoing
ensemble of common and conflicting interests. 30 2 Wagner's preferred
model of integrative collective bargaining itself showed that the workplace was not inevitably a terrain of pure arms-length contracting
through independent agents, but could also be a zone of more fluid,
interdependent social relations that blurred functional roles in the
interest of collaborative operations.
The primary difficulty, however, with the analogy to an unwaivable right to unconflicted collective voice - as with the asserted
inalienable rights to political participation and to autonomous personhood - is that the Wagner Act allowed full alienation of the right to
"democratic" collective bargaining, to freedom from industrial "slavery," and to collective voice of any kind, 30 3 by permitting workers to

For historical evidence that inside union representatives used the counter-threat of outside
affiliation as a way of strengthening their hand vis-a-vis management, see Sanford M. Jacoby,
Reckoning with Company Unions: The Case of Thompson Products, z934-1964, 43 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 19, 30 (1989). Nonetheless, the transaction costs of converting from an inside
to an outside union, and the costs to workers of "insuring" their inside representatives' income
against managerial reprisal prevent the conflict of interest from being fully eliminated. I am
indebted to my colleague Jeff Gordon for clarification of this theoretical point, which is illustrated
historically by the experience of the prototypical company union instituted in 1914 by the
Rockefeller-owned Colorado Fuel and Iron Company. In 1917, the employee representatives of
that company union unsuccessfully sought to secure such "insurance" from the rank and file.
See BEN M. SELEKMAN & MARY VAN KLEECK, EmIPLoyEs' REPRESENTATION IN COAL MINES

89-94

(r924).

300 See 79 CONG. REc. 7571 (i935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2336.
301 See, e.g., PIORE & SABEL, supra note zo, at 124-28; Daniel Nelson, The Company Union
Movement, 1900-1937: A Reexamination, 56 Bus. HIST. REV. 335, 335-39 (1982).
302 See Robert F. Wagner, Company Unions: A Vast Industrial Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
I,
1934, § 9, at I ("The company union has improved personal relations, group welfare
activities, discipline and the other matters which may be handled on a local basis."); Wagner
Brief, supra note 125, at 64-65.
303 Legislators could have understood the company union ban as the minimal paternalism of
preventing workers from knowingly choosing an organization in which management's manipulation of employee representatives was too subtle and pervasive for workers to monitor ex post.
No legislator, however, owned up even to such minimal paternalism. In any event, this
justification would not sit easily with the skeletal structure of the Act. The Act allowed workers
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choose no union. 30 4 Wagner repeatedly insisted that the company
union ban was justified exclusively on the ground of preserving workers' free choice over modes of workplace governance. 305 He never
explicitly conceded that workers' free choice was overridden in the
name of an inalienable right or nonratifiable conflict of interest.
(c) The Empowerment Failure Argument. - As discussed above,
the primary objective of the Wagner Act was to achieve workers'
"substantive freedom" by eliminating duress in workers' consent to
managerial authority. The means to that end was the facilitation of
collective action in the labor market in order to enhance workers'
bargaining power.
Wagner explicitly connected the company union ban to his larger
program of collective empowerment of workers in the labor market.
The goal of redistributing bargaining power by means of independent
labor organizations which, unlike company-dominated unions, were
capable of amassing strike funds and engaging in trans-enterprise
bargaining, 30 6 was clearly the key element in Wagner's larger program. That goal nonetheless cannot provide the sole justification for
section 8(a)(2). 30 7 The Act allowed workers to choose two modes of

to choose non-dominated company unions. Although free of management funding and control,
such unions were marked by the same key source of (subtly and pervasively generated) conflict
of interest as dominated company unions, namely, the dependence of worker representatives on
the employer for their livelihood and advancement. See Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 65,
at 9 (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 39;
79 CONG. REC. 2368, 2371 (i935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1312-13. Hence, the Act allowed workers to waive their right not
only to collective voice, but also to unconflicted collective voice. In Senate debates, committee
chair Senator Walsh maintained, with no explanation why the same argument would not apply
to dominated company unions, that if non-dominated company unions "are not representative
of the men, if they are not really engaged in honest collective bargaining, we must give the
employees of this country, men and women, credit for recognizing that and overthrowing, in
time, such organizations." 79 CONG. REC. 7648, 7660 (i935) (statement of Sen. Walsh), reprinted
in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2375.

304 Wagner often insisted both that the Act allowed the worker "to belong to any kind of
union that he likes, or to stay out of all unions if that is his wish," Robert F. Wagner, Speech
for Movietone i (Feb. 23, 1935) (transcript available in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30, at
6oo SF io3, Folder 32), and that the absence of a union gave employers "despotic control" of
workers. Wagner, supra note 89, at ii.
305 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 38, at 417, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1803; 79 CONG. REc. 6183, 6184 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2284; Wagner, supra note 89, at 9.
306 See 79 CONG. REC. 7565, 7570 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2321, 2333 (introducing the 1935 bill); 78 CONG. REC.
3443 (1934), reprinted in i LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 15; supra note 16.
.307In an important interpretive study of the political significance of the Wagner Act, Christopher Tomlins suggests that "leading advocates" of the bill condemned the company union for
reasons of economic stabilization, and "not ... because of the existence of employer interference
[with the civil rights of their employees] per se." TOMLINS, supra note 31, at 122 & n.63.
Tomlins acknowledges that the Act's protection of workers' choice of non-dominated company
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governance that would have the same harmful effect on labor-marketwide bargaining that Wagner attributed to company-dominated
unions, namely, non-unionization and non-dominated company unionization. 30 8
2. The Debate Among Political Entrepreneurs Over Company
Unionism and Worker Consciousness. - The puzzle over the justification for the company union ban thus reflects the tension between
the two leading principles articulated by Wagner and his allies in the
framing of the Act: the principle of workers' absolute free choice over
modes of workplace governance, 30 9 and the principle of the collective
unions poses difficulties for his argument that § 8(a)(2) was designed solely to block modes of
workplace governance that did not implement market-wide bargaining (although he does not
mention that the same difficulty is posed by the very premise of voluntary unionization itself).
Tomlins suggests that those difficulties were resolved by the Act's combination of the company
union ban and the "administrative designation of the dimensions of the group from which
representatives would be selected by majority vote to bargain on the group's behalf." Id. at
123. But the proponents of the Act understood that its unit-determination provisions were
intended to restrict the Board to defining units that did not extend beyond single employers.
See NLRA, supra note 3, § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1988); 79 CONG. REC. 9668, 9728 (1935),
reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 3093, 3220. They also understood that
parties' voluntary aggregation of bargaining units would by no means inevitably widen ultimate
bargaining configurations. See Casebeer, supra note 31, at 333; Wagner, supra note 89, at 14i5. However large the issue of bargaining-unit definition loomed in the post-enactment politics
of the Act, see TOMLINS, supra note 31, at 149--96, it was not a significant issue that drove the
drafting of the Act's key substantive provisions. See Handler Oral History, supra note I8, at
38 (explaining that "the unions were not fighting with one another in terms of the bargaining
units," but rather, "[t]he fight was between company unions and outside unions"). It is important
to recognize that § 8(a)(2) was deeply inscribed with the multiple purposes of redistribution of
bargaining power and protection of rights of free collective choice and free association. See
supra sections II.D and IV.B. i.(b). Otherwise, it is difficult to explain either the Act's allowing
workers the options of non-unionization and non-dominated company unions, or the relentless
efforts of legislators (and administrators and judges) to develop a satisfying choice-protecting
justification for the company union ban, including the justifications discussed below at section
IV.B.2.(c).
305 See supra notes 291, 303-305. No legislator advanced the argument that putting company
unions on NLRB representation ballots might have "agenda effects" conflicting with the basic
legislative goals of collective empowerment and free group choice. As the discussion above has
stressed, workers were permitted several options that might "drain" votes from an independent
union that would otherwise be able to win an electoral majority - including the non-union
option, the non-dominated company union option, and rival independent unions. Legislators
gave no reason - independent of the other justifications for the company union ban canvassed
in this Article - that company unions' diversion of votes was less legitimate than the diversion
caused by these other options.
309 By Wagner's "principle of absolute free choice," I mean free choice only over a range of
governance mechanisms limited by the background regime of property, contract, and corporate
law, and the background distribution of endowments, that practically ensured that hierarchical
control of enterprise decisionmaking would rest with the agents of capital suppliers. See generally Louis Putterman, On Some Recent Explanations of Why Capital Hires Labor, ECON.
INQUIRY, Apr. 1984, at 171, 172-86 (examining why capital hires labor instead of the reverse).
Thus, workers' range of governance options in NLRB elections did not include full workplace
democracy, that is, worker election of managers or direct management by worker assemblies.
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empowerment and substantive freedom of workers. 310 That tension
was at least partly resolved for proponents of the company union ban
by their particular understandings of the symbolic effects of law and
managerial structures on the formation of workers' subjective interests
and perceptions.
(a) Progressivism and the Principle of Free Choice. - Under one
interpretation of the principle of free choice, the company union option
should have been placed on NLRB representation election ballots
alongside the options of non-unionization and outside unionization.
Wagner was well aware of this interpretation, which was reflected in
the law fashioned by the labor boards that administered the NIRA of
1933-35 (including the Wagner-chaired NLB), 31 1 in the policies of the

If the background regime of entitlements and endowments were such that unionization enhanced
workers' bargaining power sufficiently to contract collectively for such full workplace democracy,
then the NLRA regime would practically afford workers even that governance option. The
craft unions of the late nineteenth century are one illustration of full worker control achieved
by contract. See DAVID MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CONTROL IN AMERICA 9-27 (1979).
310 The two principles are in tension, but are not necessarily contradictory. Even if workers
exercise their free choice not to unionize, the availability of the threat of unionization itself
enhances their bargaining power. Hence, legislative protection of workers' free choice or freedom
of association lowers the cost of organizing, thereby enhancing the collective bargaining power
of even non-union workers by making their threat to unionize more credible. In this light, the
company union ban can be cast as serving collective empowerment either directly - because
the company union could not amass the strike funds or deploy the trans-enterprise strike power
of an outside union - or indirectly - because company unionism enhanced the costs of, or
illegitimately diminished the willingness of workers to choose and form, outside unions. The
"puzzle" of the company union ban, as presented in the previous section, is that the availability
of the option of forming a "weak" company union would not seem to weaken workers' bargaining
power so long as the availability of the company union did not impede their free choice of (or
their mere threat to choose) the more empowering outside union - or, at least, so long as the
company union option did not impede that choice any more than did the availability of the
nonunion option which was left open to workers.
311 Although the NRA boards ruled against coercive practices associated with company
unionism and vigorously opposed the NRA's endorsement of company unions unilaterally imposed by management, the boards compromised by allowing workers to ratify company-dominated unions. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., I N.L.R.B. (old) 173, 175-76 (1934)
("[O]rdinarily the choice [between independent and company unions], good or bad, is for the
employees to make.
...
); Kohler Co., i N.L.R.B. (old) 72, 72-76 (1934); B.F. Goodrich Co.,
i N.L.R.B. (old) i81, 181-84 (i934). NLB General Counsel Handler summarized the policy as
a proscription of employer interference and domination of labor organizations, but only "where
the employees have not clearly consented thereto." 78 CONG. REC. 12,oi6, 13,030, reprinted
in i LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1177, 121o. The old NLRB, however, left open
the possibility that an employer's various modes of interfering with or dominating the company
union would still be subject to challenge in the event that the company union won the election.
See, e.g., Firestone, i N.L.R.B. at 276. But the Board was never presented with the question
before its demise in June 2935. In other words, it remained an open question whether the old
Board was on the road to the thoroughgoing "absolute free choice" position allowing workers to
ratify and the company to maintain even a dominated organization. It may instead have been
headed toward some, perhaps diluted, version of the Wagner Act NLRB's position that workers
would be permitted to choose a company union only if it were fully cleansed of company
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Federal Transportation Coordinator prior to the Railway Labor Act
Amendments of 1934,312 and recurrently in testimony during the
NLRA hearings over which Wagner presided. 3 13 In the view of managerial and company union representatives, company unions were
"obstacles" to outside unions only for the unobjectionable reason that
the former provided greater worker preference-satisfaction than the
14
latter. 3
During the framing of the NLRA, not only self-interested employers and company union representatives, but also such longtime progressives as Donald Richberg, General Counsel to the NRA, and FDR
himself forcefully asserted workers' right to choose company unionism. 3 15 Both Roosevelt and Richberg cast the pro-company-union
position in language that matches Wagner's own professed commitment to worker free choice. 316 Wagner's view of unions as organic
domination and conflict of interest. See, e.g., NLRB v. Falk Corp., 3o8 U.S. 453, 461 (1940).
The compromised treatment of company unions was one of the few major policies of the NRA
labor boards that Senator Wagner did not bequeath to the Wagner Act Board.
312 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note i6, at 223.
313 See Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 65, at 531 (statement of Ralph F. Foster), reprinted
in i LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 27; id. at 677, 725 (statement of G.L. Fullmer,
AT&T Co.), reprinted in i LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 27; id. at 674, 712

(statement of Francis C. Maloney, N.Y. Telephone Co.), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 38, at 27.
314 See Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 38, at 411 (statement of Jack Larkin, Wierton Steel
Co.), reprinted in 1-2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1373, 1797 ("If the (AFL] is
good for the workers of this country it can win on its merits and it ought not to have any laws
designed to exterminate other organizations .

. . . ").

"Who knows better than we, the employees,

what the employees desire? Is the labor board to tell us that what we desire is not good for
us? We believe that a fair election with a secret ballot conducted by the Government will best
subserve our rights and our desires." Id. at 547 (statement of A.B. Trembley, Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co.), reprinted in 1-2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1373, 1933. These
statements came, of course, from self-interested witnesses. As legislators knew, employers
arranged the testimony of company union representatives and paid them for their time, See
Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 38, at 773, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note

38, at 2159. Nonetheless, the extent to which company unions preempted independent unions
due to "genuine" preference-satisfaction rather than to coercion or illegitimate preference-transformation is a controversial normative and historiographic issue, analyzed at length in Barenberg, cited above in note 28.
315 From the time § 7(a) of the Recovery Act of 1933 became law, Richberg and Roosevelt
repeatedly affirmed their view that the provision allowed employers to maintain company unions.
See GROSS, supra note 83, at 13, 33, 6i, 67; LORWIN & WUBNIG, supra note go, at 112-13.
Indeed, it was FDR's personal settlement of the automobile industry dispute in March of 1934,
which permitted company unionism within a system of proportional representation, that dealt
a "staggering blow" to the policies of the Wagner-chaired National Labor Board and undercut
the prospects for Wagner's just-introduced Labor Disputes Bill. Id. at 13, 357; see also 78
CONG. REC. 5384, 5384-85 (1934), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at
1O67,

io67-69 (giving Roosevelt's statement in the settlement of the automobile industry dispute),

316 See LORWIN & WUBNIG, supra note go, at 357 (quoting FDR supporting a system of

proportional representation and company unionism "in which all groups of employees, whatever
may be their choice of organization or form of representation, may participate in joint conferences
with their employers'); DONALD R. RICHBERG, THE RAINBOW 55-56 (1936).
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groups unified by solidary interests and norms - and his increasing
exposure to employers' use of company unionism to divide the workforce - underlay his intensified opposition to company unions, and
his increasing commitment to majority rule and exclusive representation, during the NRA years. 3 17 In contrast, FDR's acceptance of
company unions and proportional representation rested on a3 1purely
8
associational, rather than organic, conception of unionization.
The antipaternalist principle that the progressive proponents and
opponents of company unionism each claimed as their own was, of
course, deeply rooted in the liberalism from which American progressive thought sprang. 3 19 Among progressive academic thinkers, even
such a committed communitarian as Dewey insisted that genuine
social cooperation could rest only on the voluntary initiative of individuals. 320 Progressive "practitioners" such as Wagner consistently

317 During the NRA period, the antipaternalist arguments for allowing worker choice of
company unions were closely linked with the voluntarist arguments for proportional representation. Franklin Roosevelt, the administrators of the NRA, and the employer representatives
on the NRA labor boards pressed the two arguments concurrently. See TOMLINS, supra note
31, at 114-15. Institutionally, however, there is no need to combine proportional representation
with legalization of company unions. Indeed, the NRA boards' policy was to allow the company
union option in majority-rule elections for exclusive representatives. Wagner's 1934 Labor
Disputes Bill reversed that policy: it would have banned company unions without mandating
exclusive representation by the majority representative. Only the NLRA itself combined the
company union ban with exclusive representation. That combination accords with Wagner's
ultimate view that only autonomous unions acting as exclusive representatives could provide
sufficient organic solidarity and collective empowerment to achieve genuine consent. The question, however, remains: How was that rationale consistent with Wagner's commitment to the
policy of allowing workers as a group the option of no unionization and to the general principle
of allowing workers as a group free choice among modes of dealing with management?
318 According to his Secretary of Labor and longtime associate, Frances Perkins, Roosevelt
likely did not understand
what solidarity really means in the trade union movement. He tended to think of trade
unions as voluntary associations of citizens to promote their own interests in the field of
wages, hours, and working conditions. He did not altogether grasp that sense of their
being a solid bloc of people united to one another by unbreakable bonds which gave
them power and status to deal with their employers on equal terms.
FRANCES PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW 325 (1946). Consonant with Perkins' recollection,
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. explains FDR's views on labor as an ideological holdover from pre-war
progressivism, unmodified by the post-war brand of participatory labor progressivism of the
likes of Wagner, Brandeis, and Frankfurter: "Reared in the somewhat paternalistic traditions of
prewar progressivism and of the social work ethos, Roosevelt thought instinctively in terms of
government's doing things for working people rather than of giving the unions power to win
workers their own victories." SCHLESINGER, supra note 5o, at 402.
319 See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 95, at 4o1-1o; WESTBROOK, supra note 161, at 430-39.
320 See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 95, at 4oo-o; John Dewey, Interview, in I BELIEVE
347-48 (Clifton Fadiman ed., 1939); cf. Alan Ryan, Communitarianism:The Good, the Bad, &
the Muddly, DISSENT, Summer 1989, at 350, 350-51 (denying an inevitable contradiction
between communitarianism and liberalism). Although Dewey meant to rule out political or
social coercion as roads to cooperation, he was not averse to political engineering of an "enabling"
kind, including social reconstruction that altered the environments in which individual person-
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voiced the theme of workers' free choice and self-determination. Wagner's unwavering premise that workers would remain free not to
unionize - the hallmark distinguishing a contractualist from a corporatist labor law regime3 2 1 - reflected the bedrock voluntarism of
the Wagner Act, as the previous section emphasized. In fact, the
leading corporatist among interwar labor progressives, Herbert Croly,
3 22
was also the only prominent proponent of compulsory unionization.
(b) Wagner's Unresolved Tension Between Individual and Group
Consent. - Although Wagner remained enough of a liberal (and
political pragmatist) never seriously to entertain mandatory unionism,
he was also closely enough aligned with progressive corporatism to
blur the line between individual and group consent, in the name of
collective empowerment. That is, Wagner often spoke of workers'
voluntary consent and cooperation in mass production industry as a
group rather than an individual phenomenon. Company unions, unlike autonomous unions, "hampered the efforts of labor to preserve
order within its own ranks or to restrain the untimely and wayward
acts of irresponsible groups." 323 Full collective bargaining was necessary not only to enhance workers' bargaining power and to elicit
labor's sense of responsibility for the efficient operations of the common enterprise, 3 24 but also to enable unions, in lieu of the employer
or the state, to discipline those workers who refused to consent to the
regimes of either workplace or social governance. So long as the new
regime of cooperation through collective bargaining elicited the actual
consent of a majority of workers, the problem of democratic consent
in the workplace was solved. 325 The expected alignment of individual
preferences with group interests, if not fully achieved by the anticipated galvanizing force of legislative symbolism,

326

would be com-

alities were shaped. Indeed, such reconstruction was central to his and other progressives' social
visions, including Wagner's. See supra note 265.
321 See Tamara Lothian, The Political Consequences of Labor Law Regimes: The Contractualist and CorporatistModels Compared, 7 CARDOzO L. REV. oo1, iooS-ii (1986).
322 See CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE, supra note 65, at 386-89.
323 78 CONG. REC. 4229, 4230 (1934), reprinted in x LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38,
at 24; see also id., reprinted in i LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 25 ("[T]he company
union line of organization is least likely to bring forth the restraint of irresponsible employees
by others of their own group.
... ); 79 CONG. REc. 2368, 2371 (935), reprinted in x
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1312 (stating that, without unions, employees "cannot
exercise a restraining influence upon the wayward members of their own groups").
324 See supra sections UI.D. and III.E.
325 "Is not this despotic control of all by the employer [in the non-union workplace] over all
less desirable than a democratic process whereby the majority of the workers represent the
interests of their group in dealing with their employer?" Wagner, supra note 89, at II. 'Wagner's

rhetorical question sidestepped the central question in the progressivist debate over workers'
choice: why should individuals or minorities not be represented by the entity of their choice in
a system of proportional representation?

326 See supra section IV.A.2.
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pleted through the union's instrumental sanctions or the workgroup's
informal inculcation of social norms and sentiments concordant with
32 7
those interests.
Wagner's thinking was consistent with the ascendancy in progressive thought not just of social integrationist goals but also of "group
theory" - particularly the premise of thinkers as varied as Croly,
Commons, and M.P. Follett, that individuals' objective interests were
3 28
fully aligned with the group interests of their natural associations.
Wagner wrote that "[i]n modern society, the welfare of the individual
is embedded in the destiny of the group. '3 29 Labor organizations could
themselves be effective "only when workers [were] sufficiently solidi0
fied in their interests to make one agreement covering all."33
"Free choice" for Wagner was therefore an ambiguous concept,
denoting both individual and group consent. The most important
unresolved tension in Wagner's thought lay in his commitment to both
the individual responsibility-building effects of self-expressive workplace participation, and the group discipline he thought necessary for
collective empowerment and social integration.
327 To serve their disciplinary and empowering functions, unions were thus enlisted as the
frontline of the corporatist machinery of "social controls" and "collective discipline." Robert F.
Wagner, Wagner Challenges Critics of His Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1937 (Magazine), at i,
2o. Although the theme that democracy required individual self-discipline was prominent in
the thought of Jeffersonian progressives like Brandeis, see STRUM, supra note 118, at 192, it
was extended to the notion of group self-restraint by collectivists such as Croly and Tugwell.
See HABER, supra note ir9, at 97 (stating that, for Croly, "there was no loss of self-respect
when subordination was self-imposed" by the group); TUGWELL, supra note 189, at 99-ioo
(arguing that collectivist industrial democracy would achieve "genuinely effective discipline"
from within the workforce rather than from above). The exercise of the core right of "selforganization," enshrined in both the NIRA and the NLRA, would simultaneously serve as
workers' self-implemented disciplinary and normalizing mechanisms in Foucault's sense. See
MICHEL FOUCAULT, POvER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS,
1972-1977, at io4-o6 (Colin Gordon ed. & Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham & Kate

Soper trans., Ig8o).
328 On group theory in progressive thought, see, for example, LUSTIG, cited above in note
149, at 120-31, 134; Daniel R. Ernst, Review Essay, The Critical Tradition in the Writing of
American Legal History, 102 YALE L.J. 1019, 1071-73 (I993); Price, supra note 218, at x66778. Herbert Croly was perhaps the most frank proponent of the subsumption of individual
interests in group interests. In the bible of progressive reform, The Promise of American Life,
he wrote that the non-union worker was an "industrial derelict" who should, in the name of
workers' common interests, be "rejected as emphatically, if not as ruthlessly, as the gardener
rejects the weeds in his garden for the benefit of fruit- and flower-bearing plants." CROLY,
supra note i65, at 387.
329 Wagner, supra note 163, at 395. He believed that "[i]t
was only natural" for workers to
reject company unions for independent labor organizations. 81 CONG. REc. 2943 (1937). In
his Senate speech supporting the Norris-Laguardia Act, Wagner described unionization as a
product both of objective "necessities" and of the human urge "to associate." 75 CONG. REC.
4916 (1932).
330 Hearings on S. z958, supra note 331, at 43 (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1373, 1419.
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(c) "Domination"Under Section 8(a)(2) as StructuralCoercion and
Hegemonic Interest-Formation.- Wagner believed that legislative
policy would help guide workers' subjective preferences toward their
"natural" group interest in independent unionism. 331 This empirical
assumption mitigated the tension between his declarations that workers were absolutely free to choose non-unionization and his belief that
the non-union workplace was a state of illegitimate despotism. But
if Wagner indeed believed the majority of workers would choose
outside unionism over non-unionism and company unionism, 3 32 the
need for the legal prohibition on company unionism remains a puzzle. 333 Among his pronouncements are the kernels of two further
justifications for the ban that could be cast - and were, by the Act's
early interpreters - as a means of simultaneously protecting workers'
objective interest in collective empowerment and their free choice.
The justifications rest on the same endogeneity of worker interests
and perceptions that contributed to Wagner's confidence that workers,
at least in the mass production industries, would generally disfavor
the non-union and company-union options.
(i) The Hegemonic Interest-FormationJustification. - Wagner
occasionally referred to company unions as "sham[s]" or "masquerades"
or "pretended union[s]. ''334 But protection against simple managerial
misrepresentation about the empirical differences between inside and
outside unions was not the driving rationale of the company union
ban. The ban was carefully drafted to include grievance-adjusting
shop committees "even though [the employer] does not use such shop
committee[s] as a subterfuge for collective bargaining on the essential
points of wages and hours. '335 Outside unions, in any event, had

331 8i CONG. REC. 2943 (x937).
332 Handler Interview, supra note 9I.
333 Of course, it is possible that, despite Wagner's constant assertions that the Act generally
and the company union ban specifically did not compromise the principle of free group choice
for workers, he was consciously or unconsciously willing to countenance either outright paternalism or choice-overriding protection of third-party interests. But see supra note 146. That
is, he may have supported a ban on the choice of company unions because they ill-served what
he took to be workers' objective interests, the public interest, or even (as in the public choice
story) the private interests of organized labor. If these were Wagner's hidden motives, then
presumably only political expediency would explain his willingness to allow the non-union and
non-dominated company union options, which also failed to serve workers' objective interests,
the public interest, and the interests of organized labor as he conceived them.
334 79 CONG. REc. 6183, 6184 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2282-84; 79 CONG. REc. 7565, 7570 (i935) (statement of Sen.
Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2321, 2334.
335 SENATE COMIM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, supra note 5i, at i, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1319, 1320. S. z958 altered the definition of "labor organization"
to include entities that dealt with management concerning "grievances" as well as "wages, rates
of pay or hours of employment." Id., reprinted in i LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at
1319, 1320.
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every incentive to provide information about those differences. 33 6
Wagner believed that after the highly publicized, bitter fights between
inside and outside unions during the NRA years, workers and the
public-at-large were "overwhelmingly
conscious" of the differences be3 37
tween the two entities.
Was there something more systemic and subtle about the effect of
company unions on worker perceptions and preferences that disabled
workers from exercising genuine choice in the service of their own
interests? Wagner's recognition that legislative edicts shaped workers'
subjective interests and perceptions could sit easily with a recognition
of consciousness-shaping by the structures of managerial authority. If
management exerted such influence through company unions, then
seemingly paternalistic government intervention could be understood
actually to protect worker choice against employer paternalism. Remarks in Wagner's writings and the legislative proceedings suggest
such a view. Wagner endorsed Tugwell's appeal for public education
to remedy the exposure of "'[tihe masses of people . ..to all kinds of
interested pressures from those who expect to exploit them as a source
of profit.'338 Wagner was also familiar with more specific claims

about the "interested," consciousness-shaping "pressures" of company
unions, claims widely voiced by pro-labor progressives and, indeed,
by managerial proponents of company unionism as well. The Harvard
labor economist and Wagner adviser, Sumner Slichter, for example,
wrote in 1929 that modern personnel methods, including company
unions, were "one of the most ambitious social experiments of the age,
because they aim[ed], among other things, to counteract the effect of
modern technique upon the mind of the worker, to prevent him from
becoming class conscious and from organizing trade unions. '33 9 Leslie
Vickers, an economist for an employer association, testified approvingly before Wagner that "management has, through these employee336 Furthermore, explicit managerial misrepresentation could be remedied by means short of
choice elimination, such as by the sort of administrative policing of managerial communication
the Act was understood to prescribe in anti-union campaigns.
337 Wagner, supra note 259, at 23; see also Interview with Senator Robert F. Wagner for
American Magazine 7 (July 7, 1934) (transcript available in The Wagner Papers, supra note 30,
at 6oo SF io3, Folder 31) (stating that the public was "shocked at the spectacle" of company
unions); infra p. 1458.
338 Wagner, supra note 174, at 18 (quoting Tugwell). Wagner believed that Tugwell opposed
"not genuine individualism, but the specious cry of freedom which is used in defence of exploiters
who do not desire [disinterested] government interference." Id. By endorsing the distinction
between disinterested (democratic) and interested (private) preference-shaping, Wagner implicitly
defended the symbolic effect of labor legislation as an instance of the former. That position
was, in any event, consistent with the progressives' commitment to subordinating private interests to a democratically determined public interest. See BRAND, supra note 49, at 278-79, 28889; RODGERS, supra note 254, at 182.
339Sumner H. Slichter, The Current Labor Policies of American Industries, 43 Q-J. ECON.
393, 432 (1929).
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representation plans, fostered the thought that ultimately . . . the
'340
interests of management and labor are identical.
(ii) The Structural Coercion and Distorted DeliberationJustifications. - However congenial such accounts of "hegemonic" 3 41 interestformation might seem to progressives, such as Wagner, who believed
that interests and preferences were socially constructed, they appeared
only as a secondary justification for the company union ban in Wagner's own thought. His primary view was that, precisely because
company unions were such patent shams and operated so coercively,
workers would naturally see through their seductions and opt for
genuine collective bargaining. 34 2 Indeed, Wagner seemed to believe
that, just as the legal engineering reinforced workers' felt entitlement
to collective bargaining, the company union ban would itself have the
343
surgical symbolic effect of de-legitimating company unions.
A justification of the company union ban more consistent with
Wagner's overall political vision, his antipaternalist principle of free
group choice, and the basic structure of the Act, then, would rest on
either (i) an account of how the company union was more systemically
and less remediably coercive than the non-union option, or (2) an
account of how the company union in other ways damaged the social
preconditions for free group deliberation and choice more than did
the non-union workplace. Such accounts would focus empirically on
essentially the same mechanisms that Wagner identified as creating
the company union's conflict of interest as a collective agent. The
normative taint of such mechanisms, however, lies in their systematic
coercive and distorting effect on workers' choice over modes of workplace governance rather than in their systematic deflection of worker
representatives' conduct as honest agents. That is, proponents of the
340 Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 65, at 68o (statement of Leslie Vickers), reprinted in I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 716, 718. See also id. at 143 (statement of John L.
Lewis), reprinted in I LEGiSLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 169, 173 (stating that company
unions are "deceptive in themselves and intended to divert the energies of the workers from
their own self-protection to the protection of the corporation which employs them").
341 Critical theorists define "hegemony" as the processes of perception- or interest-formation,
or other modes of consciousness-shaping, that constitute or help sustain illegitimate asymmetric
relations of power. See, e.g., Lears, supra note 277, at 568-74.
342 "The men understand thoroughly the nature of the company union which has been wished
upon them as a condition of employment. They know full well whose union it is and in whose
interests it will work." Wagner Brief, supra note 125, at 397; see also 81 CONG. REC. 2943
(1937) (statement of Sen. Wagner) (claiming that "[it was only natural that, under the lash of
treatment received," workers rejected company unions for outside unions). Other legislators,
including Senate committee chair Walsh, agreed. See, e.g., Hearingson S. z958, supra note 38,
at 656 (statement of Sen. Walsh), reprintedin 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2038,
2042.

343In August, 1935, Wagner said that in the NLRA the company union "has been branded
according to its true colors by Congress." 79 CONG. REC. 14,229 (1935) (statement of Sen.
Wagner).
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company union ban believed that the phenomenon of "simple coercion"
-

in which managers directly threatened workers when they made

governance choices -

pervaded both non-union and company-union

workplaces, but could be neutralized by secret ballot elections and
direct administrative sanctions. But they viewed the cadre of company union representatives under managerial control as a political

machine that penetrated the social infrastructure of the workforce.
That penetration

illegitimately

distorted group deliberation

and

coerced worker choice more systematically than did the nonunion
workplace.

Such "structural coercion" or "distorted deliberation" is

well captured by Section 8(a)(2)'s central term: "dominat[ion].

'3 44

Wagner's optimism about the trajectory of worker preferences

proved, in the years after 1935, to be largely (but not universally)
warranted. 345 Mass production workers did flood into industrial
unions, and the discourse of rank-and-file activists frequently echoed,
with remarkable particularity, the NLRA's animating ideology of en-

titlements to industrial "citizenship" and to collaboration in decisionmaking about productive efficiency. 346 The NLRB and the Supreme

Court nonetheless faced many specific instances in which workers
appeared to favor in-house unions. In those instances, the Board and

the Court often sought to reconcile the company union ban and the
principle of worker free choice by appealing to Wagner's secondary

justification for the ban -

34 7
the idea of hegemonic interest-formation.

By the time of the Taft-Hartley hearings in 1947, in fact, the Board's

chief argument for continuing the ban was that workers' choice needed
protection against illegitimate processes of perception- and interest3 48
formation.
(iii) Alternative Essentialist Views of Worker Interests. - Both
Wagner's and the Board's positions rested on the assumption that
workers' objective entitlement lay in collective bargaining through
autonomous unions. Assuming also a natural or engineered alignment

344NLRA, supra note 3, § 8(a)(2). The instrumental and ideological dynamics of these modes
of domination, in the context of old-style company unions and new-style team workplaces, are
analyzed in detail, and a revised § 8(a)(2) jurisprudence is proposed, in Barenberg, cited above
in note 28.
345In a 1937 survey of several thousand Chicago workers in diverse occupations, more than
four-fifths supported strong unions for all workers. See COHEN, supra note 261, at 252-53.
346 An excellent case study of this relation between the NLRA's legal discourse and worker
rhetoric is offered in GERSTLE, cited above in note 233, at 183-87.
347See, e.g., NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1938); International Harvester Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 310, 354 (1936); Wheeling Steel Corp., i N.L.R.B. 699,
710 (1936).
348See Hearings on S. 5S and S.J. Res. 22 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Pub.
Welfare, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. 1912 (1947) (statement of Board Chairman Paul Herzog). Recent
commentary on § 8(a)(2) has posited an interest-distortion justification for the company union
ban. See Harper, supra note 26, at 6-9.
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of subjective preferences with objective entitlement, workers' acceptance of company unions had to be due either to systematic coercion
(Wagner's primary view) or illegitimate distortion of preferences (the

Board's view) by management. Such essentialist reasoning is homologous to the radical view that workers' objective interests lay in full
workers' control, and that both unionism and company unionism necessarily rest on coercion or illegitimately manufactured consent. 349 A

similar essentialism underpinned the managerial view that workers'
objective interests lay in allegiance to management and the common
enterprise, whether governed through individual employment contracts or through organicist company unions. In this view, unionism

was inevitably based on coercion or manufacturing of false adversarial

interests by organized labor. 35 0 (Stripped of their untenable, essentialist assumptions that workers have determinate "objective" interests,

these three views about workers' likely subjective interests are not
necessarily mutually exclusive.) 351 While the view of Wagner and the
Board about worker interests underpinned a blanket ban on company

unions, the managerial view supports a presumption that collaborative
modes of workplace governance are legitimately endorsed by work2
ers.

35

349 See ALAN Fox, BEYOND CONTRACT: WORK, POWER AND TRUST RELATIONS 274-96
(1974). This is not the only radical position. Lenin, for example, believed that workers' objective
interests lay in workers' control but that their subjective preferences naturally tended toward
support of trade unions. See V.I. LENIN, WHAT Is To BE DONE? 63 (S.V. Utechin ed. & SN.
Utechin & Patricia Utechin trans., 1963).
350 This view was conveyed recurrently in Senate hearings on the NLRA. See, e.g., Hearings
on S. 2926, supra note 65, at 403-04 (statement of Henry S. Dennison, Employer Representative
on NLB), reprinted in i LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 437-38 (fearing that company
union ban will generate two "actively conflicting segments," instead of "a single organism"); id.
at 1oo5 (statement of Walter Drew, Counsel, National Erectors' Association), reprinted in I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1043 (asserting that unions impose conflicting rather
than mutual interests); Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 38, at 8x8 (statement of Brooklyn
Chamber of Commerce), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2204 (arguing
that the false premise of the Act is that labor and management are adversaries).
351 That is, it would not be surprising for workers as a group to believe that, within the
existing macro-economy, they have interests in common with management in expanding the
corporate pie (the managerial view) and interests adversarial to management in the distribution
of corporate revenue and risks (the organized labor view), and that within conceivable alternative
macro-economies - the achievement of which may be blocked by collective action dilemmas or
other transition costs - they would benefit from fuller forms of workplace democracy (the
radical view). See, e.g., Jon Elster & Karl 0. Moene, Introduction to ALTERNATIVES TO
CAPITALISM 9 (Jon Elster & Karl 0. Moene eds., x989).
352 Such a presumption is precisely the rule adopted in recent circuit court decisions on
§ 8(a)(2); the presumption must be overcome by a showing of actual worker dissatisfaction,
actual coercion, or actual manufactured desire and consent. See cases cited supra note 24. The
companion Article analyzes in more detail the shifting administrative and judicial understandings
of § 8(a)(2)'s concept of "domination," in light of the ideas of structural coercion, distorted deliberation, and hegemonic interest-formation introduced above. See Barenberg, supra note 28.
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Both proponents and opponents of company unionism in the 1920S
and 193os asserted the same objectives of enhancing labor-management cooperation and productive efficiency. Wagner and his circle
envisioned an ideal workplace that combined the collective empowerment of independent unionism with the collaborative shop committees and organicist relations that, for enlightened managerial proponents of welfare capitalism, 35 3 could stand alone as company unions.
The next section examines the theoretical framework - and contemporary elaborations - of Wagner's analysis of the dynamics of workplace cooperation. Why precisely did Wagner anticipate that effective,
collaborative relations would grow only within the protective shell of
collective bargaining? Again, the institutional and discursive endogeneity of preferences, interests, and norms proves central to the
analysis.
C. Reciprocity, Trust, and Resentment in
Workplace Cooperation
Wagner and his advisers understood that the labor-management
relationship had the structure of a "bargaining game" vulnerable to
non-cooperative outcomes stemming from opportunistic behavior by
either party. The crux of the problem of cooperation was whether
governance mechanisms could be devised to induce labor and management to exchange credible mutual commitments - labor to provide
high effort and collaboration in problem-solving, management in return to provide the fair long-term compensation and job security
anticipated by workers. Stated at this generalized level, the "problem
of cooperation" as understood by the framers of the Wagner Act is
substantially the same as the problem addressed in the leading legaleconomic models of labor law of the last decade. Nonetheless, the
details of both the problem and its solution diverge substantially in
Wagner's and the leading legal economists' models.
Subsection i of this section briefly reviews the model of internal
labor markets that constitutes labor-law economists' most sophisticated
treatment of the problem of cooperation and their best interpretation
of the Wagner Act scheme. Subsection 2 presents the points of divergence between that model and Wagner's view, and the deeper
ideological commitments that account in part for that divergence.
Wagner's distinctive commitments - consonant with his progressive

353 W.L. Mackenzie King - leading practitioner of company unionism, industrial relations
adviser to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and future Canadian Prime Minister - saw in company
unionism "a means on the one hand of preventing labour from being exploited, and on the
other, of ensuring that cordial cooperation which is likely to further industrial efficiency."
MONTGOMERY, supra note ii, at 349-50 (quoting GEORGE P. WEST, UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REPORT ON THE COLORADO STRIKE 162-63

(,9,s)).
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philosophy as reconstructed in Part III - included an emphasis on
the group formation of worker norms and sentiments; a normative
and descriptive prioritization of the distributional contest rather than
efficiency maximization; and an understanding that norms of fairness,
perceived common interests, and trust between labor and management
could be nurtured endogenously by institutional structures cleansed of
excessive power disparities. In Wagner's thinking, as in certain
counter-currents in recent sociological and economic thought, instrumental safeguards against self-interested opportunism offered a partial, but not primary, enabling condition for cooperation. To the
contrary, Wagner recognized that instrumental hierarchy generated
the trust-threatening ideological contests common to most structures
of political authority. The Conclusion comments on the historicalempirical accuracy of Wagner's forecast of the consequences of his
35 4
regulatory model.

i. The model of internal labor markets and relational contracting.
In the leading law and economics model, the law of collective
bargaining is a functional response to the operation of so-called internal labor markets. 355 The internal labor market is a long-term contractual agreement, explicit or implicit, between employees and management, specifying job classifications and ladders; promotion,
transfer, layoff, and recall rights, generally based substantially on
seniority rules; wage, hour, and benefit terms, typically attached to
the job-classification-and-seniority ladder; discipline and discharge
rules and procedures; and enforcement procedures that range from
internal grievance mechanisms to third-party arbitration or adjudication. 35 6
-

3S4 This section and the Conclusion aim to present theoretical and empirical grounds that
support a broad theoretical framework - elaborated in the conceptual terms of current theories
incorporating the general elements and relations that Wagner stressed. Neither this general
framework nor Wagner's more specific model of workplace cooperation can be comprehensively
defended at the level of abstraction presented in these sections. The framework incorporates
relations among institutional practices and managerial and worker consciousness - relations
which are generally contingent on historical, highly contextual variables. See, e.g., ROBERTO
M.

UNGER,

FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN

SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF

RADICAL DEMOCRACY 187 (1987); Gordon, supra note 8, at 85-87; infra note 48!. From the

standpoint of legal policy, such a broad framework's ultimate utility rests not only on its
faithfulness to legislative origins, but also on its capacity to illuminate historically specific
institutional and ideological dynamics in order to guide the application of § 8(a)(2) to new forms
of workplace cooperation. See Barenberg, supra note 28.
355 See Michael L. Wachter & Randall D. Wright, The Economics of InternalLabor Markets,
in THE ECONOMICS OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 86, 104 (Daniel J.B. Mitchell &
Mahmood A. Zaidi eds., 199o); supra note 6.
356 See generally PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS

AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS 1-2, 13-34 (1971) (examining the origins and components of internal
labor markets); RONALD G. EHRENBERG

& ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS:

THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY r39-40, 318-26 (1982);

sources cited supra note 6.
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In the economists' model, internal labor markets serve as efficient
contractual safeguards against the threat of opportunistic behavior
under conditions of match-specific investments and asymmetric information between the parties. 35 7 Both individual workers and firms are
presumed to make match-specific investments, including job-specific
training, learning-by-doing, and inculcation of idiosyncratic organizational and interpersonal routines. Such match-specific investments
yield a joint surplus or "quasi-rent" to the parties that exceeds what
they could generate by ending the relationship and turning to the
external labor market for new partners. As a result of the sunk
investment, the parties are locked ex post into a bilateral-monopoly
bargaining game over the division of the surplus. The game is vulnerable to strategic quits or discharges that deny one party its expected
return on the match-specific investment. It is also vulnerable, in
bargaining over wages and employment security, to hold-ups and
uncertainties stemming from informational asymmetries. Management
may strategically misrepresent the state of product markets, technological innovation, and the firm's financial picture; the individual
worker may misrepresent her degree of work effort or the opportunity
35 8
wage she could earn in the external labor market.
Even independent of match-specific investment, information asymmetries generate another governance problem. The individual worker
has an incentive to shirk to the extent that management has less than
full information about the effort level and marginal productivity of
individual workers within interdependent or costly-to-monitor work
processes. Similarly, management has an incentive to raise required
effort levels by misrepresenting market, technological, and financial
35 9
conditions.
In the legal economists' model, both of these governance problems
are mitigated by internal labor markets. Arrangements that effectively
require workers to post a "bond" or to sink costs in match-specific
investments safeguard against opportunistic quitting or shirking by
individual workers. 360 These safeguards take the form of deferred
compensation over the worker's career-cycle: early in the workers'
3S7 The potential for such opportunistic behavior presents a governance problem because it
directly imposes transaction costs within the relationship and indirectly discourages such potentially surplus-yielding matches. See Michael L. Wachter, Does the NLRA-System Protect Union
or Firmfrom Rent-Seeking? 16-23 (Sept. 2, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file at Harvard
Law School Library); Wachter & Cohen, supra note 6, at 1358-61; Wachter & Wright, supra
note 355, at 90-92, 94.
358 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 65, at 244; Wachter & Cohen, supra note 6, at 136o-6i;
Wachter & Wright, supra note 355, at 94-95.
3S9 See Wachter & Wright, supra note 355, at 96.
3 60
See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 18-29 (1964). See generally Michael C. Jensen
& William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 3o8 (1976) (explaining the concept of "bonding" by an agent).
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career wages are set below opportunity wages, while senior workers
receive higher, "backloaded" wages and benefits (for example pensions
and severance pay). Workers thus have an incentive to stay with the
firm and perform well so as not to lose the deferred compensation
that comes with progress up the seniority ladder.
Legal economists also identify safeguards against management's
opportunistic lowering of wages below workers' expected share of the
joint surplus, discharging of senior workers before they can reap their
deferred compensation, and illegitimately intensifying work requirements. These safeguards take the form of seniority rules, downwardly
rigid wage classifications, well-defined job classifications, and sunk
capital. To prevent management from simply firing higher-compensated senior workers or from lowering wages on a false claim of
worsening market conditions, the internal labor market requires management to adjust to adverse environmental changes by maintaining
wage levels and laying off junior workers before senior workers. This
rule, by forcing management to absorb a consequent decline in output
and revenue and a loss of sunk capital, acts as a bond against opportunistic exploitation of locked-in workers. 36 1 Finally, grievance
systems that protect workers against unjust discharge also safeguard
against opportunistic dismissal of more expensive and less productive
senior workers.
These implicit or explicit contractual safeguards against opportunism are, however, only as effective as they are enforceable. Since the
entire governance problem in this model is generated by the parties'
presumed opportunism, what ensures that the parties can make credible commitments to honor those rules of the internal labor market
that are not self-enforcing? 362 Specifically, what prevents management
from opportunistically lowering wages, discharging senior workers in
violation of the relational contract, or intensifying the pace of work?
Legal economists have identified three sources of credible commitment:
third-party enforcement of a formalized contract through unionization;
the possibility of reprisal and loss of future surplus owing to the
repeat-play nature of the employment relationship; and reputation
sustained by prudential long-term self-interest. 363 According to this
361 See, e.g., Wachter, supra note 357, at I5-I7; Wachter & Cohen, supra note 6, at 137886. Professor Leslie's analysis of the internal labor market emphasizes that employees may act
strategically by refusing to train new workers for fear that subsequent managerial opportunism
will displace veteran workers or undermine wage standards. The internal labor market solves
this difficulty by tying jobs and downwardly rigid wages to seniority. The internal labor market
therefore encourages workers not only to receive but to give job-specific training. See LESLIE,
supra note 6, at 32-33.
362 Cf. MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 4 (1987) (arguing that, assuming self-interested behavior and the absence of coercion, "no individual has any greater incentive
to abide by [an] agreement [to cooperate] than he had to restrain himself before the agreement
was made.").
363 See, e.g., Wachter & Wright, supra note 355, at 97-98.
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model, whether unionization occurs depends on whether formal collective bargaining is more successful than repeat-play reprisals or
reputational effects in maximizing the joint surplus generated by the
364
internal labor market.
Wagner's understanding of labor relations and law, although addressing some of the concerns about credible instrumentalist commitments, diverges in key respects from the internal labor market model.
2. Wagner's Model of the Bargaining Problem and Its Current
Elaborations. -

In the

1920s

and 1930s, only a small minority of

progressive managers believed that the benefits of internal labor markets outweighed their costs to the firm. 365

And only a negligible

number believed that formalizing the commitment to the internal labor
market contract through collective bargaining was desirable. 3 66 Many
among Wagner's circle of labor reformers, on the other hand, advocated the extension of career ladders from the white collar professions
to the wider labor force. Their quintessentially progressivist goal was
to secure the long-term integration of a volatile working class into the
political and industrial order by satisfying workers' deeply rooted 3 67
and, in the reformers' eyes, justified - feelings of entitlement.
Even with these integrationist virtues, however, rationalized personnel administration and career ladders - that is, internal labor
markets - were not central to Wagner's belief that collective bargaining would solve the problem of labor-management cooperation in
efficient production. Wagner and his advisers did not believe that the
principal problem of the labor-management bargaining game was to
ensure against shirking or strategic bargaining by individual workers
or against management's strategic pre-emption of individual careercycles. Their goal was not to encourage firm-specific investments in
human capital. This is unsurprising in light of the trend, then decades-old, away from idiosyncratic, skilled work in American industry. 368 They did understand, in accord with recent internal labor

364 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 65, at 272; LESLIE, supra note 6, at 33-34; Wachter, supra
note 357, at Ig.
365 In 1929, only 17% of firms (24% of large firms) had promotion plans, and less than 2%
of large firms had pension plans. See JACOBY, supra note I9, at 194, 199. A mere 20% of the
industrial workforce worked in companies with personnel departments, and IO-I5% in companies with welfare benefit plans. See id. at i89. Seniority systems were implemented by a
minority of even large firms and provided patchy and limited job security. Job evaluation,
classifications, and ladders were widely introduced only as a result of industrial union pressure
after 1935. See id. at 154-57, 233, 235-39; SUMNER H. SLICHTER, JAMES J. HEALY &
E. ROBERT LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 56o-6I
(1960).
366 See supra note 65.
367 See JACOBY, supra note ig, at 123, 144-45 (noting that Cooke, Jacobstein, and Slichter
- all Wagner advisers and associates - supported personnel reforms on grounds of social
integration).
368 See id. at 16.
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market theorists, 3 69 that seniority-based wages and benefits provided
long-term incentives against shirking. Imposing such additional costsof-discharge on individual shirkers, however, was an insignificant
incremental penalty for a workforce disciplined by the chronic unemployment of the 192os and, of course, by the labor market catastrophe of the Great Depression. In Wagner's view, the worker already
37 0
faced "ruin for his family" as the price of job loss.
Wagner and his fellow reformers instead focused on the intertwined
problems of sustaining workers' intrinsic group cooperation3 7 1 and
management's commitment to norms of group fairness in decisions
affecting the workforce's job security and distributive share. That is,
cooperation is achieved when the workforce as a group adheres to
norms and sentiments that support intrinsic motivation and creative
collaboration in problem-solving. Management, in turn, rewards labor with a fair group share of the fruits of its collaborative effort and
ensures that enterprise prosperity does not unfairly diminish job security for the workforce as a group.
This view of the bargaining game is concordant with the ascen3 72
dancy of "group theory" in interwar progressive thought generally,
and with the labor progressives' particular focus on the importance of
workers' group "instincts" 3 73 and "esprit de corps." 3 74 It also captures
369 Their views, and the economic reality of diminishing firm-specific investment, are more
concordant with the analysis of the internal labor market presented by Victor Goldberg than
the analysis of Wachter, Cohen, and Williamson. Compare Victor P. Goldberg, Bridges Over
Contested Terrain:Exploring the Radical Account of the Employment Relationship, i J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 249, 263-65 (i98o) (arguing that internal labor markets arise to
discipline workers by raising their costs of job loss) with discussion supra pp. 1463-64 (arguing
that internal labor markets arise to safeguard firm-specific investment).
370 Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 65, at 17 reprinted in i LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 38, at 47.
371 "Intrinsic group cooperation" denotes the workforce's commitment as a group to exert
initiative and effort in ways that can neither be incorporated in contractual obligations nor
enforced by enhancing the pecuniary penalties of job loss. It contrasts with the internal labor
market model's emphasis on extrinsic penalties against "individual shirking," understood as
individual workers' opportunistic breach of contractually specified work rules and effort levels
stemming from individual workers' presumed preference for leisure over work and their capacity
to free-ride on co-workers' efforts. In early writings, internal labor market theorists proposed
that the long-term contractual commitment to job ladders and promotional opportunities would
induce consummate cooperation by self-interested, individual workers. See OLIVER E. WVILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 77-78 (1975);

Oliver E. Williamson, Michael Wachter & Jeffrey E. Harris, Understanding the Employment
Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 250, 27077 (i975). Wagner and his advisers, by contrast, understood intrinsic cooperation to be a noncontractual, non-instrumental phenomenon based on an inherently group-determined mentality.
See infra pp. 1475-89. For more recent empirical confirmation of the importance of both
"intrinsic" and "group-based" motivation, see sources cited below in notes 375, 482-485.
See supra p. 1455.
373 ORDwAY TEAD, INSTINCTS IN INDUSTRY passim (1918).
374 JACOBY, supra note i9, at 1o2; see also MONTGOMERY, supra note ii, at 413 (discussing
372
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a nearly universal empirical finding in several research traditions
within industrial sociology since the 1930s -

that workplace moti-

vations and norms, as to both work effort and distribution of reward
and risk, are rooted in group-generated sentiments. 3 75 These studies
confirm that work-group norms and sentiments, enforced by informal
social sanctions, can either support or undermine workers' high effort/
high trust dispositions, depending on highly path-dependent, "local"
3 76
institutional and ideological processes in the workplace.
The broad picture of workplace bargaining as a game between the
aggregates of "labor" and "capital" - and the game's solution through
collectivization of the labor market - was framed in a 1928 Wagner
speech:
[C]o-operation is given only to equals. To match the huge aggregate
of modern capital the wage-earner must be organized before he is
ready to give co-operation to his employer...
... As soon as organized labor is accepted as an integral and necessary
part of our social structure, and the ill-advised efforts to destroy it
are abandoned, and the struggle for mere existence terminated, labor
will naturally turn to these newer tasks and to this greater vision [of
concern for cooperation in productive efficiency]. Capital on the other
hand admits that responsibilities and risks must have their compensation. Labor will naturally refuse to assume them
unless it feels
3 77
confident that it will enjoy the benefits of success.

Wagner and his advisers detailed a range of mechanisms through
which collective bargaining was expected to secure the exchange of
credible group commitments between labor and capital. Each mech-

influence on labor progressives of group psychological theories of Wagner adviser Tead, Frank
Watts, and Henri de Man).
375 The finding originates in the work of the human relations school, see, e.g., FRITZ JULES
ROETHLISBERGER & WILLIAM J. DICKSON, MANAGEMENT AND THE WORKER 263-64 (1939),

and is confirmed by the industrial pluralists, see, e.g., STANLEY E. SEASHORE, GROUP COHESIVENESS IN THE INDUSTRIAL WORK GROUP 63-69 (Arno Press 1977) (1954), the sociotechnical
systems school, see, e.g., Louis E. Davis & Eric L. Trist, Improving the Quality of Work Life:
Sociotechnical Case Studies, in WoRK AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE 246, 249 (James O'Toole
ed., 1974), industrial psychologists, see, e.g., Richard A. Guzzo & Raymond A. Katzell, Effects
of Economic Incentives on Productivity: A Psychological View, in INCENTIVES, COOPERATION
AND RISK SHARING 107, 1O9 (Haig R. Nalbantian ed., 1987), radical sociologists, see, e.g.,
RICK FANTASIA, CULTURES OF SOLIDARITY: CONSCIOUSNESS, ACTION, AND CONTEMPORARY

AMERICAN WORKERS 87-92 (1988), and other organizational sociologists, see, e.g., James S.
Coleman, Constructed Organization:First Principles, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 7, I8I9 (i99r).
376 See Barenberg, supra note 28.
377 Robert F. Wagner, The New Responsibilities of Organized Labor, Address at the Convention of the New York State Federation of Labor 2, 6 (August 28, 1928) (transcript available
in The Wagner Papers, supra note 3o, at 599 SF 102, Folder 8).
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anism corresponds to a more elaborate theory in the current economics
and sociology of cooperation and trust.
(a) Third-Party Enforcement. - Internal labor market theorists
consider enforceable collective bargaining agreements "the most powerful redress available to workers" to enforce their career-cycle entitlements. 3 78 Within a purely instrumentalist theory, however, thirdparty enforcement is unlikely to sustain cooperation in either the
group-exchange or the individual career-cycle models. Collective bargaining agreements typically have terms of only one to three years,
but the problem of intertemporal opportunism in either model spans
longer periods. 3 79 While judicial or arbitral enforcement of a collective
bargaining agreement may prevent opportunistic reneging on compensation and job security expectations during the contract term, it of
course cannot provide the same safeguard over the relevant long term
of either the individual career-cycle or the multi-year cycle of group
collaboration and reward. 38 0 Each time the short-term contract ex38
pires, the parties' presumed opportunism is fully unleashed. '
(b) Self-Interested Reciprocity. - The chief instrumental mechanism for making credible commitments in Wagner's group exchange
model (or the internal labor market model) is therefore the parties'
threat of self-help reprisal in a bargaining game characterized by
repeat plays. While the possibility of cooperation in repeated bargaining games has been a subject of much sophisticated modelling,
"[i]ntuitively, the idea is simple. When the same people interact over
and over again, they may choose to cooperate out of fear of retaliation,
hope of reciprocation or both. '382 The general conclusion of these
models is that non-cooperation is the self-interested rational response

378 Wachter & Wright, supra note 355, at 98.

379 See Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 159, 172-75 (1991) (rejecting the argument that shortterm sequential contracting is a feasible solution to opportunism where long-term contracting is
not). This does not mean that the existing structure of collective bargaining cannot be rationalized by the greater gain in efficiency from frequent adjustment to environmental changes than
from credible commitment to the rules of the internal labor market. The point is that the

institution of third-party enforcement of collective agreements is not explicable as an instrumental
solution to the problem of long-term enforcement of the internal labor market or the exchange
of commitments to group effort, reward, and risk.
380 In addition, Wagner believed that the kind of consummate group effort necessary for
efficient cooperation was intrinsically "noncontractible." ERic RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION 140 (1989) (noting that effort may be "noncontractible" in principal-agent contracts
because slacking may not be provable in court even if observable to the principal); see also infra
p. 1481.
381 This abstract problem was made painfully real for workers in the 197os and xg8os who

made short-term contractual concessions with the expectation of long-term, but not contractually
formalized, recompense - an expectation that was unfulfilled. See, e.g., KIM MOODY, AN
INJURY TO ALL 185-87 (,988).
382 ELSTER, supra note 63, at 43.
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of players in a Prisoner's Dilemma game, whether one-shot or finitely

repeated. 3 83 But in an indefinitely iterated two-person Prisoner's Dilemma, mutually self-interested strategies of conditional cooperation,
such as the "tit-for-tat strategy" 384 or the "grim strategy, '3 85 may
generate an equilibrium of ongoing reciprocal cooperation.

(Within

pure game theory, however, there is nothing to guarantee that the
parties will adopt such strategies).

Wagner and his advisers believed that collective bargaining enhanced the possibility for this type of self-interested reciprocal coop-

eration between labor and management. Their reasoning fits comfortably with contemporary instrumental theories of the "evolution of

cooperation."

Most obviously, unionization makes credible labor's

383 Non-cooperation or "defection" in the finitely repeated game results from the presumption
of "backward induction": the parties know that defection is rational in the final repetition, and
so it will also be rational in the penultimate round, and so on. See RASMUSEN, supra note 380,
at 88; Reinhard Selten, The Chain Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 127, passim (1978).
384 Under the tit-for-tat strategy, a party begins by cooperating in the first round, cooperates
in later rounds so long as the other party cooperated in the previous round, and acts noncooperatively in a round only if the other player acted noncooperatively in the previous round.
See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 207-13 (x984); ANATOL RAPOPORT
& ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA: A STUDY IN CONFLICT AND COOPERATION
56-59 (1965); TAYLOR, supra note 362, at 65-66. Although the mutual tit-for-tat strategy is one
possible equilibrium outcome in the infinitely repeated game, it is neither the only equilibrium
nor is it a "perfect" equilibrium in game-theoretic terms. It is not "perfect" because, if both
parties aatopt the tit-for-tat strategy, it is not rational for one party actually to penalize the other
for noncooperation in a previous round, because the result would be eternally alternating
noncooperation. See RASMUSEN, supra note 380, at 12o. Nonetheless, empirical studies have
shown the tit-for-tat strategy to be highly successful across environments made up of players
with varying strategies. See, e.g., AXELROD, supra, at 42.
38S Under the grim strategy, a party begins by cooperating and continues to cooperate unless
the other party acts noncooperatively in a round, in which case the first party acts noncooperatively forever thereafter. See RASMUSEN, supra note 380, at 91. Cooperation based on mutual
grim strategies is a perfect equilibrium in game-theoretic terms. See RASMUSEN, supra note
380, at 91. Nonetheless, "although eternal [unconditional] cooperation is a perfect equilibrium
outcome in the infinite game under at least one strategy, so is practically anything else, including
eternal finking [i.e. noncooperation]." Id. at 92. David Kreps' model of corporate governance
relies on the self-enforcing nature of the grim strategy and the capitalized value of the parties'
high-trust reputation that emerges from continued adherence to such a strategy over time. See
David Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90, 102-03 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., I9go). Emphasizing the
weaknesses of Kreps's model, Williamson points both to the multiple equilibria of the repeatplay game and to numerous compelling reasons that the reputation mechanism is likely to be
ineffective. See Williamson, supra note 379, at 167-69; see also infra note 407. Indeed, Kreps
himself ultimately abandons the parsimonious assumptions of self-interested rationalism and
resorts to the "evolutionary adaptation" of "corporate culture" to solve the problem of opportunism within hierarchical organizations - a move prefigured in Wagner's progressivism. Kreps,
supra, at 127-29; see also Andrei Schleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile
Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS 33, 40-41 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988) (putting aside
the model of managerial commitments based on self-interested, feigned trustworthiness and
developing instead a model based on socialization into genuine trustworthiness).
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threat of severe penalties for management's non-cooperation in each
round of the group-collaboration/reward cycle. 386 A second predicate
for the success of a mutual strategy of conditional cooperation is each
party's capacity to assess whether the other has in fact acted cooperatively or non-cooperatively in each round. 38 7 On this score, Wagner
and his advisers believed that unionization proved advantageous in

two respects that have been elaborated by recent theorists. First, the
union acts as the workers' collective monitor of managerial behavior.
The union has a greater capacity than either individual workers or
company union representatives to assess managerial honesty because
it can draw on information about the behavior not only of the im388
mediate employer, but of comparably situated employers as well.
Second, as an entity with a long-term relationship with the enterprise,
the union makes possible increasingly accurate inferences about firm
performance and environmental constraints - also an important fea-

386 Theorists of the internal labor market recognize that non-unionized workers also have
tools at their disposal, such as shirking and sabotage, for penalizing managerial noncooperation.
See Wachter & Wright, supra note 355, at 98. But Wagner and his advisers were convinced
that more potent collective action was necessary to achieve successful reciprocal cooperation.
In his attack on the yellow-dog injunction, for example, Wagner quoted his adviser Sumner
Slichter:
Wage-earners cannot be expected to take a wholehearted interest in improving technique
unless they have definite assurance that they will not be thrown out of work because of
labor-saving methods they suggest. . . The willingness of workers to co-operate in the
improvement of technique presupposes that they will receive a certain and substantial
reward for their help. A union strong enough to bargain on terms of approximate equality
with the employer over the division of the gains from union-management co-operation
would appear to be necessary in order to make the men feel confident that their cooperation will be adequately rewarded.
Wagner Brief, supra note 125, at 418-19 (quoting Sumner Slichter). Wagner thus offers efficiency-enhancing grounds for giving unions the right to bargain over strategic corporate decisions
that affect the job security of the workforce, confirmed by various empirical studies of the
immediate post-enactment period and of more recent years, see sources cited infra notes 481485. Those grounds weigh against the increased transaction costs and possibilities for strategic
union behavior that some have attributed to such bargaining rights. Compare Wachter & Cohen,
supra note 6, at 1377-98 (arguing against such bargaining rights unless NLRB proves that
employer acted opportunistically) with Stone, Labor and Corporate Structure, supra note 8, at
86-96, 159-72 (arguing for such rights).
387 See AXELROD, supra note 384, at i26-3o.
388See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (I934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in x LEGISLATiVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at iS (noting that without a union, the worker "has only
slight knowledge of the labor market, or of general business conditions"); 78 CONG. REC. 3678
(1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in i LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supa note 38, at 2I
("[E]mployees should have the right to be represented by independent experts who have a
knowledge of business conditions."). Such monitoring is one of the myriad ways in which unions
provide "public goods" to the work group, an efficiency-enhancing function of unionization that
has received much attention from neoclassical labor economists. See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN AND JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 8-iO (1984); LESLIE, supra note 6, at
35-38.
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ture of efficient relational contracting noted in recent principal-agent
3 89
and game theorizing.
The long-term continuity of the collectivized bargaining relationship also established a third enabling condition for instrumental reciprocity. Conditional cooperation strategies are more likely to prevail

the longer the parties' time horizons and the lower their rates of
discounting future rewards. 3 90 Discussing this problem in the abstract

context of deregulated labor-management bargaining, Jon Elster
writes that "since collective wage bargaining lacks a constitution, so
that one never knows who will bargain with whom in the future, selfinterest dictates a shorter time horizon," and the prognosis for selfinterested cooperation is to that extent more pessimistic. 3 9 1 Recognizing the horizon problem, Wagner believed that legislation promoting
the long-term stability of collective bargaining relationships would
induce organized labor to collaborate more efficiently with manage3 92
ment.
(c) Collective Empowerment and the DistributionalContest. - In
Wagner's analysis, therefore, the crucial instrumental condition for
encouraging reciprocity was the provision of new organizational weaponry, monitoring capacities, and time-horizons to labor in order to

safeguard against managerial opportunism.

And, as noted above,

recent theorists of the internal labor market agree that unionization
can be a means for management to make its commitments credible.
389 Wagner adviser Paul Douglas wrote that "'[w]ith the increased knowledge of actual
conditions, impossible demands upon the part of the workmen would become less frequent.'"
Wagner Brief, supra note 125, at 402 (quoting Douglas, supra note 230, at 3o5). For contemporary theoretical and empirical treatments confirming Wagner's view, see, for example, MASAHIKO AOKI, THE COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FiRM 119-27, 152-71 (1984); Oliver
Hart & Bengt Holstr6m, The Theory of Contracts, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY, FIFTH
WORLD CONGRESS 71, 97 (Truman F. Bewley ed., 1987). The union's role as collective monitor
underscores the relatively weak role that "reputation" could otherwise be expected to play in
making credible the parties' commitments to the internal labor market. See Williamson, supra
note 379, at 167-69. It is precisely the employer's asymmetric access to information about
product and financial markets that generates the need for the incentive-compatible rules of the
internal labor market. If third-party adjudicators with subpoena and oath-enforcing powers
cannot determine when an employer has acted opportunistically, it is difficult to place much
weight on individual prospective employees' capacity so to judge; and it is the latter's judgment
that matters. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, io4 HARV.
L. REV. 373, 417 n.144, 418 (i99o); Hart & Holstr6m, supra, at 142.
390 That is, a party will be less willing to exercise self-restraint against reaping opportunistic
gains in the present if the jeopardized future rewards are presently less valuable. See AXELROD,
supra note 384, at 58-59.
391 ELSTER, supra note 65, at 172 (emphasis omitted).
392 See supra p. 3467. Of course, a precise assessment of the actual time horizon of union
officers depends on a theory of intra-union politics that Wagner did not elaborate. For surveys
of such theories, see, for example, KAUFMAUN, cited above in note 65, at 5o6-33; and ELSTER,
cited above in note 65, at 169.
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In those theorists' conceptual terms, however, unionization also poses
the threat of escalated opportunism. The threat is obvious. Collective
empowerment not only affords labor greater opportunities for tit-fortat penalties against managerial opportunism, but also provides workers with greater capacity to extract opportunistic increases in their
very opportunism the internal
share of the firm's quasi-rent 393 - the
3 94
labor market was supposed to check.
Michael Wachter and George Cohen theorize that the Mackay
Radio395 doctrine is the legal system's optimizing response to this
problem. By allowing employers to hire permanent strike replacements at wages below those demanded by striking workers, Mackay
Radio enables management to preempt unions' efforts to expropriate
supra-competitive shares of the surplus from match-specific investment. The Mackay Radio "solution" for optimizing the internal labor
market's safeguards against worker opportunism, however, clashes
with Wagner's goal to enhance workers' capacity to inflict penalties
to enforce managerial reciprocity. The Mackay Radio "solution" also
points to a deeper respect in which Wagner's implicit model of the
bargaining game departs substantially - both normatively and descriptively - from the legal economists'. Wagner's primary normative
concern was redistribution of bargaining power as an end in itself 393 Oliver Williamson concludes that because management recognizes unions' potential for
"expropriating sunk costs in physical plant and organizational infrastructure . . . firms and
industries in which investments in durable nonhuman capital are greater will be more resistant
to union organization, ceteris paribus." WILLIAMSON, supra note 65, at 263; see also ELSTER,
supra note 65, at 167. In this analysis, the scope of the union-enforced internal labor market
as a surplus-maximizing governance structure may be extremely limited. Recall that a crucial
component of the successful internal labor market is the existence of sunk capital investments
sufficient to constitute the firm's primary "bond" against opportunistic cutbacks in locked-in
labor. See supra pp. 1463-64.
.94 Indeed, historically, managers resisted not just unionization but even the introduction of
the non-unionized internal labor market for fear that the consequent uniformity in treatment of
workers would spur workers' solidarity and enhance their bargaining power. See JACOBY, supra
note 19, at 95. In other words, contrary to the prescription of internal labor market theory,
management feared that the opportunism-enhancing effects of even the non-union-enforced
internal labor market outweighed its opportunism-diminishing effects.
395 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); see George M. Cohen &
Michael Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers: The Law and Economics Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEw YORK UNIVERSITY 43RD ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 109, 11724 (Bruno Stein ed., I9go). Cohen's and Wachter's theory of Mackay Radio is weakened,
however, by the fact that strike replacements are highly unlikely to know whether the employer
is attempting opportunistically to limit wages or is fairly adjusting to unforeseen contingencies
in the firm's environment. See Note, One Strike and You're Out: Creating an Efficient Permanent Replacement Doctrine, io6 HARv. L. REV. 669, 678 n.5x (1993); supra note 389. By
hypothesis, even incumbent workers lack management's financial and market information. See
supra p. 1463. That is, while allowing the employer to counter workers' increased capacity for
"opportunism," Mackay Radio gives the employer the capacity to escalate the very managerial
opportunism against which internal labor markets were to safeguard workers - namely, opportunistic mass replacements with cheaper, less senior workers.
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as a matter of achieving what he considered social justice and genuine
consent to managerial authority - wholly apart from its ancillary
effect on cooperation and efficiency. 396 The Mackay Radio safeguard
of surplus-maximization extinguishes the very collective empowerment
that was the keystone of Wagner's scheme. 397 As a descriptive matter,
Wagner and his institutionalist advisers concluded - as do many
contemporary labor economists and sociologists - that both product
and labor markets are sufficiently non-competitive to allow discretionary power and customary norms to affect institutional outcomes even
396 See supra pp. 1422-26. Wagner, unlike internal labor market theorists, did not attempt
to model collective bargaining exclusively as an institution "mutually agreed to" in the interests
of joint surplus-maximization. WILLIAMSON, supra note 65, at 272; see also Wachter & Wright,
supra note 355, at 88, Io5-o6 (acknowledging that internal labor market theory models the
distributional contest only to the extent that it constrains surplus maximization). Wachter and
Wright are careful to note that, in the language of neoclassical economics, their internal labor
market model examines only how alternative modes of workplace governance move the parties
to or away from the "contract curve" of pareto-efficient outcomes; their model is not concerned
with distributional movements along the curve. See id. Wagner and his advisers, to the
contrary, pictured unionism concurrently as a weapon in the distributional struggle between
labor and capital and as a governance mechanism with effects on cooperative productive
efficiency. In theory, the two models may be capable of explaining the same domain of empirical
phenomena because, as Dean Calabresi has recently restated, distributional contests that do not
move the parties from a pareto frontier may not exist. See Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness
of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, IOO YALE L.J. 1211, 1216-18 (i99i). Nonetheless, Calabresi's point suggests that Wagner's conceptual focus on the dynamics of the distributional
contest is likelier to capture more fully the complex phenomenon of labor-capital bargaining
than an analysis distracted by the empty concept of pareto improvements. See id. at 125
(arguing that distributional problems should be directly conceptualized, because "[p]areto optimality is no guide and distributional issues cannot, even in theory, be avoided").
Wagner's direct descriptive focus on, and his normative prioritization of, the problem of
redistributing bargaining power are reflected in the core provisions of the Act. Wagner's response
to the glaring historical fact that management strategically sought to prevent workers (by means
of yellow-dog contracts, blacklists, discharges, labor spies, etc.) from increasing their distributive
share was not only to ban those employer tactics; his Act also gave workers the unilateralpower
to determine whether to collectivize the employment relationship through NLRB election and
certification proceedings. But by giving workers the inalienable right unilaterally to choose
unionization, the Wagner Act scheme forecloses a significant productivity-enhancing possibility
in the internal labor market model. The employer is not allowed to commit contractually to
pay a distributive "bribe" in exchange for workers' promise not to unionize in order to achieve
a productivity-enhancing, non-unionized state. The Wagner Act proscribes such "yellow-dog
contracts" that promise non-unionization. See, e.g., Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 678, 684 (I944). "Productivity-enhancing" here refers to the engineering concept of "productive efficiency," as distinguished from the welfarist concept of "allocative efficiency" at stake
in Calabresi's critique of the theory of pareto efficiency. On this distinction, see Lewis A.
Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv.
591, 592-97 (198o).
397More precisely, the Mackay Radio doctrine gives workers only the limited empowerment
of raising their distributive share in an amount equal to the transaction costs to the employer
of hiring a replacement workforce - an amount mitigated in the internal labor market model
by the savings to the employer from ridding itself of less productive and more expensive workers
in the recoupment phase of their career cycles.
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at the expense of long-term surplus-maximization. 3 98 This conclusion

is contrary to the internal labor market theorists' premise that distributional contests that produce non-optional governance mechanisms
399
are doomed in the Darwinian marketplace.
Part of the labor-share-enhancing effect of the Wagner Act scheme

is the unilateral capacity it gives workers to choose unionization at
dramatically reduced costs to themselves. Workers need not offer a
"bribe" of a larger distributive share to capital in order to move to a
share-enhancing unionized state, whether or not surplus-maximizing.
However, in the postwar era of heightened capital mobility, unforeseen

by Wagner, workers' need to "bribe" capital to stay in the unionized
sector came to depend on the indeterminate outcome of a decentralized
"gameo of attrition," 40 0 absent government regulation of capital mo-

bility. That is, if, on a market-wide basis, workers' pro-union solidarity crumbled in the face of employers' persistent flight from union
to non-union status in the repeat-play game, unions would be forced

to restrain their bargaining power to permit capital to maintain at
least its non-union distributive share. 40 Conversely, if workers' market-wide solidarity outlasted employers' anti-union resolve, workers
might achieve enhanced distributive shares even if unionization was
40 2
not surplus-maximizing.
398 See Sanford M. Jacoby, The New Institutionalism: What Can It Learn from the Old?,
in THE ECONOMICS OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, supra note 355, at 162, 164 (summarizing institutionalist labor economists' views). For contemporary evidence that discretionary
power, custom, status comparisons, and other "sociological" factors affect labor market outcomes,
see BARBARA R. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN, passim (1986); ROBERT
M. SOLOw, THE LABOR MARKET AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION 5-24 (2990); William T. Dickens
& Lawrence F. Katz, Inter-Industry Wage Differences and Industry Characteristics,in UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE STRUCTURE OF LABOR MARKETS 48, 50-53 (Kevin Lang & Jonathan S.
Leonard eds., 1987); and Richard B. Freeman, Does the New Generation of Labor Economists
Know More Than the Old Generation?in How LABOR MARKETS WORK 205 (Bruce E. Kaufman
ed., 1988); see also infra pp. 1477, 1481, 1493-94.
399 See WILLAMSON, supra note 65, at 22-23; Wachter & Wright, supra note 355, at xo6.
400 Robert Wilson, Reputations in Games and Markets, in GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF
BARGAINING 27, 44 (Alvin E. Roth ed., 1985).
401 Consonant with Wagner's redistributive goals, postwar statutory interpretations prohibited employers from deliberately developing an invidious reputation for escaping a unionized
workforce. In Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg., 380 U.S. 263 (2965), the Supreme
Court ruled that an employer may not close part of its business or relocate its entire business
with the intent and likely effect of chilling unionization in future organizing campaigns against
that employer. See id. at 274-75. While the theoretical rationale of the Darlington decision is
thus consistent with Wagner's redistributive goal, the practical effect of that decision is sharply
undercut by lower court and administrative decisions allowing partial closings and runaway
shops when the employer's motive is based on substantial labor cost concerns and not on hostility
to unionism per se. See, e.g., NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226 F.2d 324, 327-28 (6th Cir.
1955).
402 These alternative outcomes depend, of course, on a wide range of variables other than
worker "solidarity" and employer "resolve" - including the costs of job loss to workers and
capital mobility to employers, the credibility of employers' threat of escaping the reach of
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As Williamson's and Wachter's analyses suggests, the overall effect
in general equilibrium may be diminished investment in capital-intensive enterprises vulnerable to expropriation by workers' unilateral
unionization 40 3 - unless, that is, unions have some means credibly
to commit to non-expropriation. While management's capacity to
deploy its own tit-for-tat reprisals provides one such means, Wagner
also identified, as do some recent theorists, non-instrumental means
of credible commitment available to both parties in the bargaining
game. Indeed, in Wagner's progressivism, the non-instrumental
modes of commitment were primary.
(d) Group Norms and Conventions. - Recall Wagner's insistence
that the cooperationist solution - "the only solution" - to the labor
problem lay in "a partnership in which moral responsibility must play
a part, '40 4 in which norms of cooperation would be implanted in "the
hearts and minds of men," 40 5 and in which "mutual understanding
and trust" would be continuously nurtured. 40 6 In Wagner's model,
collective bargaining marked a path that led beyond self-interested
instrumental rationality. This was a prescient feature, in light both
of the indeterminacy and multiple equilibria in game-theoretic solutions to repeat-play bargaining games, and of the inherent weaknesses
40 7
of reputation effects sustained purely by long-term self-interest.
domestic unions altogether by moving transnationally, and the baseline degrees of union density
and centralization.
403 Empirical evidence consistent with this thesis is offered in BARRY T. HIRSCH, LABOR
UNIONS AND THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS 84-89 (iggi).
404 Woolf, supra note 166, at 18 (quoting Wagner).
405 Wagner, supra note 162, at 4.
406 Wagner, supra note 223, at io.
407 See supra notes 384-385. As a general theoretical matter, "reputation effects" can be
expected at most to play only a very weak role in a world premised on egoistic instrumental
behavior, even allowing for the possibility of long-term self-interested action. Robert Frank
argues that a theory of credible commitments based on reputations for honesty can get off the
ground only by dropping the assumption of self-interested instrumental behavior. A prudent,
self-interested actor can be expected to cheat only when he cannot get caught, and thus
reputations for honesty could not be trusted in a purely self-interested world. See ROBERT H.
FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS 74-75 (1988).
Frank's argument does not entirely undermine the importance of reputation in a fully selfinterested world. Even in an all-egoistic world, past cooperation by a party may be rationally
taken as some evidence of some positive probability that that actor has a preference-andperceived-payoff structure with sufficiently low discount rate and sufficiently high future payoffs
to warrant self-interested longer-term cooperation. Past cooperation may also be rationally taken
as some evidence that an actor anticipates and fears that the second party will retaliate for noncooperation, and that the first actor wishes to avoid such retaliation. Nonetheless, in an allegoist world, past cooperation always may represent merely a short-term strategy of false
reputation-building which the first actor intends to "milk" in subsequent rounds. See Carl
Shapiro, ConsumerInformation, Product Quality, and Seller Reputation, 13 BELL J. ECON. 20,
29 (1982). In addition, common knowledge of the temptation for "forgiveness" by the second
party in order to avoid a permanent cycle of non-cooperation further clouds the reputationbuilding significance of the first party's past cooperative behavior. See RASMUSEN, supra note
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Harvey Leibenstein's and Jon Elster's theories of cooperation invoke sociological concepts that recapture important aspects of Wagner's "solution" to the two-group bargaining game. 40 8 For Leibenstein
and Elster, workers as a group find it difficult credibly to commit not
only to high work effort and collaborative problem-solving, but also
to restraint of wage demands both in the short term (to allow greater
firm investment and therefore greater surplus to share in the future)

380, at 94 (arguing that "tit-for-tat" penalties lack credibility for this reason); see also Williamson,
supra note 379, at 68 (suggesting other factors that cloud reputation-building).
Reputation effects become even weaker once we add to the premise of pure egoism the two
other assumptions of internal labor market theory - informational asymmetries and unforeseeable contingencies. If each party has difficulty knowing whether the other has acted cooperatively from round to round, or even knowing what would constitute cooperative behavior in
novel circumstances, then past or present behavior becomes such a weak basis for mutual
expectations of future cooperative behavior that preemptive noncooperation is nearly inevitable.
See Bernard Williams, Formal Structures and Social Reality, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 3, II (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) (noting that actors face constant
temptation to take preemptive noncooperative action when all parties know that self-interested
cooperation is sensitive to expectations that non-cooperation will be difficult to detect). Williams
concludes that "[e]goistic micro-motivation by itself will not do" as an explanation for cooperation. Id. at ii.
If the concept of "reputation effects" refers to expectations and beliefs about parties' norms
of honesty, altruism, or other dispositions to trustworthiness, then we have moved beyond the
premise of pure instrumental self-interest into a world of thicker culture and psychology, for
which "reputation effects" is generally a mere marker. The inquiry into the phenomena of
cultural norms and psychological dispositions is therefore treated below as an explicit step beyond
pure self-interested rationalist methodology. The leading economic models that rely on reputation
effects to explain cooperation either take the existence of a pool of cooperative or trustworthy
actors as an exogenous datum, or implicitly or explicitly set aside thorough investigation of how
beliefs and expectations about each party's trustworthiness are formed. See, e.g., Douglas W.
Diamond, Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets, 97 J. POL. ECON. 828, 831-33 (1989)
(assuming exogenous pool of cooperators); Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of
Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 63o-31 (1981)
(leaving unexplained how sellers who invest in unproductive advertising develop reputations
among buyers for selling high quality goods, even though buyers know that each seller who
once offers low quality goods stands to lose the same future income stream regardless whether
that seller sunk costs in advertising); Kreps, supra note 385, at 113 (assuming prior reputation
for trustworthiness and prior expectations among repeat players about how they will react to
reputation-breaching behavior). Gilson and Mnookin conclude that cooperation within law firms
rests in part on culture-driven behavior unexplained by theories that rest exclusively on actors'
"rational maximization of tangible rewards." Ronald Gilson & Robert Mnookin, Sharing Among
the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners
Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REv. 313, 376 (z985).
408 Leibenstein depicts the labor-management relation as a "latent," "two-sided," "adversarial
relationfl" at constant risk of degeneration into a pareto-inferior equilibrium, HARvEY LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM: THE INEFFICIENCIES OF HIERARCHY 57, 59

(1987), in which the

workforce as a group minimizes effort, while management affords correspondingly minimal
wages and working conditions. See id. at 48-57; Harvey Leibenstein & Klaus Weiermair,
X-Efficiency, Managerial Discretion, and the Nature of Employment-Relations: A Game-Theo-

retical Approach, in

MANAGEMENT UNDER DIFFERING LABOUR MARKET AND EMPLOYMENT

SYSTEMS 79, 81-84 (Grinther DIugos, Wolfgang Dorow & Klaus Weirmair eds., 1988).
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and in the long term (to allow more capital-intensive investment by
management free of fear of future expropriation by unrestrained labor
bargaining power). Management faces the challenge of credibly committing to future job security (including seniority protection to enhance
productivity by reducing turnover) and enlarged distributive pay-back
40 9
to workers.
Although Elster is pessimistic about the capacity of the parties so
4 10
to commit,

his and Leibenstein's potential solutions, like Wagner's,

include "social norms" and "conventions" of cooperation. Conventions
and social norms are shared standards that focus and coordinate
expectations. 41 1 Social norms, for Elster, are sustained by the approval and disapproval of others and by one's internalized feelings of
embarrassment, anxiety, guilt, and shame at the contemplation of
violating them. And, in a crucial theoretical break with self-interested
rationalism, social norms dictate behavior in non-outcome-dependent
ways. 4 12 Empirical studies 4 13 confirm Elster's proposition that "[t]he
work place is a hotbed of norm-guided action." 4 14 Workplace social
norms of "equality, equity, and fair division" are pervasively deployed
4 15
in the process of collective bargaining.
409 See ELSTER, supra note 65, at 74-96, 146, 276-78.
410 See id. at 276-77.
411 Leibenstein defines "effort conventions" as standards "with a high regularity of behavior
and a high degree of expectation that others will adhere to [the standards]." Leibenstein &
Weiermair, supra note 371, at 88. Such conventions are contingent on the local history and
culture of the firm and on socialization outside the firm, and are susceptible to concerted "leaps
of imagination" and "cultural change" in the direction of pareto-superior cooperation. LEIBENSTEIN, supra note 4o8, at 58-59.
412 See Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 99, 99-100
(1989). Norms that affect a broad range of social contexts (in and out of the workplace) include
"everyday Kantianism" - which dictates cooperation if it would be better for all if all cooperated
- and "the norm of fairness" - which dictates cooperation if most other people actually
cooperate. ELSTER, supra note 65, at 123. For empirical evidence that norms of fairness may
affect a broad range of economic outcomes, including employment transactions, see Daniel
Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairnessand the Assumptions of Economics,
in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 101, 115 (Robin
M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986).
413 See FRANK, supra note 407, at 177-84; SOLOW, supra note 398, at 5-24; sources cited
supra note 398.
414 ELSTER, supra note 65, at 121.
41SId. at 215. Examples of the most prevalent norms include "the norm of maintaining the
reference wage," "the norm that both labour and capital should benefit from any gains in the
firm's earnings," "the norm that gains from luck (e.g., improved market conditions) should be
shared between capital and labour," and "the norm that gains due to increased skills should
accrue mainly to the skill holder, be it labour or management." Id. at 222. Elster powerfully
attacks attempts to explain the origins of social norms in purely functionalist terms - that is,
the view that social norms necessarily evolve to serve either group or individual self-interest.
See id. at 124, 139, 244. Even theorists who offer a group-functionalist account of social norms
recognize that, in situations of asymmetric power, social norms may develop to serve the
distributive interests of the powerful rather than the pareto-improving interests of all parties.
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Wagner and his advisers did not elaborate the norms of fairness
that they believed would encourage cooperation in labor-management
bargaining; but they expressed optimism that collective bargaining
would in fact breed cooperative norms. William Leiserson, for example, wrote that unionism - particularly in the collaborative forms
represented by the Baltimore & Ohio and Clothing Workers experiments - brought about a "great revolution in mental attitude" that
"promise[d] . . . for the first time to give us an ethics of labor
relations." 4 16 He believed that labor arbitration, collaborative shop
committees, and face-to-face negotiations were the institutional vehicles for developing a common set of norms and conventions for labor
relations. 4 17 But the optimism of Wagner and his advisers about the
cooperationist effects of collective bargaining rested not simply on their
faith in the ad hoc introduction of discrete norms or conventions.
They also believed that collective bargaining would transform interests
and perceptions and undergird dispositions of trust favorable to intergroup cooperation.
(e) Trust, Resentment, and Endogenous Interests. - Wagner and
his advisers frequently declared that collective bargaining would promote cooperation by producing "trust" and "banish[ing] suspicion"
between labor and management. 4 18 In the context of their pragmatic
progressivism, this was not mere rhetoric but, to the contrary, was
central to their understanding of social action. 4 19 Recent theories of
trust help clarify the important place of that concept in Wagner's
vision of industrial relations.
Current theories conceptualize trust in two ways, each of which
resonates with aspects of Wagner's analysis. First, trust can be understood as a kind of code of honor. The content of the code could be
a generalized norm or duty of honesty that lends credence to specific
commitments that would not be sustained by either immediate or longterm self-interest. Or, its content could be an even more generalized
norm or duty to act fairly to protect the interests of vulnerable parties
in unspecifiable future contingencies. 420 With either content, the code

See ROBERT L. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES

179

& nn. 42-43 (1g9). Such "distortion" of norms (and of other subjective elements, such as
perceptions, preferences, and interests) under conditions of asymmetric power is captured in the
"hegemonic consciousness" rationale for the statutory ban on company unions. See supra pp.
1457-58.
416 Leiserson, supra note 208, at 161.
417 See id. at 161-63; see also Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 38, at I (statement of H.A.
Millis), reprinted in x LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1559 (stating that collective
bargaining generates "a cooperative relationship, with rough ideas of fairness').
418 Wagner, supra note 223, at io; Wagner, Talk on Labor Relations, supra note 208, at 3.
419 See supra pp. 1414, 1419-22.
420 See, e.g., NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER 24-31 (1979), supra note 65, at i16i8, 274-75; ROBERTO M. UNGER, PASSION 126 (1984). Barber thus likens trust to a fiduciary
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may dictate behavior that cuts against a party's own welfare or preferences. 4 2 1 Second, trust can be conceptualized as a sentiment, such
as sympathy, love, friendship, or some more limited form of caring

or understanding. 42 2 In this conception, trustworthy behavior serves
rather than overrides the interests or utility of the actor, whose subjective welfare function incorporates the interests of others. 42 3 These
two conceptualizations of trust - which echo, respectively, the moralistic and the communitarian dimensions of American progressivism
- are mingled in Wagner's and his associates' appeals for cooperation4 24
enhancing trust in the workplace.

obligation "to demonstrate a special concern for other's interests above [the actor's] own" that
"goes beyond technically competent performance" of specified roles subject to monitoring. BERNARD BARBER, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF TRUST 14, 15 (1983). Note the similarity between
concepts of trust and the contractual obligations sometimes assumed by parties to relational
contracts either to use "best efforts" or to exercise fiduciary care in contingent situations. See
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. io89,
1111-1130 (1981). In labor law, there are no such legally imposed obligations at times when
collective agreements have lapsed; thus the role of conditional cooperation, norms, and trust in
labor relations is potentially significant. Although §§ 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3 ), and 8(d) of the NLRA
require that the parties bargain in "good faith" when contracts expire, the requirement is virtually
toothless because management need not make concessions and may unilaterally implement
changes in terms and conditions of employment after negotiating to an impasse. See NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 745 n.12 (1962).
421 Amartya Sen refers to such codes as "commitments," Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: A
Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory, in SCIENTIFIC MODELS AND
MEN, 1, 8-11, (Henry Harris ed., 1979); Jon Elster labels them "codes of honor," ELSTER,
supra note 65, at 116-18, 274-75; Christopher Jencks calls such behavior "moralistic unselfishness," Christopher Jencks, Varieties of Altruism, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 53, 54 (Jane J.
Mansbridge ed., 199o). See also BARBER, supra note 42o, at 9 (defining trust as the "expectation
that partners in interaction will carry out . . . their duties in certain situations to place others'
interests before their own').
422 See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 407, at 51-56, 185-2ii (positing love and friendship as
basis for trust); Edward H. Lorenz, Neither Friends nor Strangers: Informal Networks of
Subcontracting in French Industry, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 194, 208 (Diego Gambetta ed., i988) (arguing that trust is necessary for ongoing economic
relations, but can be based on concerted personal contact and understanding short of friendship);
infra note 458.
423This form of trust has been labeled "sympathy" by Sen, cited above in note 421, at 8;
"altruism" by ELSTER, cited above in note 65, at 36, 41, 279-80; and "empathic unselfishness"
by Jencks, cited above in note 421, at 54. Roberto Unger acutely captures the difficulty of
distinguishing self-interest from trustworthy altruism, once we acknowledge that a person's
"interests" cannot be defined in essentialist terms:
The selfish act is cloaked more often than not in a half-transparent garb of justification.
Those who appeal to these self-serving apologies do not themselves know how seriously
to take them.. . . The obscurity of the distinction between selfishness and altruism in
human conduct is thus directly traceable to the dependence of interests upon opinions
UNGER, supra note 420, at 130.

424 Thus, Wagner frequently envisioned cooperative labor-management behavior as embodying "moral responsibility." Woolf, supra note 195, at 6. He wrote admiringly of what he saw
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The advantages of such non-instrumental trustworthiness for sustaining cooperative behavior in bargaining games are underscored in
a host of contemporary theoretical and empirical studies. 425 The idea
is straightforward: such "irrational," non-self-interested dispositions
may make commitments credible where dispositions to self-interested
instrumentalism would not. 426 The paradox is that "persons directly
motivated to pursue [even long-term, prudential] self-interest are often
for that very reason doomed to fail." 42 7 Unlike persons who are
intrinsically motivated by sentiments of sympathy or moral commitment, "[self-interested persons] cannot make themselves attractive for
ventures that require trust," ventures that would actually serve longterm self-interest. 4 28 For Wagner, cooperative labor-management relations intrinsically required a form of "social exchange" - marked
by communitarian bonds, diffuse obligations, and trust - rather than
"economic exchange" - marked by self-interested rationalism, con-

as the entrenched codes of cooperative managerial behavior in British culture, which he hoped
could be mimicked in the United States through legislative engineering. Wagner, supra note 89,
at ig. Alongside such paeans to moralistic unselfishness, Wagner often wrote of his expectation
that collective bargaining would encourage sentiments that generate a convergence of the subjective interests of management and labor. See supra p. 1428.
425 See infra pp. 1481-88. Among contemporary institutionalist legal economists, Goldberg,
Gilson, and Mnookin have most pointedly acknowledged the importance of trust and preferencealteration in the dynamics of economic institutions, including employment relations. See Goldberg, supra note 369, at 264 n. 33, 271-72; Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 407, at 334-39. Jeff
Gordon interprets the Delaware Supreme Court's important decision in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989), which gave great deference to management's business judgment in rejecting a hostile takeover bid, as a possible judicial effort to
sustain the kind of "community of interest between a firm and its workers" and "such values as
loyalty and fairness" on which "the success of a market-oriented system ultimately depends."
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931, 1986 (9gi).
426 See Jon Elster, Selfishness and Altruism, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 42 1, at
44, 49 (stating that "being honest when it does not pay to do so is a form of irrationality," but
"[i]f people pursue their selfish ends subject to the constraint of not telling lies or breaking
promises, more cooperation can be achieved than if lies are made and promises broken whenever
it seems expedient").
427 FRANK, supra note 407, at 258.

428 Id. at 255. Kenneth Arrow notes, "Virtually every commercial transaction has within
itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be
plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by
the lack of mutual confidence . . . ." Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, in ALTRUISM,
MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 13, 24 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975). Another economist,
Fred Hirsch, writes, "The point is that conventional, mutual standards of honesty and trust are
public goods that are necessary inputs for much of economic output." FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL
LIMITS TO GROWTH 141 (1976).
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tractual specificity, and instrumental enforcement. 429 "No one can
430

contract to cooperate," he believed.
For Wagner, the institution of collective bargaining was well-suited
to encourage the forms of trust discussed above, for reasons that are
plausible in light of current elaborations on the theory of trust. Wagner emphasized two trust-building features of collective bargaining:
communication and empowerment. He referred to collective bargaining as "the method of conference," in which labor and management
could interact "based upon reason rather than upon force" and thereby
"banish suspicion and hatred."'4 31 His premise that ongoing communication in a common enterprise could nurture other-regarding senti-

ments advantageous to cooperation is supported by numerous recent
psychological experiments. 4 32 The conclusions of those experiments,
429 For sociological treatments of social and economic exchange, see, for example, PETER M.
BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 88-115 (1964); and AMITAI ETZIONI, THE
MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS 67-87 (z988). For applications and elaborations in legal scholarship, see ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT

57-88 (1983); Charny, supra note 389, at 391-426; Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of
Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 691, 720-25 (1974).
430 Wagner Brief, supra note 125, at 398.
431 79 CONG. REC. 7573 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at
2341.

432 Robyn Dawes and his collaborators, for example, ran a series of increasingly refined
experiments in which groups of strangers were presented with one-shot payoffs with the structure
of a Prisoner's Dilemma. See Robyn M. Dawes, Alphons J.C. van de Kragt & John M. Orbell,
Cooperationfor the Benefit of Us - Not Me, or My Conscience, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST,
supra note 421, at 97, ioi-iio. That is, the payoffs were such that it was always in the
individual's self-interest not to cooperate, even though each received a lower payoff if all chose
non-cooperation than if all cooperated. The members of different groups were permitted varying
degrees of communication among themselves before each made his or her choice to "cooperate"
and risk a sucker's payoff, or to "defect" and be assured of a higher payoff. Individuals' choices
to cooperate or not to cooperate were kept strictly secret from the other subjects, so any breach
of promise to cooperate by an individual could not be sanctioned by other subjects in any way.
The percentage of cooperative choices rose dramatically with the degree of communication, both
communication in which promises to cooperate were not allowed and in which promises,
although completely unenforceable, were allowed. See Robyn M. Dawes, Jeanne McTavish &
Harriet Shaklee, Behavior, Communication, and Assumptions About Other People's Behavior in
a Commons Dilemma Situation, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. I, 6 (1977). In variations
on the experiment, communication enhanced the rate of cooperative outcomes only when payoffs
were structured so that an individual's choice to cooperate might benefit other members of the
group with whom the individual communicated, not when a choice to cooperate might benefit
members of groups with whom the individual had not communicated. See John M. Orbell,
Alphons J.C. van de Kragt & Robyn M. Dawes, Explaining Discussion-Induced Cooperation,
54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 811, 815 (1988). The studies concluded that communication enhances sentiments of group caring or group identity, and thereby increases cooperation
over levels explained by self-interested rationalism. From a third series of experiments, Dawes
and his collaborators concluded that variations in cooperation could be explained by such group
sentiments rather than simply by individuals' pangs of pre-socialized "conscience" over promisebreaking, because there was no correlation between the number of promisors and number of
cooperators, except in the extreme case of universal promising. See id. at 817-18.
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and of many ethnographic and quantitative studies of actual workplaces, 43 3 mesh well with the labor progressives' premise that workers'
group "instincts,"4 34 "irrepressible sense of 'common purpose,"' 435 and
"esprit de corps"4 36 were vital to effective labor-management collab4 37
oration and would be encouraged by the "conference" method.
It is true that the recent experimental studies involve individuals
in relations relatively free of power disparities. Wagner and his associates believed that "the conference method" would build the sentiments and codes that constitute trust only when the collective empowerment of labor had mitigated the asymmetric power of the
employment relation. Of course, the idea that severe power disparity
generates distrust is old and often explored. 438 But Wagner and his
advisers identified at least three particular mechanisms by which empowerment encouraged workplace trust, again prefiguring some recent
theoretical and empirical confirmation of the institutional endogeneity
of trust.
First, following Brandeis, Wagner and his advisers believed that
organizational empowerment, by enhancing labor's actual influence on
workplace outcomes, gave "employees the feeling that they have a

433 A variety of clinical studies are summarized in FRANK, cited above in note 407, at 22326; and Diego Good, Individuals, InterpersonalRelations, and Trust, in TRUST: MAKING AND
BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 31, 36, 44-45 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988). On the enhancement of worker commitment by increased labor-management communication, see sources
cited below in notes 482 and 483.
431 TEAD, supra note 373, passim.
435 MONTGOMERY, supra note ii, at 413 (quoting industrial psychologist Frank Watts).
436 JACOBY, supra note ig, at 102.
437 79 CONG. REC. 7573 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at
2341.

438 See, e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS, at 36-39 (,Valter
Kaufmann ed. & Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingsdale trans., Random House 1967) (z887)
(analyzing ressentiment in the master-slave relationship); JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND
THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS 8-23 (I990) (exploring "hidden transcripts"
of disguised ideological insubordination almost universally found among subordinate groups).
Roberto Unger has emphasized that power disparity can erode trust even if the subordinate
group believes the power disparity is justified:
There comes a point when [even] the [justified] suppression of reciprocity begins drastically
to poison the experiences of personality and community. People who stand in a relationship of inalterable superiority and subordination can hardly deal with each other as joint
participants in community. Their affection for each other across hierarchical lines will
be marred by condescension or pity on the part of the superior and self-abasement or
shameful yearning on the part of the underling.
UNGER, supra note 420, at 132.
The inherent ambiguity of the experience of trust within relations of asymmetric power only
compounds this erosion of affection. "[Wiherever there is established, emergent, or even possible
power, and whatever forms this power may take, trust and distrust become ambiguous. Each
demonstration of trust may be a self-deceptive surrender; each gesture of distrust, a sign of
enlightenment and emancipation." Id. at 126.
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stake in the business." 439 Organized workers would feel like enterprise
citizens and "partners[] shouldering . . . the responsibilities of management." 440 Second, for Wagner, the actual exercise of managerial
power not checked by workers' collective power and monitoring was
inevitably rife with manipulative or arbitrary practices that induced
worker resentment and withdrawal of trust. Wagner's concern can
be recast as a critique of transaction-cost models that see workplace
hierarchy as the remedy for worker opportunism but neglect the full
range of enhanced opportunities for employer opportunism created by
that very hierarchy. 4 4 1 Wagner went beyond even this broader instrumental analysis in his concern with the effects of such managerial
discretion on psychological dispositions of trust. That is, he recognized that hierarchical rules, such as those of the internal labor market

439 Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 65, at 287 (statement of Arthur E. Suffern), reprinted
in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 316.
440 75 CONG. REC. 4918 (1932) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
441

[T]ransaction cost theorists tend to see authority primarily as a remedy for opportunism,
rather than as a device which might be abused in an opportunistic fashion. Little
attention is given to the prospect that agents holding positions of authority might use the
data obtained through internal audits to gain strategic advantages over lower level parties,
use fiat to settle disputes in ways which suit themselves, or impose self-serving incentive
systems ....
. .[A]uthority
[
relations generate the structuralpreconditionsunder which employer
opportunism is most likely to be encouraged; namely information impactedness, small
numbers, and availability of a tool (decision by fiat) which is tailor-made for unilateral
pursuit of self-interest.
Gregory K. Dow, The Function of Authority in TransactionCost Economics, 8 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 13, 20-21 (1987).

This critique is not fully applicable to the internal labor market theories set out above, which
are centrally concerned with at least those forms of employer opportunism that threaten matchspecific surplus-maximization. Nonetheless, the critique identifies in workplace hierarchies the
structurally potent enhancement of generalized opportunities for managerial opportunism or
arbitrariness that may harm workers! (and broader organizational) interests even independent of
the dynamics of match-specific investment. Milgrom and Roberts identify three types of inefficiencies generated by centralized organizational authority: the arbitrary or self-interested action
of managers, the "influence costs" expended by subordinates attempting to shape managerial
discretion, and the diversion of organizational resources to safeguard against the first two. See
Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of
Economic Activity, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 57, 79 (James E. Alt
& Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., z9go); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, An Economic Approach to
Influence Activities in Organizations,94 AM. J. Soc. (Supp.) S154, S154-Sr58 (2988). Milgrom
and Roberts focus on the wasteful influence activities of individual subordinates seeking job
promotions. Wagner focused instead on the collective distributional "influence activities" of
management and labor - an empirically significant supplement to the organizational dynamics
examined by Milgrom and Roberts. Id. Wagner also highlighted - again with much recent
empirical support - the cultural and psychological dynamics of commitment and resistance that
inhere in centralized authority structures and that deeply affect work motivation and organizational performance.
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designed to safequard against opportunism, may tend to undermine
the trust required to make the parties' commitments to those very
rules credible - in the absence of the additional safeguard of workers'
44 2
collective empowerment.
Finally, several recent studies have elaborated yet another trustcrippling potential that Wagner saw in hierarchical workplace regimes.
In these studies, both the narrow task-discretion built into the rulebound job classifications of the internal labor market and the systematic metering and co-worker competition of the employee rank hierarchy are powerful signals to workers of managerial distrust. Organizational pronouncements about consensual values and team
cooperation are belied by these actual day-to-day practices, making
the labor-management relationship highly vulnerable to the downward
spiral that Alan Fox calls the "low-trust syndrome." 44 3 Workers respond to their perceptions of managerial distrust with demoralization,
resentment, and perfunctory performance, which may induce management to intensify metering and narrow worker discretion. Wagner's and his advisers' commitment to a combination of collective
empowerment and collaborative shopfloor structures responded to this
syndrome. The expanded participation of workers in discretionary
workplace problem-solving ran counter, if only incrementally, to the
narrow task-discretion that, for theorists like Fox, is the driving force
behind the low-trust spiral.
In the United States, of course, management has historically seen
unionization as a fecund source of distrust and polarization - the
opposite of Wagner's expectations of collective bargaining. 4 44 The

442 For recent evidence that confirms the tendency of collective bargaining over strategic
managerial decisions to sustain trust, see sources cited below in note 484.
443 Fox, supra note 218, at 102-14; see also sources cited infra note 486.
444 A small minority of progressive managers in the 1930S understood that relations with
independent unions could be either low-trust or high-trust, and that managerial practices could
be decisive in determining which orientation prevailed. Cyrus Ching, U.S. Rubber's Industrial
Relations Director, wrote:
If, in dealing with labor organizations, we are ethical, are entitled to the confidence of
people, use fair tactics and use friendly attitudes, we will get that in return; if we are
going to be militant, use underhanded tactics and fight all the time, that is the type of
organized labor leader we will get.
Cyrus Ching, Problems in Collective Bargaining, ii J. Bus. 33, 40 (1938); see also Harold B.
Bergen, Basic Factors in Present-Day Industrial Relations, 14 PERSONNEL 46, 58 (1937) (expressing similar views held by Proctor and Gamble's Director of Industrial Relations). But in
the 193os, as today, management thinking about collective bargaining's effect on trust was
generally grounded in the assumption that workers' "natural" or "objective" interests - and
legitimate individual contractual obligations - lie in organic solidarity with the enterprise and
in compliance with managerial directives. See supra p. 146o. Hence, the emergence of collective
adversarialism likely rests on workers' inaccurate perceptions of conflicting interests and on
unions' fomenting of distrustful dispositions. If, as Wagner believed, workers' natural entitlements (and their likely subjective preferences) lie in the substantive freedom of collective em-
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managerial view tends, normatively, to discount the associational and
redistributional interests of workers or, descriptively, to see their distributive struggles as strategic behavior necessarily reducing workers'
absolute share by reducing the joint product of management and labor.
Even if economists see workers' redistributive goal as legitimate or
feasible, however, some identify plausible reasons to believe that
unions' perceived institutional interests may encourage trust-undermining behavior. The union may prosper by encouraging workers to
adopt an "us versus them" or "grievance" mentality. 445 While the
possibility of such a strategy poses an ever-present threat to an enterprise otherwise suited to high-trust orientations, a large body of empirical evidence suggests that workers' loyalty to the union grows in
tandem with workers' trust in the enterprise. 44 6 This "dual loyalty"
thesis implies that a union's choice of a non-polarizing strategy is also
instrumentally rational - a strategy trumpeted by interwar (and more
recent) proponents of Wagner's collaborative brand of collective bar44 7
gaining.
(f) Wagner's Model in Sum: Gift-Exchange Through Empowerment. - In light of Wagner's emphasis on group commitments, trust,
and the endogenous interests and norms that underpin them, the
recent models of labor-management relations that best capture the
basic conceptual structure of Wagner's philosophy are those based on
powerment, then cooperation and trust likely depend on fulfilling those interests, for the three
reasons canvassed in the pp. 1483-84. Wagner quoted Arthur Todd approvingly:
The very nature of man cries out for association. If this impulse is not given free
opportunity in the open and above board, it will inevitably work under cover, secretly.
And this covert activity is likely to be much more devastating to employee loyalty, to
managerial efficiency and to public confidence than overt unionism.
Wagner Brief, supra note 125, at 441.
44s See Goldberg, supra note 369, at 271-72.
446 See, e.g., Lois R. Dean, Union Activity and Dual Loyalty, 7 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.

526, 535 (,954); Michael E. Gordon, Laura L. Beauhais & Robert T. Ladd, The Job Satisfaction
and Union Commitment of Unionized Engineers, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 359, 368 (1984);

Anil Verma, Joint ParticipationPrograms: Self-Help or Suicide for Labor?, 28 INDUS. REL.
401, 408-09 (1989).
447

The capacity of [a labor union] to make men and women do their best, to rally to its
standard the spiritual qualities which we variously designate as loyalty, devotion to duty,
pride of achievement, is at once the envy and despair of company-union
protagonists....
Gone from the service [of company union workers] is the high quality of
cooperative enterprise, valuable by-product of unionism; gone, the motivating impulse
and enthusiasm for service, which grew out of the security and freedom of unionism;
gone, too, the self-respecting kind of loyalty to a company which deserved loyalty fostered
under unionism, and lost now even under a regime of dressmaking classes, ukulele
instruction, and such tidbits of the new psychology.
Julia S. O'Connor, The Blight of Company Unionism, AM. FEDERATIONIST, May, 1926, at 544,

546, 548. For recent evidence of the enabling - if not, as in Wagner's optimistic view,
determinant - role of collective bargaining in enhancing trust, see below at pp. 1493-94.

1486

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. io6:I379

anthropological "gift-exchange" theories. 448 In these models, the two-

group bargaining game may yield a so-called gift exchange. Workers
as a group give a "gift" of work effort and goodwill that exceeds

perfunctory performance at the level of the firm's minimum work
rules, and the firm gives a "gift" of compensation and relaxed moni-

toring conditions that are better than workers could find in the external labor market. The explanation for the "gift exchange" rests on a

cluster of propositions that match Wagner's analysis.
First, worker interaction may generate trust-building sentiment
among co-workers and between workers and the enterprise. 449 In
other words, as for Wagner, intra-group and inter-group interaction

and communication alter welfare functions; interests and preferences
are endogenous to institutional relationships. Workers' interaction
produces sentiments that generate utility from working above the
45 0
minimum standards set by the firm.
Second, the interaction may also generate trust-building norms of
fair exchange of group effort for compensation and monitoring conditions. 45 ' Group norms and group sentiment are mutually reinforcing. Because of workers' sentiment for the work group, the firm "must
at least to some extent treat the group of workers with the same

norms, collectively.

'452

In turn, the sentiments of goodwill toward

the firm that underpin workers' willingness to give supra-minimum
448 The locus classicus of the concept of gift-exchange in the anthropological literature is
MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES

passim (W.D. Halls trans., 19go); see also CYRIL S. BELSHAWv, TRADITIONAL EXCHANGE AND
MODERN MARKETS 46-52 (i965) (comparing gift-giving in traditional and modern societies, and
concluding that it continues to play an important role in North American culture). The giftexchange concept has been applied to workplace relations by George Akerlof and Masahiko
Aoki. See AoKI, supra note io, at 176; George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift
Exchange, 97 Q.J. ECON. 543, 557-67 (1982).
449As Akerlof argues:
Persons who work for an institution (a firm in this case) tend to develop sentiment for
their co-workers and for that institution; to a great extent they anthropomorphize these
institutions . . . . For the same reasons that persons (brothers, for example) share gifts
as showing sentiment for each other, it is natural that persons have utility for making
gifts to institutions for which they have sentiment.
Akerlof, supra note 448, at 55o. For those who find this a bit rosy, consider Ashworth's evidence
that even enemy soldiers in the trench warfare of World War I developed sentiments of caring
from what began as purely instrumental interaction. See TONY ASHWORTH, TRENCH WARFARE
1914-918: THE LIVE AND LET LIVE SYSTEM 29 (i98o).

450 The gift-exchange model shows how group-based analysis can indirectly shed light on
problems of individual workers' motivation and free-riding. See supa note 371. In the giftexchange model, individual workers are motivated to provide intrinsic rather than perfunctory
performance because of group-generated sentiments and norms. For empirical support of this
claim, see sources cited infra notes 481-485 and accompanying text.
451 See supra pp. 1477-78.
452 Akerlof, supra note 448, at 544; see also Albert 0. Hirschman, Against Parsimony: Three
Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories of Economic Discourse, i ECoN. & PHIL. 7, 14
(1985) (expressing same idea).
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effort depend in part on the firm's honoring the group norms of fair

exchange.

45 3

Third, in the gift-exchange model, these sentiments and norms are

rendered fragile by the context of workplace hierarchy.

They are

susceptible to corrosion in the face of excessive instrumental discipline
by management. An intensification of monitoring and minimum standards, even if it targets only a few less productive workers, "might

easily be considered by the group as a whole as failure by the firm to
reciprocate the group's collective donation of productivity . . . in
4 4
excess of minimum requirements. 5

Wagner's normative vision of workplace relations might be characterized as a gift-exchange-through-empowerment model. He and his

advisers adopted 45 5 the three propositions underpinning the gift-exchange models, but gave greater weight to plausible mechanisms -

discussed in the previous section -

by which enhanced worker bar-

4 56
gaining power strengthens trust-building sentiments and norms.

(g) Deliberative Trust and HierarchicalResentment. -

At the core

of Wagner's understanding of collective bargaining lies a notion explored recently by Charles Sabel under the concept of "studied" or
"deliberative" trust. 45 7 That is, the norms and sentiments that allow
453 A recent MIT study of the automobile industry concludes that "workers respond [with
high effort and quality work] only when there exists some sense of reciprocal obligation, a sense
that management actually values skilled workers, will make sacrifices to retain them, and is
willing to delegate responsibility to the team." JAMES P. WOMACK, DANIEL T. JONES, & DANIEL
Roos, THE MACHINE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 99 (1990). Other empirical studies are cited
below in notes 482-486.
Whereas gift-exchange theorists identify potential non-instrumental benefits when management provides a supra-competitive compensation and monitoring package, other economists
emphasize the instrumental benefits of such so-called "efficiency wages." Supra-market-clearing
wages act as a disciplinary device because workers who are discharged for shirking suffer greater
losses. See ANDREW WEISS, EFFICIENCY WAGES: MODELS OF UNEMPLOYMENT, LAYOFFS,
AND WAGE DISPERSION 1-14 (i99o); Carl Shapiro & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 433, 433 (i984).
454 Akerlof, supra note 448, at 551.
4S5For Wagner's analyses prefiguring the three arguments of the gift-exchange model, see,
respectively, above at pp. 1481-82, discussing group-generated worker motivation; above at pp.
1477-97, discussing the development of norms of fair treatment and trust; and above at pp.
1483-84, discussing the fragility of trust within hierarchy.
456 In Akerlof's version of the gift-exchange model, no role is specified for the formal
collective organization of workers, although he does note that gift-giving outcomes may have
the consequence of diminishing worker mobility and may therefore induce greater inclination
for workers to exercise collective voice through unionization. See Akerlof, supra note 448, at
55o n.5. Aoki, whose model is designed to capture the stylized facts of core Japanese workplaces,
assumes the presence of an enterprise union, which monitors and sanctions management's
compliance with the norms of gift-exchange over repeated bargaining rounds and thereby plays
a significant role safeguarding against the loss of trust. See AoKI, supra note io, at 176; Taishiro
Shirai, A Theory of Enterprise Unionism, in CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN
117, 135 (Taishiro Shirai ed., 1983).
4s7 See Sabel, supra note 2, at 27; Charles Sabel, Moebius-Strip Organizations and Open
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trusting cooperation in economic relationships need not be viewed as
exogenous cultural facts that "explain" cooperative behavior only by
the tautology that parties cooperate because they subscribe to cooperative norms or because they believe, for exogenous reasons, in each
other's cooperative "reputation." In their ongoing economic dealings,
parties not only meter each others' instrumental compliance with contractual specifications, but can also simultaneously engage in consultative interactions through which the norms and sentiments of trust
458
are deliberately nurtured and warily monitored.
For Sabel, as for Wagner, the course of such consultative dealings
not only may build trust but also may endogenously redefine the
subjective interests, perceptions, and even identities of the parties.
Deliberative trust and interest-redefinition reflect the basic human
capacity for self-reflexivity, in other words, for self-evaluation and
self-transformation spurred by intersubjective communication, vulner45 9
ability, and assertion.
That Wagner's thinking reflected such abstract ideas is understandable in light of the progressivist intellectual atmosphere he breathed.
Recall the traces in Wagner's writings of Dewey's declaration that
cooperative institutions could "perfect] the means and ways of communication of meanings so that genuinely shared interest in the consequences of interdependent activities may inform desire and effort
and thereby direct action. '4 60 Wagner's attraction to a cooperative
form of collective bargaining that encouraged collaborative consultation between workers and managers at all levels of the enterprise was
a concrete instantiation of that abstract ideal.

Labor Markets, in SOCIAL THEORY FOR A CHANGING SOCIETY 23, 32 (Pierre Bourdieu & James
S. Coleman eds., iggi).
458 For Albert Hirschman as well, trust is a "resource] whose supply may well increase
rather than decrease through use," but may atrophy in institutions that fail to encourage otherregarding practices and norms, because institutional structures are premised solely on actors'
instrumental self-interest. Hirschman, supra note 452, at 17; see also SEN, supra note I, at 8587 (expressing same). Unger succinctly captures the subtle phenomonology of this process:
Though the ideal of reciprocity is repressed and restricted in associations of trust, it is
not forgotten. It is as if the parties had agreed to remove this ideal from the forefront
of concern so that it might be realized all the more smoothly and effectively; as if because no such bargain occurs in fact. The participants attach the demand of reciprocity
to the ongoing experience of communal life rather than to particular exchanges in the
course of the enterprise ...
[T]he vitality of communal life demands a willingness to overlook particular hardships
and to count on the good faith of one's co-venturers. But the integrity of the group also
requires a measure of vigilance to ensure that this trust not be abused ....
UNGER, supra

note

420,

at

127, 132.

459See Hirschman, supra note 452, at ig; Sabel, supra note 2, at 21-27; Sen, supra note
421, at 8-1. For more extended treatment of the psychological underpinning of self-reflexive
and inter-subjective social action, see DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 17-36, 124-40 (1984); and UNGER, cited above in note 42o, at 275-300.
460 DEWEY, supra note 182, at 155.
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Wagner's insistence on collective empowerment and his opposition

to company unionism reflected his understanding that cooperation and
trust within hierarchy entailed vulnerability - vulnerability to either
instrumental coercion or illegitimate shaping of workers' norms and
interests by management's asymmetric power. Wagner and his progressive allies recognized, to an extent that contemporary transactioncost analysts have yet sufficiently to theorize, that even if "hierarchical
governance" mitigates certain instrumental dilemmas, it also generates
the trust-threatening cultural and psychological contests over legitimacy, commitment, resignation, and resentment that inhere in every
authority or power relationship 46 1 - contests that very much affect
organizational outcomes. That recognition flowed naturally from
Wagner's view that the labor-management relationship was not just a
horizontal exchange, but was embedded in an essentially political
hierarchical structure, subject to the instrumental and symbolic struggles of any such structure.

V. CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS AND AMBIGUITIES OF
WAGNER'S VISION

Confronting the rise of large-scale industry and its propertyless
wage-labor force, labor republicans of the Gilded Age condemned the
individual employment contract in much the same language that Wag4 62
ner and his progressive circle were to use half a century later.
There was no actual liberty of contract in the employer-employee
relation because "'when a man is without means to subsist upon, his
wants compel him to work, and he must ask for employment as a
favor from someone who has the property required to carry on productive work.' 46 3 Because the workers "'do not consent, [because]
they submit but they do not agree,"' wage labor was a form of
"'industrial slavery."'' 464 Drawing on the traditional republican ideal
that freedom and public citizenship could rest only on ownership of
461 See EAGLETON, supra note 240, at 45-61; SCOTT, supra note 438, at Io8-35; UNGER,
supra note 420, at 126-34. The business community of the 1920S through the 1940s fully
understood it was "engaged in a complex struggle for moral authority, not just a contest for
power." HOWELL J. HARRIS, THE RIGHT TO MANAGE 10 (1982).
462 On labor republicanism, see, for example, LEON FINK,

WORKINGMEN'S DEMOCRACY

passim (x983); DAVID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND RADICAL REPUBLICANS,
x862-1872 passim (1967); and SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEW YORK CITY AND
THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1788-i850, at 61-io3 (1984).
463 MONTGOMERY, supra note 462, at 239 (quoting an unidentified eight-hour advocate of

187os), quoted in William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in
the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 767, 81i.
464 MONTGOMERY, supra note 462, at 239 (quoting George McNeil, an eight-hour advocate),
quoted in Forbath, supra note 463, at 8i.
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productive property,
the labor republicans called for a "Cooperative
465
Commonwealth."
But the "cooperative order" that labor progressives of the 1930S
envisioned for the supersession of the inherent "duress" of wage "slavery" differed dramatically from that of the labor republicans of the
1870s. Labor republicans called for the end of the capitalist wage
relationship itself and the erection of a "True Republic" based on
cooperative ownership of industry by workers. 4 66 Wagner, to the
contrary, believed that capitalist ownership and hierarchical largescale production were the inevitable engines of economic progress. He
believed that "free cooperation" 4 67 and full industrial and political
"citizenship" and "self-mastery"4 68 could nonetheless be secured for the
propertyless worker within capitalist mass production through the
collective empowerment of unionization. Indeed, he foresaw a regime
of egalitarian communication and equal responsibility between labor
and capital in the large-scale enterprise and in the democratic corporatist polity.
Wagner's progressive cooperativism perched perilously - as both
a normative and descriptive matter - on the promise of empowerment
afforded by collectivization of the labor market and on expectations
of attendant transformations in workplace culture. His own pronouncements occasionally revealed the vulnerability of this vision. On
the one hand, as detailed in this Article, he believed that the hightrust, cooperative workplace required an equalization of labor-management bargaining power and a softening of hierarchy in workplace
problem-solving. Yet in his final substantive exchange in Senate debates on the Labor Relations bill, he insisted that the Act put no
restrictions on management's traditional prerogative to impose discipline on workers who engaged in concerted activity contrary to the
requirements of efficient production. 46 9 His paeans to unions' capacity

465 MONTGOMERY,

supra note 462, at

252,

quoted in Forbath, supra note 463, at 8og.

466 JOHN SWINTON, STRIKING FOR LIFE: LABOR'S SIDE OF THE LABOR QUESTION 252-53

(x894), quoted in Forbath, supra note 463, at 814. On labor republicanism, see, for example,
sources cited above in note 462.
467 79 CONG. REC. 7573 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at
2341.

468 75 CONG. REC. 4918 (1932).

469 In a colloquy with Senator Hastings, Wagner said:
Of course, if employees [engage in § 7 activity] when they should be working, they would
be subject to discharge.
No sensible person would interpret [§ 8(I)] to mean that while a factory is at work
the workers could suddenly stop their duties to have a mass meeting in the plant on the
question of organization.
79 CONG. REC. 7676 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 240. The

values and assumptions of hierarchical control that several critical scholars have uncovered in
the decisions under the Wagner Act were thus embedded ambivalently in Wagner's own thinking.

1993l

WAGNER ACT

1491

to discipline "irresponsible" individuals and minorities likewise suggest

the limits of the egalitarian cooperation and individual self-mastery
that the new regime would implement. Neither of these concessions

to hierarchy necessarily clashes with Wagner's core ideal of workers'
majoritarian consent to modes of workplace governance.

That is, in

theory a workforce could democratically consent to hierarchical discipline. 4 70 But, in a striking aside in his i937 victory speech at Yale
Law School after the Jones and Laughlin decision, 4 7 1 Wagner candidly
expressed doubts about the possibility of realizing within the regime

of wage labor the consent-defining "equality" of bargaining power that
had for years been the normative North Star of his legislative pro4 72
gram.
Some economic historians characterize the 1940s and 195os as a

period of relative labor-management cooperation stemming, as Wagner
had theorized, from organized labor's capacity to restore workers' trust
that management would adhere to fair norms of gift-exchange '- trust
that had been shattered by Depression-era wage and employment
4 73
Nonetheless, while members of Wagner's own circle contincuts.
ued after the 1930s to promote his cooperative vision of a highly
collaborative, integrationist mode of collective bargaining, 474 that full-

See Putterman, supra note 309, at 172.
471 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. i (x937).
472 See Wagner, supra note 129, at i5-I6 ("The restrictions placed upon the worker economic, social and legal - are so tremendous that he probably would not have equality of
bargaining power even if the National Labor Relations Act were obeyed in full."). This admission prefigured the fundamental defect that Professor Stone identifies in postwar statutory
interpretations that rest on a false premise of equality of bargaining power between labor and
management. See Stone, Post-War Paradigm, supra note 8, at I544-59. Of course, "equality"
of bargaining power for Wagner was a mere label for the labor market conditions and relative
employer-employee bargaining power that he considered just. How to define what degree of
relative bargaining power is just and when that degree has been institutionally secured in vastly
different historical contexts is one of the key puzzles of any attempt to adapt Wagner's collaboration-through-empowerment model of the 1930s to the team workplaces of the I9gos. See
Barenberg, supra note 28.
473See sources cited infra note 477. William Lazonick's recent study concludes:
Before the Great Depression, many of the dominant mass producers [though a minority
of large employers] had, in the absence of unions, undertaken to provide shop-floor
workers with employment stability and even systematic pay increases in order to elicit
effort and maintain the flow of work. But after the debacle of the 1930s, it is unlikely
that American blue-collar workers would have placed their trust in these companies to
provide "good jobs." Assurance that corporate promises of stable employment and rising
incomes would be kept required the presence of powerful unions. Particularly during
World War II, many nonunion employers found that, without a union to support workers
[sic] claim to a share of the firm's value gains, the shop floor became unmanageable.
470

WILLIAM LAZONICK, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE ON THE SHOP FLOOR 276-77 (199o).
474See, e.g., MORRIS COOKE & PHILLIP MURRAY, ORGANIZED LABOR AND PRODUCTION
passim (1940); SUMNER H. SLICHTER, JAMES J. HEALY & E. ROBERT LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 841-78 (i96o); SUMNER H. SLICHTER, THE
CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 170-75 (1947).
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blown model never became the norm. Wartime labor policy,4 75 the
Taft-Hartley Amendments, and post-War administrative and judicial
interpretations helped secure a more adversarial mode of unionization, 476 even if workers achieved a substantial degree of de facto
"mutualism" in shop-floor decision-making. 4 77 Labor progressives'
hopes for the immediate achievement of a labor-corporatist
society
478
died by the the early i96os, if not much earlier.
In a Pyrrhic vindication of Wagner's vision, the last two decades
have seen a revival of practical schemes of labor-management cooperation, linked with new theoretical and empirical confirmation of the
major elements of Wagner's progressivism. 4 79 Although Wagner's optimistic premise that collective bargaining would inevitably generate
a high-trust workplace reflects an overly deterministic conception of
the relation between institutional structures and consciousness, 48 0 the
475 Business executives and their allies in the military procurement and defense planning
agencies rejected the CIO's wartime call for tripartite "industrial councils" to run each industry.
The War Production Board attempted to mollify the CIO by sponsoring plant-level, labormanagement production committees. Owing to business pressure, however, even the few committees that were effectively implemented excluded union officers and fully preserved managerial
prerogatives. See NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, LABOR'S WAR AT HOME: THE CIO IN WORLD WAR
II 89-9o (i982).
476 The Taft-Hartley Amendments, among other things, rejected proposals to codify the
wartime labor-management committees discussed above in note 475, and excluded supervisors
from the Act's protection. See NLRA, supra note 3, § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988). Decisional
law extended that exclusion to all managerial employees, see, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974), and prohibited both supervisory and managerial employees from
participating actively in common labor organizations with rank and file employees, see, e.g.,
Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 631, 633 (1979); see also KOIKE, supra note 2o, at
237-39 (contrasting the United States with Germany and Japan in this respect). This deterrent
to collaborative blurring of the labor-management divide was reinforced by a number of other
doctrinal developments, see Stone, Labor and CorporateStructure, supa note 8, at 138-61, but
also by what Arthur Goldberg called the "'incalculable effects'" on "'industrial mores'" caused
by Taft-Hartley, CIO, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 224
(1949) (quoting Goldberg).
477 See NEIL W. CHAMBERLAIN, THE UNION CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT CONTROL 8
9128 (2948); JAMES W. KUHN, BARGAINING IN GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT: THE POWER OF
INDUSTRIAL WORK GROUPS 174-76 (i96I); Jeffrys, supra note 247, at xoo, 122-23.
478 See, e.g., LAZONICK, supa note 473, at 276-80; Nelson Lichtenstein, From Corporatism

to Collective Bargaining,in THE

RISE AND FALL OF THE NEw DEAL ORDER, 1930-198o, supra
note 44, at 222, 122-23 (arguing that corporatist hopes ended in 1946-48); David L. Stebenne,
Arthur J. Goldberg, New Deal Liberal passim (i9I) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia
University) (arguing that the imminent construction of corporatism did not seem foreclosed until
the early 196os); supra note 211. Faith in Wagner's visionary brand of progressivist cooperationism was, according to Alan Brinkley, already "in retreat" among New Dealers by the late
193os. Brinkley, supra note I8o, at 85, 93.
479 Whether and under what conditions even the collective empowerment of independent
unionism protects workers against illegitimate coercion and preference-transformation in such
cooperative workplaces, as Wagner assumed, is a contested question that I take up in Barenberg,
cited above in note 28.
480 See supra note 354; infra pp. 1493-94. For evidence of such contingency in the specific
context of collaborative labor-management relations, see Barenberg, supra note 28; Edward H.
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empirical and theoretical grounds for the "enabling" role of collective
empowerment in trust-enhancement now seem persuasive. 48 1 The
most recent and thorough set of empirical studies - although by no
means the final or uncontested word - on the cooperative schemes
of the 198os and 199os conclude that, for reasons essentially similar
to those offered by Wagner, collaborative arrangements in unionized
workplaces generally yield greater productivity, ease of technological
transformation, and active worker participation than in non-unionized
workplaces. 48 2 These studies confirm that an increased workers' role
in workplace decisionmaking tends to enhance workers' sense of responsibility and commitment to the decisions they help make and to
enterprise goals more generally; 4 83 that collective participation in strategic corporate decisions bolsters workers' confidence that their enhanced effort and initiative, acceptance of flexible work rules, and
short-term wage restraint will be fairly rewarded in the future;4 84 and
Lorenz, Trust and the Flexible Firm: International Comparisons, 31 INDUS. REL. 455, 457
(1992).

481 "Most U.S. studies indicate a positive union productivity effect, but there are enough
counter-examples to suggest that it is the state of labor relations rather than unionism and
collective bargaining per se that determines productivity." David G. Blanchflower & Richard
B. Freeman, Unionism in the United States and Other Advanced OECD Countries, 31 INDUS.
REL. 56, 68 (1992). Unger points out that the contingent, but enabling, relation between
empowered reciprocity and trust is a general phenomenon in social life. See UNGER, supra note
420, at 128-29.
482 See Maryellen R. Kelley & Bennett Harrison, Unions, Technology, and Labor-Management Cooperation,in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 247, 276-77 (Lawrence Mishel
& Paula B. Voos eds., 1992) (concluding from study of over iooo union and non-union plants
that collaborative problem-solving is more successful in unionized plants because of employment
security and trust provided by collective bargaining, although unionization enhances efficiency
more than do formal participation schemes); see also Adrienne E. Eaton & Paula B. Voos,
Unions and Contemporary Innovations in Work Organization, Compensation, and Employee
Participation,in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS, supra, at 173, 181 (reaching same
conclusion, reinforced by fact that unionized, unlike non-unionized, workplaces have an institutionalized procedure to discuss and negotiate the exchange of greater productivity for greater
wages and security); Lorenz, supra note 480, at 462-63 (reaching same conclusion based on
international comparative data); Lowell Turner, IndustrialRelations and the Reorganization of
Work in West Germany: Lessons for the United States, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS, supra, at 217, 220-241 (reaching same conclusion based on West Germany's combination of independent unionism with collaborative workplace structures). But cf. HIRSCH,
supra note 403, at 87-89, 122 (concluding that, whereas unions cause a decrease in enterprise
investment, their effect on productivity is ambiguous); William N. Cooke, Product Quality
Improvement Through Employee Participation:The Effects of Unionization and Joint UnionManagement Administration, 46 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 119, 119 (1992) (concluding that
product quality in joint union-management participation programs is "at least equal" to that in
nonunion participation programs).
483 See, e.g., CHARLES C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT

IN THE CHANGING CORPORATION 5-6, 88-89, 25, (1988); David E. Guest, Human Resources
Management and Industrial Relations, 24 J. MGMT. STUD. 503, 512-14 (1987); Edward E.
Lawler M, Pay for Performance:A Motivational Analysis, in INCENTIVES, COOPERATION, AND
RISK SHARING, supra note 375, at 69, 78-79.
484 See, e.g., AOKI, supa note zo, at i6; KOCHAN, KATZ & MCKERSIE, supra note 1o, at 16.
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that flattened managerial hierarchies, team production processes, and
group-based pay systems often provide greater productivity gains than
would be predicted by self-interested rationalist theories of free-riding
and moral hazard. 48 5 A recurrent failing of the new cooperative work
arrangements, however, is workers' low-trust response to "drill sergeant" supervisors and to managerial practices that undermine union
strength and involvement. 4 86 This challenges Wagner's conviction
that collective bargaining would inevitably sustain trust, but confirms
his recognition that hierarchical labor-management structures are
highly vulnerable to the "low-trust syndrome."
In the last twenty years, collaborative schemes were also implemented widely in non-union enterprises, and they gelled into a relatively stable mode of workplace governance that reflected and reinforced the precipitous, decline of organized labor. 4 87 The failure of
the Wagner Act regime (as amended and actually administered) to
guide managerial culture toward cooperationist acceptance and trust
in collective bargaining was registered in intensified managerial resistance to union organizing campaigns. 48 8 The anticipated collective
empowerment that, in Wagner's view, promised to build trust and
489
loyalty continued instead to feed managerial resistance and distrust.
485

See, e.g., John W. Kendrick, Group FinancialIncentives: An Evaluation, in INCENTIVES,

COOPERATION, AND RISK SHARING, supra note 375, at 120, 132; Haig R. Nalbantian, Incentive
Compensation in Perspective, in INCENTIVES, COOPERATION, AND RISK SHARING, supra note

375, at 3, 35; Edward J. Ost, Team-Based Pay: New Wave Strategic Incentives, SLOAN
REV., Spring, I9go, at ig, 21-22.
486 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. COOKE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT

MGMT.

COOPERATION 104-05 (1990);

LLOYD TURNER, DEMOCRACY AT WORK: CHANGING WORLD MARKETS AND THE FUTURE OF
LABOR UNIONS 31-90 (1991); Cooke, supra note 482, at 124-25, 132; Lorenz, supra note 480,

at 457487 See KOCHAN, KATz & MCKERSIE, supra note io, at 47-8o.
485 See, e.g., William N. Cooke, The Rising Toll of DiscriminationAgainst Union Activists,

24 INDUS. REL. 422, 422 (1985); Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, Employer Behavior
in the Face of Union Organizing Drives, 43 INDUS. LAB. REL. REV. 351, 351 (1990); Weiler,
supra note 290, at 1776-81. There are, of course, many sources of deunionization and labor
disempowerment other than the escalation of management anti-union campaigns, including
heightened international and domestic competition, enhanced capital mobility, excessive union
wage premiums, unions' bureaucratic ossification, and increasing cultural legitimation of management's hiring of strike replacements. See, e.g., HIRSCH, supra note 403, at 118-22; Blanchflower & Freeman, supra note 481, at 57-60; Henry S. Farber, The Recent Decline of Unionization in the United States, 238 SCIENCE 915, 916-i9 (2987).
Continued managerial anti-unionism not only undermined employers' acceptance of collectivization. It also discouraged established but weak unions from supporting the diffusion of
cooperative experiments for fear that management would use them as union-subverting mechanisms. See, e.g., COLE, supra note 9, at 15o-5I.
489 Signs of a managerial counter-offensive against the strengthened labor movement that
emerged from World War II were visible immediately after the war and increasingly prevalent
throughout the i95os. See MIKE DAVIS, PRISONERS OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 104, 121-23
(1986); HARRIS, supra note 246, at 118-27; HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY C. BROWN, FROM THE
WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 293-94 (950).
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Wagner's optimistic vision of a legislatively nurtured culture of cooperation underestimated "the deep-seated resistance toward unions
that historically has been embedded in the belief system of U.S.
managers" - more deeply embedded than in any other industrial
490
nation's business culture.
American management's adversarial psychology is traceable in part
to certain tightly intertwined historical institutional patterns. First,
the enterprise-level decentralization of American industrial relations
raised the competitive economic stakes for any individual firm targeted
for unionization in an otherwise non-unionized industry, compared
with the industry-wide collective bargaining of many European economies. 49 1 Second, the pre-eminence of mass production in American
industrial organization placed a premium on centralized managerial
discretion to coordinate decomposed production tasks. 492 Finally, the
historically fortuitous collision between strong craft unionism and
management's drive for high-throughput, mass production in the late
nineteenth century implanted lasting managerial commitments to deskill production labor and to retract discretionary authority from the
4 93
shopfloor to the managerial strata.
But, ironically, Wagner also underestimated management's awareness and fear of the potency of the very process of cultural change he
extolled and urged among workers. Many American managers, before
and after the New Deal, were convinced that the normative legitimation of collective bargaining risked opening a cultural Pandora's
Box. Workers' appetite for decisionmaking authority, organizational
4 94
democracy, and redistributive power would grow with the eating.
Precisely for that reason, the bulk of interwar managers opposed even
the limited collective dealing of company unionism, until the latter
became the only apparent strategy to block independent unionism after
4 95
the enactment of section 7(a) of the Recovery Act.
Concurrently, and in part as a consequence, Wagner overestimated
the new legal regime's long-term capacity or willingness to reduce the
(substantially management-generated) transaction costs incurred by
workers who attempt to move to a labor-share-enhancing but profit-

io, at 14.
491 See, e.g., Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor
490 KocHAN, KATz & MCKENZIE, supra note

Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1400-58 (1971); Rogers, supra note 8, at 8o-98.
492 See, e.g., PIORE & SABEL, supra note io, at 64.
493 See LAZONICK, supra note 473, at 292-98, 302-03.
494 See Barenberg, supra note 28.

495 According to one Wagner adviser, most managers believed that any such liberalization
would "give the workmen exaggerated notions of their rights and management desires to keep
the workers' minds off their rights." SUMNER SCHLICHTER, THE TURNOVER IN FACTORY LABOR

319 (1921). On management's last-ditch resort to company unionism after the passage of § 7(a),
see, for example, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, cited above in note 16, at 6-30.
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reducing unionized state. 496 The relative loosening of business constraints on labor law policy - the structural veto - during the
Depression years that had permitted such radical legislation did not
4 97
last into the post-war period.
Each of these two developments - de-unionization and the new
cooperative workplace - highlights the ambivalence and tension in
Wagner's own thinking. The success of management's aggressive antiunion campaign, combined with heightened capital mobility and international competitiveness, pose the basic question implicitly explored
by a number of recent commentators: 498 Can the labor law regime
secure free worker communication and choice of workplace governance modes, against a background regime of property, contract, and
corporate law, and a background distribution of endowments, which
afford strategic control of enterprises to suppliers of capital? The
emergence of the new cooperative workplace reraises, in a dramatically changed historical context, the fundamental question that Wagner's political economy and legislative program attempted to answer:
What legal regime can best encourage collaborative, high-trust workplaces, and simultaneously empower and safeguard workers against
"domination," understood as illegitimate instrumental coercion and
endogenous shaping of workers' preferences and interests? Even if
his specific institutional vision remains unfulfilled, Wagner's progressivism and its current variants at least provide a general theoretical
framework for addressing the latter question. 4 99
496 The leading empirical studies agree that unionization raises labor's and reduces capital's
distributive share, even if those studies disagree about whether unionization raises productivity.
See, e.g., FiREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 388, at 162-9o (arguing that unions raise productivity); HIRSCH, supra note 403, at 35-66, 9i-Iii, 115-25 (arguing that evidence of unions'
effect on productivity is inconclusive). As noted above at p. 1474, Wagner also did not anticipate
the heightened mobility of capital and its effects in the postwar period.
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Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947 and defeating the Labor Law Reform bill of 1978. See
HARMS, supra note 65, at 118-27; MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 489, at 281-96; Weiler, supra
note 29o, at 1776-81. The primary goal of the latter bill was simply to enhance enforcement
of the basic goal of the original Wagner Act - that is, reducing the transaction costs of workers'
choice to unionize - through stronger penalties for employer unfair labor practices. See id. at
1770.
498 For a sample of this voluminous literature, see MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF
ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 115-179 (1987); JOHN J. LAWLER, UNIONIZATION

AND DEUNIONIZATION I-6 (199o); and Paul C. Weiler, Hard Times for Unions: Challenging
Times for Scholars, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. io5, io3I (1991) (responding to Robert J. LaLonde
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499 See Barenberg, supra note 28.

